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Abstract 
This thesis examines the possible `greening' of the Japanese aid system in 
order to appreciate such change in a little studied yet important Northern 
donor. It considers how the policies and procedures of Japanese 
international cooperation may have been altered to account for 
environmental concerns in the 1990s. It does so with reference to two 
Philippine projects: a `traditional' development project and a new 
environmental project. The theoretical framework combines a political 
ecology perspective with insights from the foreign aid and implementation 
literatures. The empirical research involved fieldwork in both Japan and the 
Philippines using qualitative methodologies, namely in-depth interviews (98 
formal interviews), documentary analysis and direct observation. 
Following the introduction, theoretical framework, and methodology 
(Chapters 1-3), Chapter 4 presents an overview of the Japanese aid system. 
Chapter 5 then examines a traditional development project (kaihatsu-enjyo): 
the San Roque Multipurpose Project involving the building of a large dam 
in Luzon. Here, the empirical analysis revealed some evidence of limited 
greening in aid procedures. Yet, the overall result was seen to be `business 
as usual' - with environmental concerns peripheral to the evolution of this 
project. In contrast, Chapter 6 assesses a new environmental project (kankyö 
enjyo): the Sustainable Environmental Management Project embracing 
tourism and environmental conservation in Palawan. In this case, the 
empirical analysis highlighted a relatively higher level of project greening, 
as indeed was initially anticipated given its `environmental' project status. 
Nonetheless, this thesis argued that both projects were riddled with political 
compromise and ambiguity such that a definitive assessment of the greening 
of Japanese aid is unlikely. 
Chapter 7 summarises the empirical findings while also highlighting the 
conceptual contributions of the thesis. In this regard, the thesis has 
demonstrated the utility of an analytical approach to political ecology that 
stresses the contextual sources of environmental change - notably, in 
relation to the under-studied dynamics of North-South bilateral aid relations. 
It has also suggested the value of a `cultural politics' perspective in political 
ecology, as the cultural politics of specific donor countries (here Japan) is 
related to unequal power relations between donor and recipient as well as 
between different types of actor, as aid flows crisscross national boundaries. 
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Glossary 
Japanese terms 
anken-hakkutsu project excavation 
bakufu feudal government or shogunate 
chösadan research team 
daitöa-kyöei-ken co-prosperity sphere 
dokenkokka construction state 
enjyo aid 
gaiatsu external or foreign pressure 
jijyo-doryoku self-help effort 
kaihatsu-chösa development study 
kaihatsu-enjyo development aid 
kankö tourism 
kankyö-enjyo environmental aid 
kankyö-hairyo environmental consideration 
kankyö-hairyo-kakunin verification of environmental consideration 
kankyö-hogo environmental protection 
kankyö-hozen environmental conservation 
kankyö jissa field (or environmental) investigation 
kankyö-shinsa environmental appraisal 
kanyo (passive) involvement 
keiretsu Japanese business conglomerate 
keizai-kyöryoku economic cooperation 
kokueki self economic interest or national interest 
kokusai-köken international contribution 
kokusai-kyöryoku international cooperation 
köryü interaction 
the relations between the client and the kou to otsu no kankei contractor 
marukosu giwaku Marcos scandal 
meiwaku inconvenience or trouble to others 
minkatsu jigyö privatisation project 
okami something or somebody high above 
oshitsuke-gamashi Intrusive 
purofai project finding 
sanka (active) participation 
sögö-shösha general trading company 
taiwa dialogue 
temiyage-anken gift project 
torikomi inclusion 
töshi investment 
yen-shakkan bilateral yen loans 
yon-shoöchö-taisei four-ministry consultation 
yösei-shugi Request-based approach 
big family-controlled banking and industrial 
zaibatsu combines of modern Japan 
zaikai-gaikö business diplomacy 
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Philippine Terms 
Barangay 
Ibaloi 
Ilocano 
Luzon 
Tagalog 
the smallest administrative district in 
the Philippines 
an indigenous ethnic group found in 
the mountains of the Cordillera 
Central in the Northern Luzon, and 
their language 
the dominant ethnic group in 
Northern Luzon, and their language 
the main island of the Philippines 
the major language of the 
Philippines which a direct of Central 
and Southern Luzon including 
Manila, or the people who speak the 
language 
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Acronym 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
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Philippines 
ECA Export Credit Agency 
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EO Executive Order 
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FOEJ Friends of the Earth Japan 
GEF Global Environment Facility 
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IIWMP-PMO IIWMP Project Management Office 
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IRN International Rivers Network 
JACSES Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society 
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
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JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
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MLIT Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, Japan 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOF Ministry of Finance, Japan 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
MOT Ministry of Transport Japan 
MPS Master Plan Study 
NEDA 
National Economic Development Authority, 
Philippines 
NEPC National Environment Protection Council 
NGO Nongovernmental Organisation 
NIA National Irrigation Administration 
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NPC National Power Corporation, the Philippines 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
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PCI Pacific Consultant International 
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RWESA Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia 
the 
and 
SAPROF Special Assistance for Project Formation 
SEMP Sustainable Environmental Management Project in 
Northern Palawan 
SEP Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan 
SRMP San Roque Multipurpose Project 
SRPC San Roque Power Corporation 
TIMMAWA 
Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway ti Agno 
(Alliance of Peasants to Free the Agno) 
TOR Terns of Reference 
UN United Nations 
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs 
SDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
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USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development 
W\\TF World Wildlife Fund 
Chapter One 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the possible nature and extent of greening in bilateral 
official finance by way of a case study of Japanese international cooperation 
to the Philippines in the 1990s. ' The role of foreign aid as a key component 
of North-South relations in the contemporary era is well known (Keohane 
and Levy 1996; Raffer and Singer 1996; Wilkinson 2004). However, less 
well understood is the way in which this process may have been shaped by 
the growth of environmental concerns since the late 1980s. Even less is 
known about the shifting operation of Japanese international cooperation in 
this regard - despite Japan's leading role as an aid provider in the 1990s. As 
such, this thesis aims to shed light on this important if little understood 
aspect of North-South relations. 
The present chapter introduces the concerns of this thesis. It first presents 
the general background on the greening of aid by briefly looking at the key 
trends in the decade that is our main focus - the 1990s. The remainder of the 
chapter then addresses the main research aims and questions of this study, 
briefly introduces the political ecology perspective, and explains the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1. `Green' Trends and Aid 
The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development or 
the so-called Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) was a key impetus for the 
introduction of the concept of sustainable development into the global 
political arena (Redclift 1987; Hajer 1995; Victor 2006). This `green' 
paradigm shift led in the 1990s to a proclaimed decade of `green 
development' based on a new type of global environmentalism. Central here 
was the holding of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, at which 118 heads of state 
gathered to discuss how to tackle diverse global environmental crises. The 
1 In this thesis, and in keeping with Japanese practice in particular, aid is used here 
interchangeably with 'international cooperation' and `official finance' to denote a broad 
classification of foreign assistance encompassing various mixes of grants and loans (see 
Chapter 4). 
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upshot of the 1992 `Earth Summit' was a rush by nation-states to represent 
themselves as key environmental actors even as the outline of global 
environmental governance took shape (Miller 1995; Taylor 1999; Frank et 
al. 2000). 
The Earth Summit thus kicked off a new era of `sustainable development' in 
which policy-related objectives were to reconcile "human use of the 
environment with the latter's long-term conservation" (Bryant 1996: 341). 
This particular policy initiative was translated into an action plan, Agenda 
21 (and its national-level versions), that emphasised the importance of 
protecting local and national natural environments. As climate change and 
ozone depletion were increasingly recognised, there was seen to be an 
urgent need to conserve the global commons from harm. In short, 
environmental problems rose to prominence in national and international 
environmental policy making to an unprecedented extent in the 1990s 
(Adams 2001; Adger et al 2001; Keely and Scoones 2003; Clapp and 
Dauvergne 2005). 
Just as the ideology-based concerns of the Cold War had a huge impact on 
foreign aid policy between the late 1940s and the end of the 1980s (Raffer 
and Singer 1996; Patterson 1997), so too the rise of the sustainable 
development paradigm in the 1990s would seem to have had a comparable 
impact (World Bank 1995,1997; OECD 1997). Northern donors thus paid 
greater attention to the environmental aspects of their aid, commonly 
referred to as the `greening' of aid (Conroy and Litinoff 1988; Buttel 1993; 
Wade 1997; Goldman 2004). `Greening' is clearly a political process in that 
it requires existing policies and practices to be changed (even if only at the 
rhetorical level). Indeed, during the 1990s, most aid providers 
enthusiastically and unequivocally committed themselves to integrating the 
concept of sustainable development into policy and practice. 
Although "the display of development agencies and environmental groups 
dancing to the `sustainable development' tune in the 1990s is remarkable" 
(Adams 2001: 3), this `green ' trend was not built in a day. Rather, it had 
been pushed along due to persistent environmentalist pressure on aid 
13 
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providers throughout the 1980s, in the full glare of politically influential 
media reporting. As official awareness was thereby promoted, aid agencies 
accordingly increased their budget allocation to `environment-friendly' 
projects while providing stricter environmental guidelines and criteria for 
aid provision in general. Thus, for example, environmental impact 
assessments and social impact assessments were held to be critical to 
successful aid delivery because of a new sustainable development related set 
of norms in the aid deliberation process (JICA 1990,1992; OECD 1992, 
1997; World Bank 1992; UNCED 1993; Swiss Agency for Development 
and Co-operation 1994; OECF 1997,1999). Also, donors have increased 
environmental staff in order to strengthen institutional capacity for 
environment-related operations (World Bank 1995; JICA 1996b, 2001 a; 
JBIC 2003c). 
Evidence of the impact of the Rio-inspired agenda could also be seen in the 
increased percentage of `green' aid as a proportion of total aid dispersed 
during the 1990s, even though total Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
disbursement had started deceasing after the collapse of the USSR and the 
consequent end of the Cold War in the late 1980s (Katada 1997; Patterson 
1997; Grant and Nijman 1998). Indeed, the latter declined considerably in 
comparison with the rate of world economic growth in the last decade of the 
20th century (LTNDESA and UNCTAD 1999). Notwithstanding this 
situation, the percentage of total world ODA (including both bilateral and 
multilateral aid) allocated to projects for the conservation and `sustainable' 
management of natural resources continued to rise; the share of funds 
allocated to `green' aid thus rose from under 19 percent of total ODA in 
1983 to about 26 percent in 1996 (Porter et al 2000; UNDESA 2001). 2 
Northern donors thereby recognised the role of the environment in their aid 
allocations, with environmental aspects being `mainstreamed' from project 
formulation to implementation (JICA 1988,1992,2001 a; World Bank 1995; 
OECD 1997,2001,2002a). However, there arises a fundamental question 
here - namely, were these green promises kept? After all, most global and 
2 The share of funding to environmental ODA projects dropped to 20.8 percent in 1997 due 
to the financial crisis in East Asia and Russia - and yet, nonetheless stayed at an average of 
over 20 percent in the latter part of the 1990s (UNDESA 2001). 
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national environmental problems remain as uncompromising as ever today 
(U. S. Department of State 2002; Blair 2004). Indeed, a growing band of 
environmentalists and NGOs have loudly criticised the much heralded green 
commitment of the 1990s as being mere political rhetoric, also stressing 
how environmental degradation has become worse in the interim (e. g. WWF 
2002; Bosshard 2004; Victor 2006). Reports by the NGO Friends of the 
Earth are typical here in as much as they point out that the 1990s was a 
decade lacking in `real' action for sustainable development (FOE 2002a, 
2002b). 
1.2. Examining the Greening of Aid 
The criticisms of environmentalists and NGOs trigger serious questions 
about the extent and significance of the greening of aid in the post-Rio 
world, and it is these questions that constitute the heart of this thesis. 
Despite these criticisms, `greening' is still described in many official circles 
as one of the striking policy trends of the 1990s, and is seen, for example, 
to have been partially successful in multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank (Watts and Peet 2004; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). In contrast 
to donor assessments (e. g. World Bank 1992,1995,1997,2000a; OECD 
1997; JICA 2001a; JBIC 2003b, 2003c), there has been relatively little 
independent scholarly study of this widely proclaimed process - particularly 
of its implications for the quality of aid via the careful assessment of donor 
compliance with `green' policies in the form of project design and 
implementation (Greeley 1991; Davies 1992; Fox and Brown 1998; Horta 
2000). This lacuna is particularly true in the case of bilateral aid which has 
benefited from fewer in-depth analyses than multilateral aid (especially the 
World Bank, see Goldman 2005). Thus, it is important to interrogate the 
possible greening of bilateral aid closely, in particular in relation to specific 
examples of the practices of the official aid industry set within the context 
of the broader political economy of donor interests. 
This thesis pursues that aim by assessing Japanese international cooperation 
with the Philippines. It considers two central questions in doing so. First, to 
what extent and in what ways has Japan's bilateral international cooperation 
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process become `greener' in terms of the procedures formally adopted to 
guide such greening? Second, what specific devices and tools have been 
used to `mainstream' the environment in aid projects and what effect have 
they had in terms of project delivery? To do this research, the study will 
focus on policy documents and other official statements associated with 
planning and implementation tools (such as environmental guidelines) as 
well as in-depth interviews with participants and direct observation (see 
Chapter 3). 
The focus of this thesis on Northern donors in general, and Japan in 
particular, is key if we are to understand the shifting power dynamics of 
North-South environmental relations at a time when such relations are 
becoming even more critical to global environmental governance (Miller 
1995; Clapp and Dauvernge 2005). Indeed, it is argued that since "... the 
ideas, norms, blueprints and personnel determining `development' come in 
large part from the North, notably by a few donor(s) ... then one must 
indeed study those ... as closely as possible" 
(Gasper 1996: 165). It is, 
therefore, vital to understand the way Northern donors pursue and practice 
the possible greening of their aid and the way that they `conceptualise' 
recipients in this process (Ferguson 1990; Goldman 2005). 
Yet, Northern donors have different interests and political cultures - with 
likely knock-on effects in terms of how aid is conceptualised and delivered 
in the first place, let alone how `greening' is anticipated and incorporated in 
the aid process. It is thus essential to understand specific donor political 
cultures (and relations with recipient countries) here. As such, this thesis 
examines the under-studied case of Japan's international cooperation 
(kokusai-kyöryoku); the importance of this particular donor is attested by the 
fact that Japan was the world's largest donor throughout the 1990s 
(Castellano 2000; MOFA 2004a). However, Japanese aid has always been 
an ambiguous process, especially given that the Japanese government 
integrates ODA with other official finance under the banner of `international 
cooperation' (a key term moreover never defined by that government, see 
Chapter 4). Thus, this thesis needs to situate Japan's bilateral international 
cooperation within the post-1945 context of its wider political and economic 
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relations with East and Southeast Asia -a region that has traditionally 
received the biggest share of Japanese aid. More specifically, the focus is on 
the Philippines, long a key recipient of Japanese assistance. 
In this particular bilateral relationship, we will consider, in turn, two types 
of project in order to gauge to what extent and in what manner Japan's 
international cooperation process has been `reoriented' (Nuscheler et al 
2000) and `greened'. One project is a mainstream development project 
(kaihatsu-enjyo) where it is plausible to expect at least some degree of 
`greening' to have occurred, while the other project (kankyö-enjyo) is more 
centrally concerned with the environment, and is hence anticipated to show 
substantial greening. 
The concerns of this thesis reflect the wider sentiment that environmental 
changes in the South must be appreciated in the context of North-South 
relations (Chambers 1988; Bryant and Parnwell 1996; Adams 2001). Indeed, 
it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to deal with ecology and 
international (as well as national) political economy as separate fields 
(Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). It is essential 
therefore to situate the research questions of the present study in the context 
of a theoretical approach that recognises the inextricable linkages between 
ecological and political-economic dimensions in North-South dynamics. 
To this end, a political ecology perspective is pursued in this thesis in order 
to shed light on and appreciate the possible greening of the aid process in 
Japan-Philippines bilateral relations. The political ecology perspective 
suggests that environmental changes not only reflect neo-liberal policy 
imperatives but, in broader terms, are manifestations of the political- 
economic forces of global capitalism (Bryant and Bailey 1997; McCarthy 
and Prudham 2004). Research in this field (considered in more detail in 
Chapter 2) tends to stress how a series of highly unequal power 
relationships - upon which the present international system was founded 
and continues to operate - influences policy options and life chances in both 
North and South, among both rich and poor, and for ruler and ruled (Peet 
and Watts 2004; Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). Such relations of 
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inequality are anticipated between donor and recipient in the context of 
Japan-Philippines relations (Ofreneo 1993; Dauvergne 1997; Tsuda and 
Yokoyama 1999; Bryant 2005). 
This thesis provides one of the first in-depth studies of the political ecology 
of the bilateral aid industry. While work has been done on multilateral aid 
(e. g. Rich 1994; Fox and Brown 1998; Bosshard 2004; Goldman 2005) as 
well as on global aid discourses (Adger et al. 2001), the bilateral aspect has 
tended to receive far less attention. Yet, bilateral aid is of immense 
importance to the shaping of `politicised environments' and, indeed, is seen 
to depict donor interests more clearly than multilateral aid ever does (Arase 
1995). In other words, through analysis of the specific Japan-Philippines aid 
relationship, wider issues in political ecology as well as debates on 
sustainable development in particular are taken into account. 
Above all, political ecology puts the spotlight on the role of politics 
(including policy) in environmental change. Thus, it is asserted that "the 
substance of politics - decisions and commands, compliance and 
enforcement ... - (are) inescapably implied in almost every ecosocial 
problem" (Deutsch 1977: 359). Since this research considers the 
environmental aspect of Japanese bilateral cooperation with the Philippines 
as a politicised `ecosocial problem', the greening of Japanese aid can be 
studied most fruitfully by examining the cohesion (or not) between aid 
policy - that involves `decisions and commands' - and aid projects on the 
ground, which will assist assessment of the `compliance and enforcement' 
capacity of the former. As Gasper (1996: 160) correctly claims: "policies 
cannot be judged primarily by their good intentions or supposed inherent 
worthiness regardless of actual performance". In short, policy reform, 
including the `greening' of aid, is best studied via actual performance 
(Rondinelli 1993) and the transmission belt between decision makers and 
practice, that is, the policy process. 
This study will therefore trace the policy process of Japan's bilateral aid, 
including its administration, organisation and policy procedures, by 
analysing criteria, guidelines, rules and specifications for projects while 
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relating this analysis to the assessment of two particular types of projects. 
As mentioned briefly above, these types of projects are kaihatsu-enjyo 
(development aid) and kankyö-enjyo (environmental aid), and they are 
considered in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
The first of these relates to an `old style' development project that was 
claimed by the Japanese government to have been subject to greening in the 
1990s. This, the San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam (in Northern Luzon), will 
be investigated to assess how the greening process may have taken place in 
a development assistance (kaihatsu-enjyo) project. Mega-dam projects like 
this one have displaced millions of people and damaged countless 
ecosystems around the world, leading some to describe them as `lethal aid' 
(Erler cited in Raffer and Singer 1996: 4). Given this dubious social and 
ecological reputation both internationally and in the Philippines, our first 
case study project is notably concerned with the following questions: First, 
to what extent and how has Japan's policy on development aid changed as a 
result of post-Rio `green' trends surrounding sustainable development and 
biodiversity conservation? Second, to what extent and in what ways has 
Japan's traditional aid project applied `fortified' environmental guidelines 
from `green' aid policy at the implementation level? Third, how well has the 
project conducted environmental assessment as a key procedure? Finally, 
how has the politics surrounding decision-making in both Tokyo and Manila 
affected the life of this project in relation to environmental issues? 
The second project, the Sustainable Environmental Conservation Project in 
Northern Palawan, will be assessed as a specific environmental aid (kankyö- 
enjyo) project. The degree of `greenness' of this environmental aid will be 
analysed and assessed at different stages of the project. This second case 
study project will be used to investigate various questions. First, how is the 
precise nature of Japan's environmental aid as well as post-Rio `green' 
trends manifested in the contours of this project? Second, what are the 
objectives of environmental aid, what tools and procedures are used to 
realise them, and how coherent is this effort? Third, to what extent does 
project design and delivery mean that the conservation objective is 
achievable? Finally, what specifically environmental concerns and 
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objectives, as opposed to standard development assistance interests, are 
addressed in the project? 
This thesis thus constitutes a study that is designed to interrogate the 
possible impact of greening trends in the 1990s on the aid sector, using a 
case study of Japan's international cooperation with the Philippines 
delivered through two types of aid project. The structure of the study is as 
follows. 
In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework is established in relation to a 
selective assessment of relevant literatures including political ecology, 
foreign aid, implementation and environmental assessment studies, which in 
turn inform the empirical portions of this thesis. The first theoretical element 
addresses the political ecology perspective and provides an appropriate way 
in which to frame the aid process in terms of `contextual sources' of 
environmental change and unequal power relations. The second theoretical 
element that is considered relates to a critical assessment of the foreign aid 
literature linked to the possible `greening' of aid in the 1990s. Finally, the 
third theoretical element that is addressed encompasses work on policy 
implementation, with a particular focus on the role of projects in aid 
delivery. 
This discussion is followed in Chapter 3 by an explanation of the 
methodology used in this thesis. In particular, the chapter considers 
qualitative methodologies, a case study approach, and data collection 
techniques including in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and direct 
observation. This chapter also discusses difficulties that were encountered in 
conducting the research as well as matters pertaining to research ethics and 
translation. 
Chapter 4 then provides the necessary empirical context by setting out the 
key elements of the Japanese aid sector in general through a brief historical 
analysis of international cooperation (kokusai-kyöryoku). This overview of 
the Japanese aid policy is linked to the possible `greening' of policy, 
especially in relation to the three key agencies involved - namely Japan 
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International Cooperation Agency, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
and Export-Import Bank of Japan. Finally, this chapter considers Japanese 
aid in relation to the Philippines in particular, thereby highlighting how that 
relationship is shaped by political and economic interests in both countires. 
Chapter 5 analyses the kaihatsu-enjyo (development aid) type of project, 
namely the San Roque Multipurpose Project. In order to evaluate the degree 
of greening in the project in terms of the procedural framework, this chapter 
follows the three stages of the environmental assessment procedure (namely, 
environmental consideration, verification of environmental consideration, 
and monitoring) where both the donor and the recipient are supposed to 
make efforts to ensure that environmental concerns are appropriately 
incorporated into the project. This chapter also investigates how the aid 
project and its environmental assessment process have been influenced by 
the political and economic decisions of successive Philippine leaders in a 
manner that contradicts any notion of `rational' development. 
Chapter 6 assesses the kankyö-enjyo type of scheme, that is the Sustainable 
Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan. This chapter will 
investigate how the greening process may have differed from that of a 
traditional development aid project by highlighting tools and procedures 
used in this first Japanese environmental aid project in the Philippines. This 
case study unfolds a complex picture that is one shaped by such things as 
global environmental discourse, fragmented aid delivery and donors and 
recipient interests, which again underscores the importance of political 
economy in the bilateral relationship involved. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis findings and assesses their wider 
implications for future research. By revisiting the two projects considered in 
Chapters 5 and 6, this final chapter summarises the key findings - the three 
key stages of the environmental assessment process are thereby evaluated in 
order to gauge the degree of commitment of the main Japanese aid agencies 
to project greening. Then the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of a 
future research agenda related to the topic of the greening of aid in the light 
of the thesis findings. 
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Chapter 2. Theorising the `Greening' of Aid 
Chapter 2 presents the relevant theories and concepts that serve as the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. Through the theoretical framework, 
this chapter brings together various literatures from the fields of political 
ecology, foreign aid, and policy implementation in order to facilitate 
examination of the main concerns of this study - namely, to assess to what 
extent and in what ways the `greening' of aid occurred in the 1990s using a 
Japanese case study. 
The history of aid-linked development has certainly been controversial. 
Thus, Bill Adams (2001: 381) has pointed out that development is "what is 
done to [human communities] by states and their `bankers' and `expert' 
agents, in the name of ... national integration, economic growth or 
thousands of other slogans". With foreign aid, Northern states and their 
allies (such as international financial institutions and Northern banks) are 
seen to have directed development `in the name of progress. ' Yet, such aid 
has been frequently criticised by a variety of scholars and activists as being 
nothing more than an instrument designed to plunder both natural 
environments and poor people in the South rather than being something that 
provides meaningful help (Adams and Solomon 1985; Escobar 1995; FOEJ 
2002b). Hence, foreign aid is undoubtedly a subject fit for political ecology 
analysis as it demonstrates unequal power relations between North and 
South notably through adverse social and environmental impacts on the 
latter. 
This thesis represents one of the first in-depth studies of the political 
ecology of bilateral aid. In so doing, it draws on a diverse set of literatures 
encompassing political ecology, foreign aid and policy implementation that 
are selectively considered here. Specifically, the chapter begins with an 
assessment of the political ecology perspective and considers in particular 
how the discussion of aid flows illustrates aspects of the `contextual 
sources' of environmental change that have hitherto gone under-explored. 
The second theoretical element of the thesis is then explored by way of a 
critical assessment of foreign aid literature and the possible `greening' of aid 
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in the 1990s. Here, the multiple dimensions of greening are considered in 
relation to the aid process. The third aspect to the theoretical framework 
relates to processes of aid policy implementation - implementation theory, 
project implementation and environmental assessment processes in 
particular are highlighted. In aggregate, the framework underscores the 
complex and ambiguous nature of the `greening' of the aid process when 
understood in terms of the unequal power relations and institutional interests 
that comprise that process. 
2.1. A Political Ecology Perspective 
As a research field that gained momentum in the 1980s, political ecology 
has sought to provide a multi-faceted understanding of human- 
environmental interaction. In particular, in its most well known text, it was 
defined as combining "the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined 
political economy ... encompass[ing] the constantly shifting dialectic 
between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and 
groups within society itself' (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 17). "Land- 
based" resources were later widened to "environment" in order to provide a 
fuller account of "the political sources, conditions and ramification of 
environmental change" (Bryant 1992: 13). 
Political ecology developed originally in reaction to the apolitical approach 
that was seen to be characteristic of mainstream development and 
environmental studies during the 1970s and 1980s (Peet and Watts 2004; 
Neumann 2005). To consider political questions seriously, political 
ecologists understood environmental change as a manifestation of the 
unequal power relations in which environmental costs and benefits are 
unequally distributed (Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). As a critical research 
project, attention was focused on unsustainable and inequitable resource use 
and ecological conditions mostly in the South, and that were caused by a 
complex political economy linking state predations and capitalist 
profiteering (e. g. Blaikie 1985; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Peluso 1992; 
Dauvergne 1997). This situation was seen to be a decidedly grim one that 
derived from both colonial and post-colonial practices (Guha 1989; Robbins 
2004; Neumann 2005). Bryant and Bailey (1997: 7-8) thus observed that "a 
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colonial legacy of integration in a global capitalist economy, natural 
resource dependency, environmental degradation and centralised political 
control have conditioned environmental use and conflict in postcolonial 
times. That legacy in turn continues to distinguish the Third World from 
elsewhere". Indeed, and as Escobar (1995) notably shows, in spite of a half 
century of `development', the vast majority of people there are still living in 
relative poverty and face intractable livelihood-based environmental 
conflicts (see Peet and Watts 2004). 
For political ecologists, politics and environment are therefore everywhere 
thoroughly intertwined; environmental issues need to be studied in the 
context of unequal power structures, as well as institutional dynamics and 
discourses' (Escobar 1995; Harvey 1996; Bryant 2002; Neumann 2005). 
Recognising the importance of the political in political ecology reflects an 
attempt to appreciate Southern environmental changes and problems within 
the multi-scale political and economic contexts in which they arise. There is 
then, a `politicised environment', a concept that recognises "the complex 
ways in which actors interact at the material and discursive levels over 
environmental questions" (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 47). Such an emphasis 
formed part of a `post-structural turn' in political ecology in the 1990s that 
involved a move away from the class-focused structuralism of Marxist 
political ecology in the 1980s (Bryant 2001; Neumann 2005). 
As the field of political ecology has matured, new issues and debates have 
emerged in recent years. One such debate in political ecology has been over 
the relative emphasis on politics as opposed to ecology in the analytical 
concerns of the field (Zimmer and Bassett 2003; Robbins 2004). Thus, 
while Peet and Watts (1996: 8) asserted that there was still "very little 
politics" in political ecology, Vayda and Walters (1999: 168) complained 
that too much stress was placed on political influences thereby `missing out' 
non-political factors (like ecology; see Walker 2005) let alone "the complex 
1 Discourse in general is defined as a shared meaning of a social phenomenon at various 
scales (local, national, international), which is (re)produced and transformed 
in forms of 
written or verbal statements (Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001). Discourse often 
involves 
shared myths and blueprints of the world. This thesis defines discourse as a set of ideas, 
concepts, and particular word patterns used notably in policy statements as well as 
knowledge upon which ideas and statements are based (see Adger et al. 2001; Bryant 1998, 
2002). 
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and contingent interactions of factors whereby environmental changes often 
are produced. " Yet, the response has been to argue that the field attempts to 
understand diverse social and environmental changes in their political and 
economic contexts - and not simply those reflecting political influence 
(Watts and Peet 2004; Neumann 2005). 
The practical political and ethical implications of political ecology have also 
been scrutinised. For example, the need for work on the contours of an 
`alternative' political economy (Horta 2000), a better understanding of the 
relationship between environmental science and politics (Forsyth 2003), and 
a more complex sense of the ethics of scholarship and teaching (Bryant and 
Jarosz 2004) have been stressed. Meanwhile, one scholar worries that 
"disassociation from the instruments of policy" is making political 
ecologists "less effective in actually informing policy and mobilizing their 
conceptual insights for real-world change" (Robbins 2003: 644). Finally 
debate has erupted over the framing of political ecology in terms of a 
First/Third World dichotomy. Thus, Walker (2003: 7) labels this practice 
"problematic" in so far as it leaves the field "poorly positioned to address ... 
broad-scale comparative questions". Instead, he asserts the need for a 
`regional approach' to present `a scale of analysis' that examines the 
commonalities as well as the particularities of environmental politics across 
the First and Third World divide (Walker 2003). Here, there is an echo of 
the `regional political ecology' proposed by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987). 
Indeed, Walker's claim here is exaggerated since a regional multi-scale 
approach has been embedded in the field from the start - an approach that 
has always addressed the inter-linkages of North and South in both past and 
present (e. g. Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Dauvergne 1997; 
Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Rocheleau et al. 1996; see also Zimmer 2006). 
`Chains of explanation' have bound together North and South in the 
research (Blaikie 1995), with much insight thereby provided on multi-scale 
power dynamics and environmental interaction. 
That said, there certainly is room for further in-depth study of specific 
North-South connections, given that this remains an under-developed aspect 
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to political ecology, especially `rich thick description' of the aid process. 
Indeed, that is a key aim of this thesis as it explores the specific mechanism 
of bilateral aid between Japan and the Philippines in order to gauge whether 
the `greening' of Japan's international cooperation has occurred. 
2.1.1. Conceptualising Aid as a Source of Environmental 
Change 
Detailed work on the impact of Northern states on Southern states and their 
environments has been patchy. While some overall assessments have been 
attempted (e. g. Maul 1992; Dauvergne 1997; Taylor 1999), the sheer 
complexity of the task has been off-putting and has meant that most political 
ecology work focuses largely on `local' impacts and dynamics (Brown and 
Purcell 2005; Robbins 2004; see Turner 2004; Warren et al. 2001). Yet, and 
given the importance of bilateral flows across North and South (see below), 
it is vital to study how a particular (Northern) state is linked through its aid 
policies to specific environmental interactions beyond its boundary in 
another (Southern) country setting. 
There is certainly a longstanding call for the study of "contextual sources of 
environmental change" as a key referent in political ecology, since it 
identifies "... the state policies, interstate relations, and global capitalism 
reflecting the growing impact of national and transnational forces on the 
environment in a world of increased political and economic 
interdependence" (Bryant 1992: 15; see also William 2000; Zimmerer and 
Bassett 2003). Compared with the amount of work done on the 
environmental performance of the state in domestic contexts, interstate 
sources of environmental change have been less explored in the political 
ecology literature (Bryant 1992; Robbins 2004; Clapp and Dauvergne 
2005). Saying this, some attention has been paid to interstate warfare and its 
ecological impacts (Harwell 1985; Westing 1988; Pittock 1989; Plant 1992; 
Thomas 1995; UNEP 1999; Austin 2000). Recent international crises in the 
Middle East encompassing notably the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the Iraq 
war in 2003 (Hoskins 1997; Bird Life International 2003a, 2003b; FOE 
2003a, 2003b) have underscored links between state-linked violence, 
resource struggles and environmental devastation (see also Le Billon 2001; 
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Global Witness 2003; Unruh et al. 2003). 
However, environmental change has been caused not only by such violent 
interstate practices. Indeed, non-violent interactions between states may 
even be a more important `contextual source' of environmental change. 
Trade and bilateral aid are key examples here. For the trade and 
environment interface, a great deal of attention has been paid to the 
multifaceted and usually adverse environmental impacts of diverse natural 
resource based trading relations such as logging, mining or pulp and paper 
(e. g. Casson 2000; Dauvergne 2001; Emberson-Bain 1994; Gedicks 2001; 
Goldsmith 1997; Karliner 1997; Lohmann 1996; Marchak 1995). In 
contrast, for the bilateral aid and environment interface, there is only a 
modest literature available, most of which has pinpointed the devastating 
socio-ecological consequences of aid for Southern recipients (e. g. Forrest 
1991; FOEJ 200b; Hayter 1989; Sumi 2004). The relative lack of attention 
to the environmental implications of bilateral aid is nonetheless surprising 
given that interaction between donor and recipient can result in adverse 
impacts on a scale that possibly even rivals those that arise from war (Sumi 
2004; The Reality of Aid Network 2004). 
One of the more interesting studies in this regard has been produced by 
Dauvergne (1997) who detailed some of the harmful direct and indirect 
environmental impacts of North-South bilateral state (and corporate) 
interaction. Using the concepts of `shadow ecology'2 and `patron-client 
politics', Dauvergne (1997) assessed foreign aid alongside others flows 
(corporate investment, technological transfer, trade) in order to show how 
Japanese bilateral relations adversely affected timber supplies and 
management in Southeast Asia. By focusing on the "largely unexplored 
terrain of the environmental impact of bilateral state relations" and 
identifying "political relations as a key force driving environmental 
degradation", Dauvergne (1997: 10) usefully marked out a terrain for further 
2 Natural resources in the developing countries are, out of economic necessity, often over- 
exploited to the advantage of the more powerful 
(i. e. richer) market players (as well as 
developing country economic and political elites); in most cases ecological capital is 
consumed in (or to the benefit of) 
developed countries, thousands of miles away from its 
country of origin. MacNeill et al. (1991) 
have referred to this phenomenon as the `shadow 
ecology' of an economy (see also 
Dauvergne 1997). 
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political ecology inquiry. Despite this, Dauvergne's study barely scratches 
the surface of the complex institutional dynamics at play. 
Foreign aid, as one element of a given donor state's external policy, reflects 
some of a state's priorities and practices, and at the same time, may 
precipitate environment change in recipient countries in the `South'. It is 
therefore a subject ripe for political ecology analysis. Nevertheless, this 
significant interstate source of environmental change must be situated in the 
broader context of global environmental politics and international political 
economy so as to underscore the complex history and links between 
global/regional political economy and environmental change in the South. 
2.1.2. Constructing Needs: Donor Interests and a 
Politicised Environment in the South 
It is often proclaimed, usually by Northern states themselves, that "donors 
expect no economic gain or political strategy advancement through foreign 
aid" (Patterson 1997: xx). Yet, this claim is simply not tenable. Indeed, 
foreign aid has always been highly political even when the immediate 
purpose of that aid has been to facilitate economic growth in a recipient 
country (Ferguson 1990; Arase 1995; Escobar 1995). Aid is constantly 
politicised and careful analysis reveals the firmly calculated behaviour of 
donors in pursuit of their national interests (Gounder 1994; Arase 1995; 
Fairman and Ross 1996; FOEJ 1997; Katada 1997; Adger et al. 2003). To 
appreciate this situation, and to set the scene for our consideration of the 
`greening' of aid as an integral element in the politicisation of Southern 
environments, we need to next provide a brief overview of the historical 
political economy of the aid industry. 
Much research has documented how foreign aid allocations have usually 
been determined by the economic/commercial interests and political or 
`strategic considerations' of donors rather than by recipients' needs (e. g. 
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Pronk 2001; Tuj an Jr. 2001). Factors such as 
former colonial ties and ongoing political alliances have been major 
determinants of aid flows. ' So long as donors' political and economic 
3 Among the big three bilateral donors (1970-1994), the U. S. has targeted about one third 
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interests shape aid flows, the donor-recipient relationship can never be one 
based on equality or mutual respect (although, the extent to which aid 
relations might ever be based upon donor-recipient equality is open to 
question). Indeed, foreign aid is often seen to represent an "extension of 
highly exploitative North-South relationships that either preserve or widen 
economic disparities between wealthy states and Third World countries" 
(Schraeder et al. 1998: 298-299). This sort of view has been important 
among neo-Marxists in particular who consider aid to be simply "another 
instrument of domination" by the North (Raffer and Singer 1996: 62). 
Foreign aid may have been formally set up to achieve economic 
development of the `underdeveloped Third World', yet it has been Southern 
recipients as well as their biophysical environments that have been 
politicised in order to serve donor interests (Escobar 1995). 
There is a long historical process at work here. The formation of capitalism 
in Western Europe (linked to the world economic system, see Wallerstein 
1974) necessitated plentiful raw materials for industrial development drawn 
from Asia, Africa and Latin America, notably in the guise of colonial role. 
Colonialism thus had a profound effect on the political, economic as well as 
socio-cultural features of the South. Of particular relevance to this thesis, 
colonialism caused "a series of political and administrative transformations 
that have conditioned resource exploitation" (Bryant and Parnwell 1996: 6) 
- with attendant significant environmental consequences in the South. 
After World War II, foreign assistance or `aid' to the decolonised `Third 
World' came in the form of loans and grants from former colonial powers 
keen to continue their hegemonic influence (Hayter 1989; Degnbol- 
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Thus, for example, between 1970 
and 1994, over 70 percent of British aid was spent in the `poorest countries' 
who happened to be former British colonies, and France disbursed 60 
percent of its aid contribution to its former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 
2000). Much of this money was spent on building infrastructure in Southern 
of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel; France has given overwhelmingly to its former 
colonies and allies in the UN; and in the case of Japan, countries that vote along with it in 
the UN and other international bodies (such as the International Whaling Commission) 
receive assistance and Japan's strategic alliances are notably built around investment and 
trade relationships (Alesina and Dollar 2000: 55-56; and see Chapter 4). 
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countries in aid of national economic development. Yet, most of these 
efforts benefited mainly powerful elite groups in control of the recipient 
state as well as Northern businesses commissioned for project work (for a 
contrasting view, see Hanabusa 1991; World Bank 1993; Franco-Rodriguez 
et al. 1998; Kosack 2003; McGillivraya and Ouattara 2005). At the same 
time, the provision of aid played a key role in profoundly disrupting and 
degrading Southern environments: as Northern donors defined `rational' and 
`objective' planning for Southern countries, the latter were "being 
incorporated into the world capitalist economy, even (as the most remote 
communities) ... [were] torn apart from their local context and redefined as 
`resources"' (Escobar 1995: 194). Indeed, as the resource-based identity of 
most Southeast Asian countries even today illustrates, 4 post-colonial aid 
entrenched the role of Southern states as raw material supply centres for 
Northern consumption (Dauvergne 1997; Hurst 2003). 
The Cold War also played a great role in shaping donor interest in aid. In 
January 1949, American President Truman's inauguration speech strongly 
advocated pro-capitalist developmental ism and used a "geographical 
imagination [that] transformed the post-War world into `undeveloped' and 
`prosperous' areas" (Dodds 2002: 3; see also Patterson 1997). Newly styled 
`Third World' recipients were politicised as an object of development and 
democratisation under a U. S. -led containment policy. Aid was thus seen to 
be an effective new `tool of statecraft' (Brown 2001) "to influence the 
recipients, to stabilise `friendly' governments ... and to 
keep countries 
within the `Free World"' (Raffer and Singer 1996: 58). 
The political and economic interest of donors is clearly demonstrated in aid 
flow during the Cold War. Foreign aid was allocated to resource abundant 
`independent' Third World countries to keep them as allies of the Western 
`Free World' rather than allies of the Eastern Communist block or `Second 
World' (Raffer and Singer 1996; Patterson 1997). The Clay Report in 1963 
clearly demonstrated America's interests: "72 percent of total (military and 
4 The identification of countries by the former colonial rulers was based on the large-scale 
production of selected natural resources, such as Burma and Thailand with rice and teak, 
Java with coffee and sugar, Malaysia with palm oil and rubber, and the Philippines with 
sugar and coconuts (Bryant and Parnwell 1996). 
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economic) assistance" was disbursed to "allies and other countries on the 
Sino-Soviet border" (Ohlin 1966: 21). Indeed, as Wolf (1960: 283-284) 
highlighted, political and economic motives were paramount even as 
"humanitarian objectives are not, nor do they appear likely to be, prominent 
among the continuing objectives of US foreign aid". Therefore, "their 
importance in donors' realpolitik was minute at best" (Raffer and Singer 
1996: 62). 
It was not only the United States that mixed political interests with aid in 
this way. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Gennany) 
gave aid only to countries accepting the Hallastein Doctrine that specified 
that recipients were not to recognize the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) and the Berlin Clause that only allowed them to accept the West 
German view on divided Berlin (Raffer and Singer 1996; Degnbol- 
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). These requirements underpinned 
bilateral German aid (as well as multilateral European Economic 
Community aid) throughout the 1980s (Raffer and Singer 1996). At the 
same time it is important to note that the manifestation of the Cold War in 
the South was not simply a 'blueprint' imposed through superpower 
rivalries; instead, Third World leaders would often manipulate Cold War 
tensions, playing East and West off of each other, to achieve maximum 
gains in their own domestic political and/or economic interests (Gaddis 
1996). 
Aid policies required a new justification among the electorates of donor 
countries with the end of the Cold War. The rationale for post-Cold War aid 
notably took on a green hue. On the one hand, the concept of sustainable 
development was popularised by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (1987), while on the other hand the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992 officially affirmed the importance of sustainable 
development as the basis for a global partnership to combat global 
environmental threats (Grubb et al. 1993; Middleton et al 1993; Sachs 1993; 
Hajer 1995). As a global environmental management system was needed to 
regulate endangered global commons such as the oceans and the 
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atmosphere, the Third World or the `South' as it has increasingly been 
called, became the renewed focus of a (sustainable) development agenda 
(Escobar 1995). 
As such, successive waves of political intervention have constantly 
reinforced unequal power relations between the North and the South, 
notably in the sphere of foreign aid. Such intervention has been 
complemented and often reinforced by sweeping changes in the 
international political economy. Thus, a globalising capitalist economy has 
further intensified the uneven relations between 'developed' North and 'less 
developed' South. Indeed, as neo-liberalism has 'triumphed', inequalities 
have continued to prevail in a contemporary system based on resource 
exploitation, a highly inequitable international division of labour, mass 
consumerism in the North (as well as among the affluent in the South), and 
enhanced environmental degradation in the South (Escobar 1995; Peet and 
Watts 2004). This "expropriation process ... 
lies at the core of 
environmental destruction and continued poverty in developing countries"' 
(Turner 1991: 168). The shifting nature of foreign aid policy over the years 
thus demonstrates not only the shifting way Northern donors have 
conceptualised recipients, but also the way they have constructed and 
politicised their interests and Southern recipients' needs. 
2.2. `Greening' of Aid 
This chapter has so far highlighted the political ecology perspective in 
general and how that perspective can accommodate the aid process as a 
`contextual' source that links the political economy of aid and affected 
Southern politicised environments in particular. The second element in the 
theoretical framework of the thesis extends this discussion by addressing in 
a selective manner the literature on the possible greening of aid in the post- 
Cold War 1990s. 
By the late 1980s research had already begun to criticise the environmental 
impact of mega-development aid projects. Thus, investigative journalists, 
nongovernmental organisation (NGO) activists, environmentalists, and 
academics related their findings on environmental destruction 
directly to aid 
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projects (Adams and Solomon 1985; Adams 1990; Forrest 1991; Sumi 
1992; Wilks and Hildyard 1994). Meanwhile, the proclaimed greening of 
aid had begun to emerge as a trend at the same time. However, the greening 
process during the 1990s was discussed by some writers as a set of "striking 
trends ... with limited success" (Watts and Peet 2004: 4). There is indeed 
some dispute here - as considered in the following discussion. 
2.2.1. Definition 
There is, to begin with, debate over what 'greening' itself has meant. The 
term 'green' since the mid-1980s has increasingly been "used in politics, 
and then spreading as a ... friendly alternative to environment ... particularly 
in media discussion of development issues" (Barrow 1995: 285). In the field 
of foreign aid, it became closely related to the practical application of the 
sustainable development concept through aid programmes and projects 
(WCED 1987; OECD 1992,1997). The World Bank, for example, put 
greater emphasis on the 'greening' of aid, which led other aid donors to act 
in concert with the global 'greening' process (Wade 1997; William 2000; 
Goldman 2004,2005). 
As with `sustainable development', however, the term `greening' has meant 
many things to many people. As Hajer (1995: 13) pointed out, "the various 
actors have rather different social and cognitive commitments" over 
environmental issues. For example, World Bank professionals and `radical' 
academics are unlikely to share the same view (Potter 1994; cf. World Bank 
1995 and Escobar 1995), thus, while the former insist on `weak 
sustainability' as the correct path, the latter propose `strong sustainability' 
as the only solution (Pearce 1993; Neumayer 1999). 5 
Given that the term `green' does not have one straightforward definition, 
6 green' can be (and has been) appropriated in different ways to serve the 
5 There is much debate over 'weak' and 'strong' sustainability as a mechanism by which the 
present generation can compensate the 
future one through the transfer of capital (Pearce 
1993; Blowers and Glasbergen 1995). Weak sustainability believes human-made capital can 
substitute natural capital that is often non-renewable, while strong sustainability asserts 
there is a limit to the ability to substitute between ecological capital and 
human-made 
capital because of uncertainty and the 
irreversibility of natural capital (Pearce 1993; 
Neumayer 1999; for discussion of aid and sustainable development, see below). 
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interests of diverse actors (such as states, transnational corporations, NGOs, 
and grassroots actors) in the sphere of global environmental politics (HaJer 
1995). Due to the inter-subjectivity and multi -facetedness of its nature, the 
term 'green' thus connotes several "changeable, associative meanings" (Hall 
1993: 96) and encompasses a wide range of the issues involved in the 
development and environment fields (Carter 2001). Before looking at the 
'greening' of aid in the 1990s in more detaill it is important to examine 
further possible meanings of 'greening' as this bears on our later discussion 
of changes in aid. 
As discussed by many scholars, the word 'greening' is often defined in 
relation to various green social movements as a process by which 
environment-related symbols have become increasingly significant in the 
mainstream political and social arena (e. g. Barrow 1995; Buttel 1993; 
Merchant 1992; Porritt 1984; Spretnak and Capra 1985). Buttel's 
understanding is most pertinent here, though, as we relate the notion of 
greening to the process of foreign aid - especially since this thesis sees 
4greening' as a political process that is purportedly about how existing 
policies, institutions and practices are reformed (see Chapter 1). Thus, 
Buttel (1993: 12) specifies that "the greening of institutions and institutional 
practices [is] the trend towards environmental considerations being 
increasingly brought to bear in political and economic decisions, in ... 
scientific research institutions, in geopolitics, and so on" (see also Frank et 
al. 2000). This sort of basic definition is used in relation to the practices and 
policies of diverse international actors including, for instance, the European 
Union (Lenschow 2002a, 200b), the United Nations (Mensah 1996; 
Timoshenko and Berman 1996), the World Bank (Horta 1996; Wade 1997) 
and the World Trade Organisation (Weinstein and Charnovitz 2001). 
Indeed, it meshes well with developments in the 1990s (our main temporal 
focus in this thesis) when the sustainable development concept became 
increasingly popular with states around the world as well as leading 
international organisations as a possible basis for policy change (UNCED 
1993; Victor 2006; see below). 
This definition of the greening process is also somewhat akin to a parallel 
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discussion that surrounds the concept of ecological modernization (Adams 
2001). Ecological modernisation is defined as the discourse that "recognizes 
the structural character of the environmental problematique [but] 
nonetheless assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions 
can internalise care for the environment" (Hajer 1995: 25). Both ecological 
modernization and greening further relate to discursive and institutional 
dynamics whereby environmental considerations are intemalised in existing 
political, economic, and social institutions (Fairman and Ross 1996; 
McAfee 1999; Peet and Watts 2004). 
However, there are debates over the extent to which the push to go 'green' 
is internally or externally generated - of which discussion in turn links to 
reflexive modernisation (Beck et al 1994; Peet and Watts 2004). Reflexive 
modernization focuses on "the self-reflexive qualities of modernization and 
on the ways in which the ecological costs and consequences of capitalist 
modernity are built reflexively into modernity itself' (Peet and Watts 2004: 
21). It is important to acknowledge those arguments saying that 'greening' 
is not merely a product of symbolic events such as the Rio Earth Summit or 
of external pressure from NGOs since the late 1980s - although these have 
been undeniably significant (Fox and Brown 1998; William 2000; Maeda, 
6 interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004). It is true that externally driven 
factors accelerated the 'greening' process. Yet, 'green' shifts in institutional 
orientation have also "evolved over time" by being reflexive about the 
success and failure of past practices (Ondrik, interview, 2004). ' In this view, 
the greening process - internalising sustainable development as a key 
element - has proceeded as a result of donors being reflexive about 
donors' 
past experiences while being adaptive to externally driven criticism and 
pressure (William 2000; Maeda, interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004). 
6 The relation between 'greening' and reflexive modernisation was observed in my own 
research during an interview with ADB Philippines chief country officer Richard Ondrik on 
6 May 2004. He stressed the greening of aid in the 1990s was "not just (a product of) the 
Rio (Summit) which obviously had a great impact in many aspects (but also the ADB's) 
learning from the success and failure of past projects changed the policy. " (Ondnk, 
interview, 2004; see also William 2000). 
Most studies of the World Bank concluded that it was a simple 'adaptation' rather than 
institutional 'learning', which would be argued 
by many World Bank staff that their 
institutional greening process was "driven primarily by internal learning" (Fox and Brown 
1998: 11). 
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For most Northern donors, such reflexive behaviour is also linked to shifts 
in domestic environmental perceptions and politics. This can be seen, for 
example, in the case of Canada, Germany, Netherlands and the UK, 
(Lenschow 2002a, 2002b; OECD 2002b). However, in the case of Japan, it 
has been a slightly different story due to its culturally unique aid system (see 
Chapter 4). While a fuller discussion of Japan's 'green' background, 
especially vis-a-vis aid, is given in Chapter 4, here we will discuss the 
Japanese domestic environmental perceptions and politics in general and its 
relation to its aid practice. Japans domestic greening thus started in the 
early 1970s with an emphasis by government on brown issues and industrial 
pollution in particular (Ui 1992; Evans 1999; Schreurs 2002). This shift was 
due to the outbreak of pollution related diseases beginning in the late 1960s' 
that had led to a special session of the National Diet (Japan's parliament) in 
1971 called "k5gai kokkai (pollution session of National Diet)" (Ui 1992; 
Broadbent 1998). ' This series of events produced strict pollution regulations 
and also brought about major advances in Japan's environmental technology 
capacity (JBIC 2002d; Revell 2003). Along with these events, many 'green' 
related terms emerged such as kanky5-ni yasashT (environmentally friendly), 
chikyfi-ni yasashT (earth-friendly), eko (ecologial), which are frequently 
used by Japanese industries in describing their products or production 
processes (Toyota Motor Corporation 1992; Marubeni 1998; Honda Motor 
2002; see also Sugiyama and Imura 1999; Revell 2003). " 
This aspect of Japan's domestic `greening' process is reflected on Japan's 
aid priority in brown issues with a particular focus on industrial pollution 
(Evans 1999; Wong 2001). There are two pragmatic reasons for this 
tendency. The first reason relates to Japan's development of technology on 
industrial pollution/waste management from the 1980s that was then seen to 
8 Rapid industnalisation resulted in the four major pollution diseases: organic mercury 
poisoning in NIgata, Minamata by5 (mercury poisoning) in Minamata, Itai-itai 
by5 
(cadiurn-poisoning) in Toyama, and Yokkaichi zensoku (asthma) in Yokkaiich (Ui 1992; 
Mason 1999). 
9 It is interesting to note that the Japanese term 'k5gai' (pollution in English) literally means 
'harm to the public' (or public domain), which clearly has stronger moral implications 
associated with it than its English counter-part. Considering there Is an exact word 
for 
environmental pollution 'kanký, 6-osen% the use of the term 'k&gai' reflects a 
broader link to 
Japanese philosophy on nature and pollution (Ui 1992; see also Asquith and Kalland 1997). 
Toyota and Honda's advertisements use these terms and simultaneously emphasise their 
roles as global citizens that act on environmental conservation and sustainable 
development 
issues (Toyota Motor Corporation 1992; Honda Motor 2002) 
36 
Chapter Two 
be readily transferable to developing countries (Evans 1999; Mason 1999; 
Takayanagi 2003). The second concerns rapidly escalating environmental 
pollution in Japans top recipient countries in East and Southeast Asia that 
also directly affects Japan, such as the increased frequency and intensity of 
yellow sand storms (kousa) originating from China (Evans 1999; JBIC 
2000b; 2002c; Takayanagi, interview, 2003). 
However, and as diverse scholars point out, for the most part the greening of 
Japan's international cooperation policy was greatly influenced by the 
global greening process itself (JACSES 1996; Potter 1996; Imura and 
Schreurs 2005; see Chapter 4). This situation can be explained by two main 
factors. The first is that, by the very nature of aid, Japan's international 
cooperation policy is an external matter not a domestic one, not least as it is 
used as a foreign policy tool (Kusano 1993,1997; Orr and Koppel 1993; 
Komori 2002). Due to its peace constitution - stating the country's 
renunciation of war - Japanese aid has been regarded as a means to exert its 
influence on the international political arena (Auer 1990; Keddell 1993; 
lokibe 2003). By way of pursuing its political and economic interests, post- 
war Japanese aid policy has been described as promoting exports via tied 
aid, fostering resource diplomacy by way of securing oil and natural 
resources for Japan's industry, and developing and deepening strategic 
alliances in international politics (Potter 1996; Alesina and Dollar 2000). In 
addition to this, public awareness (or understanding) of Japanese aid in 
Japan has remained relatively low compared with other Northern donor 
countries (see also Dalton 2005; Dunlap et al. 1993), " although the series of 
ODA scandals since the mid- 1980s investigated in the National Diet 
certainly raised some consciousness of the issue (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Therefore, in the Japanese context, the permeation of domestic green 
terminologies in international cooperation policy is of far less significance 
" For example, in the UK the influence of domestic politics on the international sphere can 
be illustrated through popular events such as Band Aid in 1984, Live Aid in 1986 and Live 
8 in 2005. Also the sheer number of officially recognised NGOs working on international 
development can suggest the British public awareness as there are now 290 NGOs officially 
recognised by the UK Government's Department for International Development (BOND 
2006a, 2006b). In contrast, in Japan, no such official recognition or registration exists for 
NGOs. Even though there were 368 NGOs in operation in 1996 (Hirata 2002), there was no 
dialogue between the Japanese government and NGOs over aid policy until 1996 (Murai 
2003, MOFA 2006). The first MOFA consultation with NGOs was held in 1996 and that of 
JBIC was only held in 2001 (JBIC 2001 a, 2001e). 
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to that policy than the role played by a global aid discourse that is shared 
with other major Northern donors (JICA 2001a; FOEJ 2002b; Hon 2003; 
Matsumoto 2004; Murai 2004). 
The second factor explaining the great influence of global gTeening 
dynamics on Japanese international cooperation relates to Japan's own weak 
environmental assessment system (Imura 1997; McCormack 1998; Huber 
2000; Revell 2003). In the 1990s, the greening of aid emphasised the role of 
the environmental assessment process in project implementation, of which 
Japan had not been able until then to develop an appropriate regulatory 
system (Barrett and Therivel 199 1; Imura and Schreurs 2005) . 
12 policy 
recommendations by the Organisation for Economic Coo-operation and 
Development (OECD 1985,1992), arising from Rio Summit (UNCED 
1993), and linked to the seventh goal on environmental sustainability of the 
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2005) thus played a 
greater role in influencing the 'greening' of Japan's international 
cooperation than they did for other leading Northern donors. 13 For Japanese 
aid, external pressure (gaiatsu) was in turn, more prominent and influential 
on this matter than was the case for domestic environmental issues. 14 
The greening of aid in the 1990s was thus a phenomenon that sought to 
transform institutional practices through the application of sustainable 
development ideals to aid projects (MOFA 1992; World Bank 1997) and at 
the same time as a political process that required existing policies to be 
reformed through the incorporation of environmental considerations into 
decision-making (OECD 1992; and see below). Therefore, the 'greening' of 
12 Indeed, Japan only enacted the environmental impact assessment law in 1997 (GOJ 
1997), which is the latest EIA law among the 29 OECD member countries (Harashina 
1997). 
13 A Japanese government official admitted that Japan was particularly sensitive to criticism 
from the US and Europe (Potter 1994). 
14 It cannot be denied that domestic and international NGOs played a part in greening 
Japan's international cooperation to a certain degree. For example, Friends of the Earth 
Japan approached National Diet members to raise issues with the San Roque Multipurpose 
Dam during National Diet sessions and have appealed to the public via media campaigning 
(FOEJ 1997; JEXIM 1999b; National Diet 2000). However, there was no regular dialogue 
channel arranged between aid agencies and NGOs or room for NGOs to make policy 
recommendations during the 1990s, the first 'NGO-JBIC Regular Consultation' took place 
in April 2001 (JBIC 2001a. 2001e). Such lack of public participation in turn indicated that 
Japan's domestic green movements (both social and political) have been unsuccessful to 
become institutional ised while those in the Western donor countries have played an integral 
role in environmental policy making (Schreurs 1996: 1; see also Broadbent 1998). 
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aid was indeed linked to both internally and externally driven shifts in donor 
perception of institutional practice, ecological modernisation and reflexive 
modernization dynamics. 
2.2.2. A `Green' Shift in the Aid Paradigm 
The 'greening' of aid in the 1990s entailed a process that required important 
policy changes and some level of institutional transformation. An important 
impetus for the push of the green paradigm shift in global environmental 
politics was the report, Our Common Future (WCED 1987). This report 
suggested a promising role for 'green' aid by means of a strong call for a 
global 'greening' agenda. Linking environment issues with development has 
a long history. However, regarding foreign aid, "it was only with the 
publication of the Brundtland ... report in 1987 that this problem was 
seriously placed on the agenda" (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg- 
Pedersen 2003: 15). This can be seen as one of the reports that created a so- 
called paradigm shift in aid policy (Hajer 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003). 
The Brundtland Report provided a new rationale for aid initiatives in the 
post-Cold War era. It certainly eased the need for painful cuts in aid flows 
as donor interests shifted from Cold War concerns to environmental issues. 
At the same time, however, it reflected the considerable pressure that 
environmentalists and NGOs put on aid providers in the 1980s that had been 
amplified by much media coverage (Fisher 1993; Wapner 1995,1996; 
Wade 1997; William 2000; Desai 2002). 
As with the Cold War itself, the US played a key role in this shift. In the 
early 1990s, the US aid discourse thus moved from a Cold War linked 
geopolitical strategy to one based on sustainable development and 
democratisation that soon acquired global recognition. Accordingly, the 
Clinton administration announced some important changes in 1994 that 
included the release of a major new aid policy statement entitled Strategies 
for Sustainable Development (USAID 1994) as well as a proposal for a new 
foreign aid law 'Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act (PPDA)' (JACSES 
1996; Grant et al. 1997). " These documents suggested that sustainable 
15 The PPDA was presented to the Congress in 1994. However, the bill was not passed due 
to the Republican opposition that was then in majority in the Congress (Grant et al. 1997). 
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development was indeed now a top priority in US policy even as such 
development was linked firmly to the multifaceted advancement of US 
national interests in an American-dominated post-Cold War era (Gore 1992; 
Grant et al. 1997; Hopgood 1998; Harris 2001). This policy shift was 
seemingly demonstrated in practice when the US government refused to 
fund the controversial Three Gorges Dam in China (IRN 1995b). " As US 
foreign aid policy was thus readjusted, other Northern donors also began to 
6mainstream' environmental concerns and promote sustainable development 
strategies (Maull 1992; Adams 2001; Goldman 2004). 
From the late 1980s, Japan also started emphasising the importance of 
environmental conservation driven both by the emergence of environmental 
issues in international relations and its own achievement of the status of the 
world's largest donor in 1989 (Potter 1994; see also Chapter 4). Japan 
expressed its determination to take environmental factors into account in its 
activities and promised increasing environmental aid - some US $300 
million at the G7 Summit of 1989 and a further $700 million at the Rio 
Summit in 1992 (MOFA 1997a; JICA 2001a). The Japanese government 
introduced its first Official Development Assistance environmental 
guidelines in 1989, and announced a fully fledged kanky5-enjyo 
(environmental aid) policy in 1991 (MOFA 1991). These efforts continued 
when the ODA charter was finally adopted by the Japanese Cabinet in June 
1992, which clearly recognised and prioritised environmental problems as a 
global issue (MOFA 1992,2003a). Thus, while Japan's aid policy 
reorientation was not as dramatic as that of the US, dramatic increases in 
environmental aid combined with formal recognition in ODA principles of 
green concerns were significant policy changes (Nuscheler and Warkentin 
2000; see also Chapter 4). 
These sorts of green policy pronouncements by Northern aid providers were 
usually welcomed by NGOs and Southern recipients as a response to 
16 Due to Clinton administration pressure, the US Export-Import Bank refused its financial 
assistance to US companies linked to the Three Gorges Dam, one of the world's most 
socially and environmentally controversial dams (IRN 1995b). A memo dated 22 
September 1995 from the White House to the Ex-Im Bank stated "we think it would be 
unwise for the US Government to align itself with a project that raises environmental and 
human rights concerns on the scale of the Three Gorges" (IRN 1995b Onli 
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worsening global environmental problems in the 1990s. However, some 
environmentalists and other activists continued to challenge donors on the 
nature and pace of their reforms in order to draw attention to the still 
adverse environmental impact of aid projects (JACSES 1996; FOEJ 1997, 
2002b; William 2000). As the literature thus highlights, greening was firmly 
in the official agenda, but with contestation still present. 
2.2.3. Aid and Sustainable Development 
Above all the 'greening' of aid offered new opportunities for Northern 
donors to reformulate and reorganise their development assistance to 
developing countries through the concept of sustainable development (Davis 
1992; Keohane and Levy 1996; World Bank 2000a; OECD 2002a). 
Accordingly, Northern donors related 'greening' issues in their aid to 
fostering the concept of 'sustainable development' in policy initiatives 
(Escobar 1998). However, the utility of the sustainable development concept 
has been widely disputed by scholars (see below). Since tensions in the 
sustainable development concept, in turn, have very important implications 
for the greening of aid, this topic, requires therefore further assessment. 
As noted above, 'greening' shares a range of concerns with the concept of 
sustainable development. The latter was famously defined as: "development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987: 43). While 
sustainable development was the concept that "a wide range of 
nongovernmental as well as governmental organizations ... embraced ... as 
the new paradigm of development" in the 1990s (Lele 1991: 607), it had its 
own contradictions and weaknesses (Redclift 1987,1992,2002; Daly 1996; 
Harvey 1998). Therefore, it is seen by a number of scholars to focus 
ultimately more on the effects of environmental degradation on economic 
growth and the potential for growth rather than focusing on the harmful 
environmental consequences of development. It is about 11... keeping those 
capitalistic activities going" (Harvey 1998: 331), which results in " ... a 
supine surrender to the agendas of neoliberal capital" (Middleton and 
O'Keefe 2003: 9; see also McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Other ten-ns used 
- such as 
'green developmental ism' (McAfee 1999) and 'green 
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neoliberalism' (Goldman 2004) reinforce this sense of `business as usual' 
vis-a-vis the environment (Gupta 1998). 
Sustainable development is also linked to " several different discourses ... 
some of which are mutually exclusive", and those discourses can be used to 
"justify, or embellish" actions taken by any actor in the sphere of global 
environmental politics (Redclift 2002: 275, see also HaJer 1995; Watts and 
Peet 2004). The all-in-one nature of the concept may have provided it with 
political strength, but at the same time that strength discloses significant 
weaknesses. This double-edged quality stemmed, it was argued, from its 
incomplete understanding of interlinked poverty and environmental issues 
as well as its indecisive views on the role of economic growth, sustainability 
and stakeholder participation in sustainable development (Fergus and 
Rowney 2005; Lele 1991; Mog 2004). The ambiguous nature of sustainable 
development matters in particular as a now global economy further 
intensifies the unequal power relations, resource and wealth distribution 
between North and South (Adams 2001; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; 
Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992). Even though sustainable development did not 
overcome its own contradictions and weaknesses, it has been argued that it 
has "served as a concept, a policy prescription and a moral imperative" 
(Redclift 2002: 275). Moreover, it continues to serve as the main concept in 
the process of the 'greening' of aid in the early twenty first century - for 
example, as the goal seven (on environmental sustainability) of the 
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2005). Hence, and in so 
far as the 'greening' of foreign aid involves incorporating sustainable 
development into policy, those same contradictions and weaknesses are 
simply replayed in the greening process. 
At the same time, the 'greening' of foreign aid is conditioned by the way in 
which aid has been delivered from the start. As noted, given that foreign aid 
has its origin in the post-war reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall 
Plan and was later reshaped as ODA for economic development (Raffer and 
Singer 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003), it was 
never intended as a means to conserve the environment or tackle global 
environmental threats. As Adams noted (1990: 167) "the 
'greening' of 
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development is bizarre theoretically in the context of the established 
disciplines of development planning, troublesome in terms of policy, and 
highly inconvenient administratively". Foreign aid, as well as being 
intrinsically about economic development, may in turn thus cause conflict 
with the process of 'greening' which attempts to mainstream the 
environment in the policy process. As such, and noting that sustainable 
development has not yet been able to overcome its own contradictions, the 
(greening' of foreign aid cannot escape from the same dilemmas that the 
popular adoption of the concept of sustainable development has seemingly 
entailed. 
2.2.4. Global Environmental Agenda 
In all of the ambiguity and contradictions of these green concepts, there was 
therefore ample scope for the continuation of unequal North-South power 
relations in the 1990s, notably concerning the setting of the global 
environmental agenda. At the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, for 
instance, there were broadly two contrasting perspectives adopted by donors 
and recipients. Southern countries notably requested Northern counterparts 
to provide aid to help them out of their dilemma concerning development 
and environmental issues - that is, the need to boost economic growth while 
conserving the envirom-nent (Grubb et al. 1993). However, this request 
failed to draw much support from Northern donors keen to reshape the 
global environmental agenda to suit their own interests. Thus, Northern 
environmental concerns focused on 'green' issues such as biodiversity 
protection and ozone depletion that threatened a perceived global commons, 
while Southern environmental concern tended to focus on 'brown' issues 
such as water pollution and land degradation (Forsyth 2002; Lewis 2003). 
Not surprisingly, then, the outcome of Rio was a global environmental 
governance system that was predisposed to Northern interests. Thus, the 
four global priorities of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
(biodiversity, climate change, international waters, and ozone depletion) 
clearly epitomise this outcome, as does the GEF's policy aphorism - 
"protecting the global commons for the heritage of humanity" (Lewis 2003: 
147). Indeed, the 'green' agenda itself is a product of global environmental 
politics that clearly depicts contrasting interests of North and South (Forsyth 
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2002). Nonetheless, and given that 'greening' is a political process that 
requires existing policy and development practices to be reassessed, there is 
no mention of the need for both Northern consumers and Southern elites to 
change their consumption patterns, nor of the need to question the 
increasingly destructive effects of global economic structures, processes and 
institutions on local-level environments and communities (Chatterjee and 
Finger 1994). 
The 'capture' of the global governance agenda in this way has had knock on 
effects in Southern countries too. Sustainable development strategies 
(including National Conservation Strategies and Environmental Action 
Plans) in recipient countries were often "required (or inspired) by an 
external agency, and connected to financial conditionalities" (OECD 2001: 
16). 'Green conditionality' thus promotes the 'greening' of Southern 
policies as the importance of environmental interests in aid flows and 
financial transfers from the North mount, but in keeping with the latter's 
environmental agenda (Blaikie 1995; Fairman and Ross 1996). Since 
attaching a 'green' label to an aid proposal often enhances the chance of a 
positive outcome (Keohane 1996), there is an automatic incentive that 
drives prospective aid recipients to please donors with 'green' policies 
reflective of 'sustainable development' (Davies 1992; Keohane and Levy 
1996; Ross 1996; Lewis 2003). Indeed, conservation planning in Southern 
countries is often led directly by aid agencies, international conservation 
organisations, NGOs, and international agreements (Bryant 2000; Zimmerer 
2000; Lawrence 2002). By imposing Northern priorities on 'wild' park 
development through 'green conditionality' (Neumann 1998), for instance, 
the provision of 'green' aid typifies the donors' endeavours to influence 
Southern countries to accept their priorities, rather than simply to provide 
resources in keeping with recipient countries' priorities (Connolly 1996; 
Lewis 2003; Carmin and Vandeveer 2004). Unequal power relations 
between donor and recipient are clear. As the literature highlights, this 
inequality manifests itself even in the very provision of 'green' aid as well 
as the way in which donors distribute it (Adams 2001). 
For some, though, the apparent gap between Northern aid objectives and 
Southern recipient needs is an unintended outcome of the process (Kusano 
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1993ý 1997; McGillivraya and Ouattara 2005). However, there are also 
possible faults of long-distance aid policy making at play here too. As the 
donor's policy-making institutions are physically remote from the recipient, 
they are usually detached from the local contexts in which distinctive 
dynamics, different manifestations of environmental problems and 
livelihood imperatives prevail (Adger et al. 2001). What is clear from this 
assessment is that there is no satisfactory recipient participation in Northern 
aid decision-making even where donors sometimes solicit recipient views 
(BOND 2003; CEC 2001,2002; see also Chapter 6). Without appropriate 
recipient participation, moreover, it is unlikely that Northern donors will 
effectively manage socio-economic and cultural -ecological changes 
stemming from aid in a way satisfactory to diverse groups in the recipient 
countries (Adams 2001). 
2.2.5. `Greening' of Procedures 
The method for assessing the purported greening of aid is itself debated in 
the literature. Crucial here were the procedures put in place to monitor and 
ensure any greening. In the foreign aid arena, such procedures were 
noticeable by their absence until quite recently. Various studies thus point 
out that aid practices prior to the 1990s tended to neglect or downplay the 
environment (Adams 1990; Forrest 1991; Sumi 1991). Environmental 
consideration as a procedural commitment was not considered important. 
However, in the 1990s, donors increasingly established environmental 
guidelines that put a significant emphasis on environmental impact 
assessment (or EIA; see OECD 1992; JICA 1992; World Bank 1992; OECF 
1997). Hence, it is critical to consider the link between the possible greening 
of aid policy procedure and overall environmental consideration in aid 
projects. 
As scholars have noted, project design rarely included environmental 
considerations such as EIA and monitoring before the 1990s, even though a 
series of long-term evaluations made of past projects indicated a fairly high 
occurrence of associated environmental damage (Hughes 1983; Adams 
1990; Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992). Not only did donors pay inadequate 
attention to recipient's weak environmental institutional capacity, but there 
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was little change made in selecting and designing project procedures that 
might account for environmental issues (Turner 1991). Recipient 
governments have received their share of the blame for the disasters created 
by aid projects - mainly, because they were seen to be corrupt, 
institutionally incapable or indifferent to the socio-environmental impact of 
foreign aid projects (Adams 1990; Ross 1994). However, such 'local' 
factors should have been identified, and taken into account by donors 
themselves during the formulation and implementation of projects (OECD 
1992; FOEJ 2002b). 
From the late 1980s, however, both bilateral and multilateral donors began 
to address the issue of the environmental consequences of their aid more 
seriously (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Donors 
admitted the possibly significant environmental impact of aid projects 
"because of their nature, size and/or location" (OECD 1992: 6) and 
committed themselves to an improvement in aid quality (JICA 1988,1990; 
CIDA 19919 1992). Similarly, the World Bank began to screen its project 
lending to establish the environmental component in its sectoral 
programmes such as agriculture and forestry projects (World Bank 1992, 
2002). Through the 'greening' of aid, Northern donors thus made efforts to 
introduce more 'environmentally friendly' project activities as well as 
policy initiatives. 
Clearly, the design of appropriate procedures was key here. Thus, 
development aid projects and programmes that could have significant 
impacts on environment "should be assessed at as early a stage as possible 
and to an appropriate degree from an environmental standpoint" (OECD 
1992: 6, emphasis added). OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC)" members further acknowledged, "environmental aspects must be 
ftilly integrated in project selection, design and implementation and the 
administrative responsibilities for the environmental aspects of assisted 
projects should be clearly determined" (OECD 1992: 6, emphasis added). 
17 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a key consultation forum of major 
bilateral donors (OECD 1996) 
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Such solemn and official ODA pronouncements rather fly in the face of 
ongoing environmental problems linked to aid projects In the South. Thus) 
a wide literature relates how there are still thousands of people being 
displaced and many environments being despoiled by dam and other 
'development' projects (Rich 1994; World Commission on Dams 2000; 
FOEJ 2002b; Kurita 2004a). This ongoing reality of aid raises questions as 
to whether administrative responsibilities have been in fact (to cite the 
OECD again) 'clearly determined' as well as how systemically the 
environmental aspect has been 'fully integrated' in project selection. And 
yet, such criticism does not tell the whole story on donor 'greening', at least 
in so far as aid providers have indeed increasingly recognised the 
significance of environmental assessment procedures (LNCED 1993; 
Scholten and Post 1999; Adams 2001). 
More 'efficient' environmental assessment has incorporated such technical 
approaches as ecosystem-based approaches, land-use planning and 
management, strategic environment assessment (SEA), project-level 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM), and integrated capacity development (OECD 
2002a: 17-18; see also Adams 2001; Glasson et al. 2005). Among those 
approaches, EIA stands out and is internationally recognised "as a national 
instrument, [that] shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely 
to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a 
decision of a competent national authority" (Rio Declaration, Principle 17 in 
UNCED 1993: 11). EIA is used at the project level as "a decision-making 
tool to predict and evaluate the environmental, and social consequences of a 
proposed (usually large-scale) development project from the formulation to 
the implementation and, where applicable, decommissioning stages" 
(OECD 2002a: 18; see also Glasson et al. 2005). 
Yet, delivery of EIA as an integral part of an environmental assessment 
process's is seen by some writers to be problematic. Horta (2000), for 
instance, identifies a lack of independent researchers monitoring from the 
18 Environmental Assessment (EA) is a common policy tool to reduce the harmful 
environmental impacts of development projects along with promoting sustainable 
development (Lee and George 2000; see below). 
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formulation to the implementation of EIA-linked projects as a major flaw in 
schemes funded by international financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. However, this perceived problem is 
not confined to international financial institutions (Asahi-shinbunsha- 
shuzaihan 1985; FOEJ 2002b; Sumi 2004). The powerful influence of the 
donor as well as recipient country elites has not been removed from 
selecting and commissioning the project appraisal team that assesses the 
environmental impact of projects in bilateral aid (Glassen et al. 2005). 
In the case of Japanese aid, for example, there has been strong criticism 
directed towards the problematic nature of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA)'s kaihatsu-ch5sa (development study). In 
Chapters 4 and 5, this matter is returned to in some detail. Here, however , it 
is the general sense of debate surrounding bilateral aid that is of main 
interest. First of all, the JICA assists recipient governments' project 
environmental consideration. However, the JICA delegates this particular 
activity in turn to private consulting companies that carry out research on 
behalf of JICA while the latter ultimately assesses their report (Murai et al. 
1989; FOEJ 1997; JACSES 2004; see Sumi 2004). What makes this process 
(partial', critics allege, is the fact that consulting companies are subject to 
intense criticism and censorship from parent corporations eager for contracts 
with aid agencies. Since Japanese aid is based on requests from the recipient 
government, it is even easier for both the donor and recipient's elite group 
to hire or influence a research body that will produce a favourable report for 
them (FOEJ 1997; JACSES 2004; Kimura* 2004). 
This situation is, once again, to be considered further in the empirical 
portion of this thesis. However, and in general, it is striking how few 
projects have in fact been decommissioned, suspended or eventually 
stopped world wide due to a negative EIA. '9 While criticising aid donors 
and recipient governments for poor EIA performance, O'Riordan (2000: 14) 
proposes "the vital ingredients for a successful EIA have to come from the 
people on the ground whose interests are directly affected" Here again, it is 
19 It is true that the Word Bank did withdraw from financing the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) 
dam in India in March 1993 (IRN 1995a; Dunne 1998; Bosshard 2004). Yet, this case is 
more the exception that proves the role. 
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emphasised that local community participation is crucial for successful aid 
delivery (Rondinelli 1993). 
2.2.6. Global Environmental Governance 
At the heart of the new 'green' agenda put forward since the early 1990s, 
there has been an emphasis on the importance of global environmental 
governance notably through the discursive framing of knowledge transfer 
between the North and South. Central here is what Adger et al. (2001) call 
the spread of 'a global environmental management discourse' into policy 
and practice throughout the world. 
Most Southern states since Rio have deployed elements of sustainable 
development and global 'green' discourses in their official agendas on 
national and local environmental management. A key mechanism here has 
been local Agenda 21. For example, in the Philippines, President Fidel 
Ramos signed Executive Order No. 15 of September 15,1992 that created a 
national council called the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development 
(PCSD) (GOP 1992c; Vitug 1993). This new agency thereafter produced a 
Philippine Agenda 21 in 1996 that was based on Rio commitments and 
which carefully reflected the ideas and language of those international 
commitments (GOP 1996a, 1996b; Vitug 1993). 
Indeed, Agenda 21, which was adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) together with the so called 'Rio 
Conventions', 20 is one of the best examples of how the global 'green' 
discourse has been advanced by states as a basis for a global environmental 
governance (World Bank 2000a; OECD 2002a). The specific elements here 
are "the quality of life on earth, the efficient use of the earth's natural 
resources, sustainable economic growth, the protection of our global 
commons, the management of human settlements and chemicals, and the 
management of waste" (Chatterjee and Finger 1994: 53-57). 
These themes of Agenda 21 nonetheless represent a technocentric 'global 
20 The Rio Conventions are the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (OECD 2002a: 9). 
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environmental discourse' that emphasises external policy interventions that 
would solve global environmental crises (Adger et al. 2001). This 
technocentric view of global environmental discourse has been heavily 
criticised by scholars. Hence, Escobar (1995: 194) describes Northern 
"environmental managerialism ... [which] embod[les] the belief that social 
change can be engineered and directed, produced at will ... and poor 
countries can more or less smoothly move along the path of progress 
through planning ... no other concept 
has been so insidious. " Harvey (1996) 
has also argued that the Northern states' calls for global environmental 
management are, in fact, designed to collect Southern state environmental 
resources under their control. Escobar further criticised that the "planning of 
management" discourses have persistently portrayed Northern developers as 
"rational and objective" and the Southern poor as a "half-human, half- 
cultured benchmark against which the Euro-American world measures its 
achievements" (1995: 194; see also Ferguson 1990; Rossi 2004). Global 
environmental managerialism thereby seemingly justifies Northern 
intervention in terms of the setting of agendas and governance priorities 
regarding global environmental issues on behalf of "grateful' Southern 
recipients. 
As various scholars note, Northern donors have organised additional 
financial resources for 'green' solutions to tackle environmental problems 
which have been at the centre of global environmental politics since the 
early 1990s (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Connolly 1996; Lewis 2003; 
Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Such resources have been linked to the two 
major activities: the debt-for-nature programme that combined international 
debt relief with conservation initiatives and the establishment of a World 
Bank-linked Global Environmental Facility that organises, supports and 
implements conservation programmes (Thacher 1992). Environmental aid 
was therefore from the beginning greatly influenced by specific Northern 
donor interests, notably in relation to conservation. 21 
Indeed, even though environmental aid was set up with contrasting formal 
21 it should also be noted here that Northern NGOs 
have been active notably over debt-for- 
nature swaps (see, for example, 
Jakobeit 1996; Meyer 1995). 
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objectives from mainstream development assistance, the same power 
dynamic between the Northern donor and the Southern recipient is 
manifested in the flow of environmental aid in the context of new global 
environmental governance mechanism (Keohane and Levy 1996; Brown 
2001). Lewis's (2003: 153) findings on USAID, for instance, showed that 
environmental aid patterns parallel traditional development aid allocations 
in as much as the latter ended up being the 'gateway' for environmental aid. 
'Traditional' interests here linked to political, economic and security ties are 
to a great degree still reflected in the distribution of US environmental aid. 
Further, donors are inclined to favour "nations with unexploited natural 
resources" (Lewis 2003: 144). Environmental aid may thereby even 
contribute to a widening gap between countries that are 'environmentally 
rich' and those that are environmentally poor with decisions on aid 
allocation here, once again, shaped by Northern interests and preferences.. 
In order for the greening of aid to be successful, it is usually noted that the 
recipients' commitment is very important (Connolly 1996; Fairtnan and 
Ross 1996; Conyers and Mellors 2005). However, as the DAC 
acknowledged, Northern donors "administrative responsibilities for the 
environmental aspects of assisted projects')l are a large factor in whatever 
success these programmes enjoy (OECD 1992: 6). Yet, although the 
'greening' of aid is unprecedented in terins of such indicators as the number 
of staff working on environment related issues, the availability of funding, 
and policy commitments to conservation, these indicators do not necessarily 
represent actual operations by the institutions (Wade 1997). Thus, it is 
important next to consider the 'greening' of foreign aid in terms of the 
implementation process. 
2.3. `Greening' of Implementation 
So far, this chapter has set the concerns of this thesis within a theoretical 
framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as key themes in 
the 'greening' of foreign aid. Here, in contrast, the focus is on the policy 
implementation process -a stage where green elements ought to be clearly 
manifested. By discussing work addressing aid policy implementation and 
environmental assessment procedures, this section thereby introduces the 
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third element of the theoretical framework for this study's assessment of the 
4 greening' of Japan's international cooperatlon with reference to the 
Philippines. 
2.3.1. Implementation 
The policy process includes the phases from agenda setting and policy 
formulation to implementation and evaluation. However, there have been 
important debates in the policy studies literature over how implementation 
should be analysed. Since the 1970s, some writers began to face criticism 
over their approach to a policy process that often neglected the 
implementation stage (Hargrove 1975; Gunn 1978; Ham and Hill 1993; 
Junti 2002). Indeed, so-called 'implementation studies' even argued that the 
implementation phase deserves particular attention precisely because public 
policy processes are not simple and straightforward as often assumed but 
rather are prone to discrepancies or even breakdown as a given policy 
moves from formulation to output (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Ham 
and Hill 1993; Turner 2002). 
The 'ignored' implementation phase was notably emphasised initially in the 
work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Since then, a growing literature 
on implementation has made important advances in policy analysis (Ham 
and Hill 1993; Junti 2002). Implementation itself is understood as a process 
of "interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving 
them" (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: xxiii; see also Younis 1990). 
Therefore, a study of implementation is essentially about "how it occurs, ... 
how organisations outside and inside the political system conduct their 
affairs and interact with each other" (Jenkins 1978: 203). For our purposes, 
studying the implementation phase is an effective way in which to assess 
how greening of aid policy may be translated into action because the 
discrepancy between aspiration and reality on the ground is most likely to 
be demonstrated therein (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973,1984; Levitt 1980; 
Hogwood and Gunn 198 1; Turner 2002). 
Like other public policies, foreign aid policy confronts the interrelated 
issues of policy and action compliance. In this regard, it is relevant to note 
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that, although the aid policy discourse has changed, there has been very 
little change in the nature of development planning and administration itself 
(Rondinelli 1993; Keen and Sullivan 2005). Hence, the aid policy process 
has been criticised for the disjuncture between the nature and aims of the 
development process and the methods of project planning and management 
used by Northern aid practitioners (Duelfer 1974; Escobar 1996; Gasper 
1996; O'Riordan 2000). Indeed, this process has generally been divided in 
practice between policy formulation done by the donor and policy 
implementation undertaken by the recipient. This internationalisation of the 
fon-nulation and implementation gap is distinctive - and that is possibly 
why, in part, the aid policy process has faced greater problems in achieving 
policy goals at the implementation phase than 'conventional' domestic 
policy process (O'Riordan 2000; Adger et al. 2001). The discrepancy here is 
often attributed to 'policy failure' in foreign aid - and is a basis for ongoing 
debates over the efficiency of traditional methods of development assistance 
(Rondinelli 1993; Raffer and Singer 1996; Wade 1997; Horta 2001). 
In order to reduce this disjuncture or gap and to translate policy effectively 
into practice, project-based programmes were considered an essential unit 
for the delivery (and hence possible 'greening') of foreign aid policy. In 
development assistance, projects have long been playing a central role in 
translating broad development plans into more narrowly focused design and 
implementation practices (Rondinelli 1993; Scholten and Post 1999). 
During the 1960 and 1970s, they were acknowledged as "privileged 
particles of the development process" (Hirschman 1967: 1), and the 'cutting 
edge' of development administration (Gittinger 1972). However, during the 
1980s and 1990s, Northern donors began to put more emphasis on sectoral 
and programme loans than on projects per se (Rondinelli 1993). Yet, those 
loans were still 'projectized' because no effective alternative emerged as a 
means for translating abstract policies into concrete action (Rondinelli 1993; 
Scholten and Post 1999; see also Cemea 1991). 
Indeed, projects have been at the core of aid policy implementation and still 
are deployed in an era of post-Rio 'greening' as a 
key means to implement 
policy as per donor wishes (Adams 
2001; World Bank 2003; Keen and 
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Sullivan 2005). They have also thereby played a practical role in 
incorporating sustainable development concepts into project procedures 
(from formulation to monitoring), and have been guided by various 
operational guidelines and manuals to ensure environmental consideration 
(JICA 1992; OECD 1992; JBIC 1999c; Scholten and Post 1999). However, 
it is observed that policies are often inadequately translated via those 
guidelines into appropriate practices by project officers or field staff (Keen 
and Sullivan 2005; see also Chapters 5 and 6). 
Therefore, following the project and its procedures will enable us in this 
thesis to examine how well projects have abided by the donor's own 
environmental guidelines and criteria stated in their policy. This will 
provide in turn some indication as to what extent the project implementation 
process has been 'greened', at least in relation to the Japanese case. 
2.3.2. Environmental Assessment 
In general ten-ns, the structure of implementation has revolved around the 
use of environmental assessment procedures as a key tool. The thesis returns 
to this tool at various stages of the analysis. Here, brief consideration is 
given to its role and assessment in the literature. 
In order to achieve the 'greening' of aid projects, donors have made an 
effort to integrate environmental assessment into all phases of the aid 
project cycle. However, in practice, an aid project's environmental 
assessment mainly involves three stages that are directly linked to an 
Environmental Impact Assessment - because it is adopted as the key 
decision-making tool (Glassson et al. 2005; Lee and George 2000; OECD 
2002a). First is the project planning stage where an actual EIA is carried out 
by the recipient (Lee 2000; see also Chapter 4). Second is the appraisal 
stage where the donor or the financer reviews the submitted EIA report and 
makes a funding decision based upon it. Last is the monitoring stage 
whereby the donor checks compliance between project implementation and 
environmental consideration as stated in the EIA report 
These three stages involve different types of decision-making at different 
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stages of a project cycle. As a result, it engages various decision-makers as 
well as other non-state stakeholders in both the donor and recipient 
countries, each struggling to reflect their own interests and motivations 
during the process (Lee 2000; Glasson et al. 2005). For example, a private 
corporation is motivated primarily by profits and therefore may only be 
interested in satisfying minimum environmental requirements (Lee 2000; 
Glasson et al. 2005). In contrast, NGOs often seek to use the EIA process in 
order to push for stricter environmental consideration measures (Feld 1999; 
Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999; FOEJ 2002b; JACSES 2004). 
Also, when the decision-making authority's responsibility lies in such 
sectors as energy or transportation, its priorities (e. g. building hydropower 
dams and concrete roads) can often overlook or downplay environmental 
considerations in relation to other higher priority concerns (Adams 2001; 
Murphy 1994; Glasson et al. 2005; see also Chapter 5). Such wider interests 
may reduce EIA practices to nothing more than a simple bureaucratic 
requirement - with the result, critics have claimed, that it becomes a 
detached and subordinate exercise rather than being an integral and key part 
of all phases of the project cycle (Ross 1994; Smith and van der Wansen 
1995; Sanchez and Hacking 2002). The literature also suggests that there 
can be an inadequately established link between EIA findings and decision- 
making at all stages - which also inevitably contributes to poor 
envirom-nental consideration (Mwalyosi and Hughes 1998; World Bank 
1997; Sanchez and Hacking 2002; Glasson et al. 2005). 
Although environmental assessment is often principally seen to be a 
technical process requiring nothing more than the professional expertise of 
the environmental scientist, it is at the same time inevitably a highly 
political process as political ecologists have noted (Blaikie 1985; Forsyth 
2003; Blaikie and Muldavin 2004; Robbins 2004). An EIA report thus 
contains only what the EIA client wants decision-makers to see - therefore, 
the environmental consequences can be perceived quite differently 
according to the stakeholders involved (for e. g., national power corporations 
and environmental NGOs; see Chapter 5). Science is not separated from 
politics here, as the latter "underlies the formulation, dissemination, and 
insitutionalization of scientific knowledge and networks" 
(Forsyth 2003: 
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xiii; see also Hajer 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Therefore, a political 
ecology perspective enables us to see the political economy aspect of this 
scientific assessment process as utilised in the EIA process (Stott and 
Sullivan 2000). Thus, this study addresses the 'greening' of two Japanese 
bilateral international cooperation projects in the Philippines by focusing on 
three stages of environmental assessment, thereby probing the linkages 
between science, politics, implementation, discourse and environment. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has established the theoretical framework of this thesis that 
examines the possible 'greening' of Japanese bilateral international 
cooperation with reference to the Philippines. The first theoretical element 
introduced the political ecology perspective and was seen to provide an 
appropriate prism through which to frame the aid process in terms of 
contextual sources', in particular, thereby connecting Southern 
environmental change and unequal North-South power relations. The 
second theoretical element provided a critical and selective assessment of 
the foreign aid literature, with a focus on the so-called greening of aid in the 
1990s. Finally, the third theoretical element considered policy 
implementation with a particular focus on the role of projects in foreign aid 
delivery. In aggregate, these three elements suitably inform and frame the 
empirical portions of this thesis. The next chapter will introduce the 
methodologies and data collection techniques used for this research. It 
presents qualitative research methods linked to a case study approach as 
well as a discussion of interviews, documentation and observation 
techniques applied to the two projects that form our case studies. Chapter 3 
finally also addresses problems encountered during the research as well as 
how the researcher sought to overcome them. This methodological 
discussion then sets the scene for the detailed empirical work that follows in 
Chapters 4 to 6. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
This thesis has so far suggested that, to assess the 'greening' of aid during 
the 1990s, a theoretical framework shaped by a political ecology perspective 
and combining insights from the foreign aid and implementation literatures 
is appropriate. For the empirical part of this thesis, a methodological 
approach has also been selected that is most suited to the research aims of 
the study. This chapter elaborates that methodology explaining how and 
why it was chosen as well as the ways in which the data were selected, 
collected, and assessed. The reasoning behind the choice of Japan's bilateral 
international cooperation with the Philippines as well as the specific case 
study projects that are featured in Chapters 5 and 6 is discussed here too 
(with the two projects receiving a fuller introduction in Chapter 4). 
3.1. Selecting a Donor and a Recipient 
In order to examine Northern donor 'greening' in relation to Southern 
recipient environmental change, I have chosen Japan as the aid donor and 
the Philippines as the aid recipient. This section briefly discusses why this 
pair was chosen for study as part of the empirical investigation of the 
political ecology of the 'greening' of aid. 
As a donor,, Japan was a good choice for various reasons. First, I am very 
familiar with the Japanese case having lived there for 7 years - therefore 
being fluent in Japanese and having various contacts and networks already 
built in the country. Second, Japan was the largest overall donor from 1989 
to 2000 when the greening of aid was a major international effort. Third, 
this country has promoted itself as a 'global environmental leader' since the 
early 1990s (Taylor 1999). Finally, traditional Japanese aid has been widely 
criticised for its environmentally damaging impact (Forrest 1991; Maull 
1992; Sumi 1992; Rix 1993; Potter 1994; Dauvergne 1997; Taylor 1999). 
This combination of personal experience and knowledge of Japan, official 
commitment, past 'malpractice', and sheer importance make 
for a 
potentially fascinating study of Northern donor 'greening'. 
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As a recipient, the Philippines was also chosen for several reasons. First, 
Japan has been the largest bilateral donor in this Southeast Asian country for 
decades and has a distinctive relationship with this country (Rix 1993; 
Takahashi 1993; NHK shuzaihan 1996; Dauvergne 1997; Potter 1996; 
Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999). Second, the Philippines has been identified as 
one of the 'hottest" of the biodiversity hotspots (National Geographic 2002) 
- that IS, a country among "the 25 richest and most threatened reservoirs of 
plant and animal life on earth" (Conservation International 2003). Indeed, 
there are serious threats in terms of biodiversity loss that, given the 
country's longstanding reliance on aid inflows, might be alleviated to the 
extent that aid is actually 'greened' (Ross 1996; Bryant 2002; JBIC 2002a; 
Lawrence 2002). 
This choice also reflects a wish to combine place and non-place based 
analysis as suggested in political ecology (Blaikie 1985). This research thus 
selected the Philippines as a specific place-based context in which to 
appreciate the 'greening' process of Japan's international cooperation. At 
the same time, this thesis also focuses on the 'non-place based' forces, here 
foreign aid, to assess the role of 'contextual sources' of environmental 
change (Bryant 1992). Analytically, 'place-based' analysis is particularly 
useful in bringing to light the specific impacts of a political and economic 
process such as aid (Robbins 2003). 
3.2. Issues of Validity, Reliability and Ethics 
This thesis is based on qualitative research. There are certainly concerns 
expressed by some social scientists over the reliability and validity of 
research done in this way (Silverman 2000; Bryman 2004). To ensure the 
quality of the research, the researcher should notably meet the 
characteristics of validity and reliability. Broadly, the former concerns the 
integrity of the conclusion while the latter concerns the replicability of the 
research (Bryman 2004). Here, these issues are considered. We also need to 
assess briefly the ethical aspects of this PhD research. 
In general, the issue of validity arises in relation to both theory and practice 
(Kitchin and Tate 2000). In order to ensure the validity of research, 
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theoretical constructs and ideas should first of all have the integrity to 
support and present the basis for empirical research (Yin 2003). The 
research should also establish appropriate methods to collect and analyse 
data (Kitchin and Tate 2000). This thesis attempts to construct validity by 
employing appropriate methods to link the theoretical framework discussed 
in Chapter 2 to an event situated in the real world. The validity of any 
specific finding or conclusion can meanwhile be achieved by using several 
different sources of information as corroboration (Yin 2003). Thus, 
qualitative research such as this study responds to the challenge of validity 
by using 'triangulation', that is, "the attempt to get a 'true' fix on a situation 
by combining different ways of looking at it or different findings" 
(Silverman 2000: 177). Further, by using multiple data collection 
techniques, the researcher can improve the validity of the research by 
drawing data from different contexts and different types of people. 
Triangulating evidence improves the 'true' state of events by intersecting 
evidence from different sources (Silverman 2000; Grix 2001; Yin 2003). 
The question of reliability concerns the matter of whether data collection 
can be repeated in such a way as to produce consistent results under the 
same conditions (Kitchin and Tate 2000). However, consistent findings tend 
to be more difficult to achieve in the social sciences than in the natural 
sciences. Thus, for example, some conditions being studied may not recur 
since they are uncontrollable social phenomena rather than precisely 
controlled experiments. 
Nonetheless, certain procedures can facilitate an increase in reliability. 
Careful documentation of the collected data was key here. For instance, tape 
recording was used when it was not considered intrusive and when 
interviewees allowed it. When tape recording was impossible, notes were 
taken during or immediately after the meeting. A field research diary was 
also kept to record the details of where the interviews and observations took 
place. Follow-up interviews with key informants were used to ensure that 
the fieldwork was on the right track. Above all, reliability was enhanced 
through use of multiple data collection techniques employed in relation to 
diverse stakeholders. 
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Finally, the ethical aspects of this PhD research require a brief mention. It is 
important not to dismiss the issue of research ethics because it is 
fundamental to the integrity of the research itself. Ethical concerns arise in 
any research - yet, they are mostly likely to occur in the following four 
main areas that are used as ethical principles: potential harm to participants, 
lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception (Bryman 2004). 
A research project with potential harm to participants is considered 
unacceptable, which can take the form of physical harm, psychological 
disturbance or stress, and confidentiality of the record and participant's 
identity. The ethical issues of my field research were mainly related to the 
issue of confidentiality of the records and identity. As I explained my 
research to them, some interviewees explicitly asked me not to quote 
particular information and/or not to reveal their identity. ' In these cases, 
such data remained unused and the interviewees' identity also remained 
anonymous in order to respect their wishes. This point relates in turn to 
informed consent - as the above mentioned participants' requests including 
confidentiality of information and the interviewees' identity were made 
during the process of obtaining informed consent. Participants can therefore 
decide at this juncture whether they want to provide information or not. 2 
Also by obtaining informed consent, informants' privacy is protected. 
When I explained my research and the way in which interviews would be 
used, I either briefly described my research or emphasised a certain aspect 
of it over others in order to approach interviewees and arrange interviews 
more smoothly. For instance, in the case of interviews with a local 
community in areas affected by a project, I was not able to explain fully 
about my research due to the sheer number of interviewees and limited time 
available - therefore, I gave them brief descriptions only. In the case of 
interviews with San Roque Power Corporation employees, my questions 
emphasised the company's response to claims that the firm had perpetrated 
social and environmental damages - thereby giving them a 'fair' chance to 
I Some interviewees, often aid agency or consulting company insiders, are anonymous in 
this thesis in order to protect them from losing their jobs. 
2 After discovering my research was to study the environmental aspect of the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project, one interviewee (a San Roque Power Corporation employee), 
avoided my interview enquiry for almost two months, and then agreed to 
be interviewed. 
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explain the issues. ' True, this tactic may raise the issue of deception. 
However, it is "rarely feasible to provide participants with a totally 
complete account of what [the] research is about" (Bryman 2004: 514). 
Nevertheless, no participant was provided with wrong or incorrect 
information about my identity and research. ' 
3.3. Case Study Approach 
Amongst other research avenues, a case study approach was specifically 
chosen to explore contemporary events surrounding the possible greening of 
aid in a real time situation. This approach is particularly useful as this study 
poses 'how' questions and investigates a specific case in a contemporary 
real-life context' where events cannot be controlled (Yin 2003) 
The approach, by focusing on a specific case, enables me to "Identify, 
uncover ... specific contextual factors in which the event to study is 
embedded" (Grix 2001: 67). As this thesis examined two projects in Japan's 
bilateral international cooperation with the Philippines implemented during 
the 1990s -a specific phenomenon in time and space - it was essential to 
emphasise the context in which those two projects were embedded (Kitchin 
and Tate 2000). In order to appreciate the multi-faceted context (both in 
Japan and in the Philippines) effectively, this thesis employed a case study 
approach that organised the data so as to preserve the holistic and 
meaningful character of the social object being studied (Grix 2001; Yin 
2003). 
However, there have been concerns voiced by some social scientists over 
this approach. The case study approach has thus been criticised for a lack of 
rigour in that it involves no systemic procedures. In order to reduce those 
potential problems, the use of multiple data collection techniques provided 
me with a specific procedure to be followed (Yin 2003). 1 also used data 
triangulation (multiple sources of evidence) and methodological 
3 This was very important in terms of both triangulating data and managing interviews 
smoothly because it was never possible to speak to the company if any sign suggesting that 
I was from the NGOs involved (Friends of the Earth Japan or Cordillera Peoples Alliance). 
4 Indeed, interview avoidance from some at SRPC and reluctant data provision by JBIC 
both tend to contirm that my research was not deceptive. 
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triangulation (multiple data collection 
discussed problems (Grix 2001; Yin 2003). 
techniques) to overcome the 
There is also a raised concern that case studies produce little basis for 
scientific generalisation. Random sampling, in theory, has a great strength 
(Babbie 1995). However, the selection of two projects is based on my 
judgement of the situation in light of the research questions that guide this 
thesis. In any event, the case study does not generalise to a large population 
but rather to the theoretical propositions being assessed (Babbie 1995; Yin 
2003). 
The principle analytical considerations guiding this thesis, then, related to 
how the greening of Japanese international cooperation may have taken 
place in the Philippines during the 1990s. In the context of official 
procedures set down initially in Tokyo, this concern was pursued by 
studying both institutional policy positions (reflected notably in public 
documents as well as revealed through interviews) and actual project 
practices in the Philippines (where documents, interviews and observations 
were used). Fieldwork itself involved dividing my time between the 
investigation of the Japan's international cooperation system in Japan 
(mostly in Tokyo) as well as its manifestation through two bilateral aid 
projects in the Philippines (involving work in various parts of Luzon and 
Palawan). A total of 9 months was spent conducting my field research. 
Thus, 5 months of fieldwork took place in Japan (Tokyo and Osaka) 
between October 2003 and February 2004, while 4 months of fieldwork 
took place in the Philippines (Manila, Baguio, Itogon, San Roque, San 
Manuel, San Nicholas, Puerto Princesa, Coron and El Nido) between March 
2004 and June 2004. 
3.3.1. Case Study Sites 
Care was taken to select appropriate project case studies that were both 
practically feasible to investigate and relevant to the research questions of 
this thesis. The two study sites chosen in the Philippines were thus: San 
Roque in Pangasinan (Central Luzon) and Puerto Princesa, Coron, El Nido 
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in Northern Palawan (See Figure 4.16). This field research looked at two 
distinct types of aid on the ground, which illustrated different facets of the 
'greening' of Japan's international cooperation in the Philippine context. 
Thus, two projects were investigated as a single embedded case study, each 
of which represented a seemingly typical project pattern of the two specific 
aid categories in question (Yin 2003). 
Thus, the San Roque Multi-purpose Project was chosen to investigate 
development aid (kaihatsu-enjyo). Specifically, it enabled me to assess how 
a 'traditional' aid project became an object for possible greening in the 
shifting Japanese aid process of the 1990s. In contrast, the Sustainable 
Environmental Conservation Project in Northern Palawan was selected 
precisely to assess a new generation of environmental aid (kanky5-enjyo) 
that was seen to be the 'cutting-edge' of the effort to implement a green 
poiicy-shift in the Japanese system. One of the factors behind the selection 
of the three case study locations (Puerto Princesa, Coron, El Nido) was that 
SEMP offices are based there, which made them ideal locales for the 
investigation of project implementation. More detail on these two project 
case studies is provided in Chapter 4. The next task of this chapter, then, is 
to discuss the specific techniques of data collection that were used in the 
research. 
3.4. Data Collection Techniques 
This section presents the techniques employed: interviews, documentation, 
and direct observation. At the same time, it considers the various difficulties 
encountered in undertaking the research, as well as the ways in which such 
difficulties were addressed. 
3.4.1. Interviews 
Along with documents and observations, a series of individual in-depth 
interviews were carried out during the fieldwork in both Japan and the 
Philippines. The total number of formal interviews conducted was 98 (see 
Appendix 4 for a complete list). The sources of interviews were as follows: 
policy-makers and project staff based in both Japan and the Philippines (26); 
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academics and journalists working on the issue of Japan's international 
cooperation with the Philippines (8); NGO employees working with and 
campaigning against Japanese aid projects (14); corporate employees (8); 
both central and local government officials in the Philippines (15); local 
community members in the Philippines (17); and others including other aid 
agency officials, NGO workers, etc (10). 
Interviews were facilitated in two main ways: namely through my 
knowledge of and contacts in the Japanese bureaucratic system developed 
during my MA degree in Japan and my PhD-linked requests for interview 
arranged through the official route. Indeed, the position of visiting scholar 
offered at both Ferris University in Yokohama, Japan and the Third World 
Studies Center at the University of the Philippines, in Quezon City extended 
my research opportunities by allowing me to build on very important socio- 
political connections in Japan and the Philippines enjoyed by these two 
centres of learning. At Ferris University, for example, where academic staff 
focus specifically on development and envirom-nent issues in the Japan- 
Philippine context, I gained much useful information including invaluable 
insider's insights (notably from a former JICA employee and a consulting 
company employee). 
Because of the sensitive nature of my research topic, two types of interview 
technique were used: the unstructured interview and the semi-structured 
open-ended interview (May 1997). The unstructured interview (or 'informal 
conversational interview') provided data of a very detailed and rich kind, 
especially when interviewees were otherwise quite guarded in their remarks. 
This technique indeed enables the interviewer to encourage two-way 
communication where interviewees feel at ease (Silven-nan 2000). The 
interviewer can act in response to the immediate conversation where non- 
predetermined interview questions possibly anse (Kitchin and Tate 2000). 
However, the interview does not flow naturally without the interviewer 
being sensitive to, and capable of acknowledging their personal views 
(Barton et al 1997). 
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The semi-structured open-ended interview meanwhile gave me the freedom 
and flexibility to investigate with predefined guide questions (May 1997). 
This so-called 'interview guide approach' (Kitchin and Tate 2000) probes 
beyond initial answers, and enables the researchers to understand both the 
context and content of the interview (May 1997). It also gives the interview 
a conversational feel, which will possibly lead interviewees to being more 
relaxed. Topics and issues to be covered are specified in advance but the 
interviewer can vary the wording of the questions and the sequence in which 
the questions are tackled (Kitchin and Tate 2000). A copy of the guide 
questionnaires used in the semi-structured interviews conducted for this 
thesis investigation is to be found in the Appendix 1. 
The sensitive nature of my research topic often made it difficult for me to 
ask questions. For example, during my officially arranged interview with 
JBIC, a senior officer from this agency's public relations office controlled 
the entire 50 minute interview. Indeed, he carefully managed time allocation 
by starting the session with overview presentations that I did not need or 
want. In this kind of situation, although the structured interview may reduce 
error with clearly defined questions, there is little or no chance to actually 
use the technique. Thanks to the flexibility of the qualitative interview 
techniques conducted with other respondents, however, I was able to allow 
interviewees more room to share their depth of knowledge and thereby bring 
out a variety of relevant information that they had but might not otherwise 
have revealed. Much depended on my interpersonal skills and sensitivity to 
facilitate the interviews (Kitchin and Tate 2000). ' For example, I was fully 
aware of the characteristics of certain interviewees, particularly male 
Japanese aid officers who in general were not willing to share detailed 
information with me (a female researcher). Thus, I had to respond to each 
unique interview situation by switching back and forth between semi- 
structured and unstructured interviews, while keeping the guide questions in 
mind. 
5 But interestingly, in fact, a high degree of interpersonal skill does not require sophisticated 
knowledge. On the one hand, it is more about listening to the interviewees' personal stories. 
In order to reach an actual conversation stage, therefore, I resorted to trivial gossip and 
news in both countries. I often studied (by watching TV and reading newspapers) what 
were the most talked about issues- for example, two Japanese baseball players playing in 
the US major league, and Korean soap operas and dramas showing in the Philippines. 
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There were often potential obstacles in the interview process. For the most 
part, they arose in the case of interviews with Japanese government officials 
who showed minimal willingness to cooperate with a Korean female PhD 
student (Rubin and Rubin 1995; May 2002). White Western researchers 
from Europe and North America are typically more welcome to such 
officials than Asian researchers. Being a junior female researcher made it 
even more difficult to arrange interviews with male Japanese officials. Here, 
well-known chauvinism and patriarchal behaviour in Japanese government 
agencies were a recurrent problem, albeit one familiar to me from my prior 
years of residency in the country. 
Another potential obstacle was that my research topic concerns the 
environmental aspects of Japanese aid. Some of the interviewees, 
particularly those who are working in the mainstream Japanese aid industry, 
became quickly offended - particularly as I was examining one of their 
4worst' projects, the San Roque Multi-purpose Project. Such evasion also 
occurred in the Philippines. Thus, for example, the San Roque Power 
Corporation avoided my interview requests for almost two months, but in 
the end agreed to be interviewed. Compounding this standard reticence, 
wider political events encouraged evasive behaviour by some interviewees. 
In particular, at the time of my study, Surnatran villagers were seeking 
compensation via a well-publicised lawsuit filed against Japanese aid 
agencies and private corporations involved in the Kotopanjang Dam project 
in Indonesian Sumatra (The Japan Times 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Susilo 
2002). 
I used two main strategies to reduce distortions in the data collection created 
by these potential obstacles. First, my aforementioned personal connections 
in Japan helped tackle one of those problems. One Japanese friend in 
particular is a high-ranking official in a Japanese government agency and 
thus helped me contact key aid officials. A 'personal' introduction has 
thereby built up 'trust' by guaranteeing my status as a researcher (Rubin and 
Rubin 1995). As for Japanese 'discrimination' towards being an Asian 
female researcher, I dealt with this by stressing the fact that I am studying at 
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one of the UK's leading academic institutions. As necessary, then, 
presented myself as somebody who was 'closer' to the UK than to Korea. 
3.4.2. Documentary Analysis 
Documentary evidence provides rich data in diverse forms - thus, for this 
research, government and quasi-government reports, minutes of official 
meetings, and unofficial reports of parties to be studied were considered 
(Kitchin and Tate 2000; Grix 2001). Documents are useful for the project 
case studies of this thesis as the following points illustrate (May 1997; Grix 
2001; Yin 2003). First, it is a stable source of evidence which can be 
reviewed repeatedly. Second, since it is not produced by the case study 
results, it is unobtrusive. Third, it helps verify the exact names, references,, 
and details of an event. Lastly, it covers an extended period of time, as well 
as many events and settings. However, it has also been criticised for several 
reasons. Since every document was produced for a particular purpose, it 
contains and reflects author bias. Therefore, documents should be studied 
bearing in mind what they leave out as well as what they include. Further, 
some documents may be less accessible and available than others. This 
patchy availability may lead to an incomplete collection of particular 
documents, thereby increasing the chance of bias in document selection. 
Documentary analysis in this thesis contributes to the analysis of a core 
concern here: the possible shift in policy procedures under the auspices of 
greening of aid. It reveals institutional positions through public documents 
with all of their revealing language and images, even as it traces Japanese 
bilateral international cooperation through the process of administration, 
organisation, policy, and project implementation. As documents tend to 
leave out one particular fact at the same time that they contain another, it is 
particularly interesting to see what is emphasised and highlighted in terms 
of the 'greening' of Japanese aid. This research also examined in particular 
documents relating to criteria, rules and specification for projects and their 
funding (such as environmental checklists, guidelines and study reports) so 
as to see how environmental aspects of Japanese international cooperation 
have been framed and monitored. Also, by using other documentary sources 
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such as NGO reports and press releases, as well as media reports both in 
Japan and in the Philippines, I was able to gauge how non-Japanese aid 
players reacted to Japan's international cooperation activities. 
Documentation was analysed by looking into various actors' responses to 
the greening process that was supposed to have taken place via the two case 
study projects. 
I obtained documents from a wide array of interested actors thereby 
enhancing the validity of the research. Clearly, the key Japanese aid 
agencies were prominent here. Thus, official documents were collected 
mostly from these major aid players involved in the two projects: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA), the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC). They were acquired from agency websites 
and public relations offices, the JICA Library, and from the interviewees 
themselves. Documents were also obtained from the relevant Philippine 
government agencies: the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), the Department of Public Works and Highways 
(DPVv'H), the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the 
National Power Corporation (NPC), the Palawan Council for Sustainable 
Development (PCSD). Documentation of non-official aid players was 
mainly collected from Japanese NGOs (Friends of the Earth Japan, Mekong 
Watch, Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society and 
Conservation International Japan), international NGOs (International Rivers 
Network, Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia and the Environmental 
Defence Fund) and Philippine NGOs and community organisations 
(Conservation International Palawan, the Cordillera People's Alliance, 
Envirom-nental Science for Social Change in the Philippines, the Haribon 
Foundation, the lbon Foundation, the Philippine Center of Investigative 
Journalism, and the World Wildlife Fund Palawan). 
It is likely that access to some documents have been deliberately blocked, 
thereby affecting the validity of data production (Yin 2003). However, this 
obstacle was overcome by approaching various actors that do not 
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necessarily share the same opinion regarding the research topic. For 
example, as expected, some crucial documents were deliberately blocked by 
Japanese aid agencies (see Chapter 5), but some of the 'classified' 
documents were acquired through NGOs, academics, and journalists. More 
interestingly, the most controversial and critical documents were in fact 
mentioned and revealed during detailed hearings in the Japanese Parliament 
(National Diet). Indeed, minutes of Diet proceedings provided crucial data 
for this research. 
3.4.3. Observation 
Observation is the only methodology that studies "what people actually do 
rather than what they say may do" (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 224). Snapshots 
of empirical phenomena are recorded by observations (Grix 2001). It serves 
as another source of evidence, which is useful in two ways. It covers the 
event in a real time situation at the same time as it covers the context of the 
event (Yin 2003). 
For this research, direct observation was used throughout field visits 
including during interviews. It was a technique used to scrutinise field 
events, and thereby served to independently assess what was said in official 
documents, reports, and guidelines. Data was collected through note taking, 
a field research diary and photographs. Photographs of the study sites in 
particular helped to explain the context and characteristics of each case. The 
evidence acquired by observation was useful as, without knowing details of 
the actual scenery or geographical location, it was all but impossible to 
appreciate local settings effectively. It also provided me with a new 
dimension in understanding the research topic (Yin 2003). For example, the 
physical condition of buildings and offices (including pictures, posters, and 
mottos) displayed the atmosphere or circumstances of each organisation. 
Further, the location or the furnishings of interviewees' office suggested the 
status of the office (and its staff) within an organisation. In the case of JBIC, 
however, interviews were always set in special rooms for external visits, 
therefore, my opportunity was lost in this particular instance. 
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Observation was intended to be overt. Thus, I carried out the research as a 
detached and unobtrusive observer, but informed the people in the area 
about my research and what I was studying. However, in the Philippine 
study sites, my physical appearance as a foreigner distinguished me from 
the local people and sometimes caused problems. Within one day of my 
arrival in Dalupirip village near the San Roque Dam project site, for 
example, my presence there was already widely circulated and even the 
Itogon municipal mayor knew about me. This prominence was both an 
advantage and a disadvantage to my research. Due to the highly sensitive 
nature of the research topic, I introduced myself to the local people through 
Friends of the Earth Japan employees who were campaigning against the 
Dam project with local residents. In contrast, I approached the San Roque 
Power Corporation and other aid agency staff separately to emphasise my 
status as an independent researcher. 
However, observation has been criticised for its selectivity and reflexivity. It 
is selective since there are limits in covering entire events (Yin 2003). 
Selectivity can be caused as observation is time-consuming at the same time 
as being sometimes difficult to instigate (Kitchin and Tate 2000). The issue 
of reflexivity has also been raised. Thus, those who are observed, by 
knowing that they are being studied, may act differently than usual, which 
will create errors in data collection. Further, there are doubts in terms of the 
observer's selective attention, encoding, and position (Kitchin and Tate 
2000). To reduce any error in data collection using observation, 
triangulation was therefore used by intersecting the data collected with data 
gathered from other techniques, notably interviews and documents. 
3.5. Translation 
By definition, this thesis involves a considerable amount of translation work 
- potentially involving movement between at least three major languages: 
Japanese, Tagalog, and English. Clearly, errors can crop up in this complex 
process (Temple 1997; Rossman and Rallis 1998; Birbili 2000; Temple and 
Edwards 2002). However, throughout the research, translation as well as my 
own extensive multi-lingual knowledge ensured that errors were kept to a 
minimum. I translated all of the documents and interviews used as primary 
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data in this thesis. Regarding Japanese fluency, I lived in Japan for 7 years 
in total and was brought up in Tokyo between the ages of 9 and 13.1 studied 
for and obtained my Master's degree in Osaka with one additional year of a 
research studentship there. Further, since I am fluently bilingual (in 
Japanese and Korean), I have worked as a translator for 8 years in Korea 
with few problems encountered either in communicating with Japanese 
people or in understanding the cultural nuances of the Japanese language. 
However, in order to reduce further potential translator error, Japanese 
professors and friends crosschecked my translation of key texts and 
interviews. 
In the Philippines, meanwhile, most of the research was carried out in 
English, while Japanese aid project employees were interviewed in Japanese 
by myself For those I could not directly interview (Tagalog, flocano, Ibaloi 
speakers), Filipino research assistants (or guides) translated some of the 
interviews involving those local Filipino dialects into English. 6 There was 
certainly a possibility of translator bias being introduced into the translation 
process here (Temple 1997; Temple and Edwards 2002). Yet, this can be 
reduced by interviewing various sources who hold different perspectives on 
an issue, while also providing an explanation to the translator about the 
nature and purpose of my research. In practice, these steps were taken in the 
course of my research. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodology used in this thesis while 
explaining how and why the data was selected, collected, and assessed. 
Qualitative research methods were used to study how and to what extent 
Japan's international cooperation was procedurally committed to the 
greening of its projects This research also employed a case study approach 
to investigate two aid projects with a combination of qualitative techniques 
for primary data collection: interviews, documentation, and 
direct 
6 Research assistants were involved on only two occasions - that is, during my visits to 
Tabu and Dalupirip, as some indigenous people interviewed there only spoke 
local dialects. 
Two research assistants (Ms. Norma Mooy from Tabu and 
Ms. Luisa Bestian from 
Dalupirip) translated and arranged interviews and also guided me throughout my visits. 
They were recruited via my contacts at Friends of the Earth Japan and 
Cordillera People's 
Alliance. 
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observation. Overall, this methodological strategy was seen to be most 
appropriate to the aims of this thesis. 
The next chapter will provide a selective history and background of Japan's 
international cooperation. With the focus specifically on the Philippines as a 
recipient, Japanese aid will also be explored in the particular historical and 
politico-economic context of the Southeast Asia region. 
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Chapter 4. Japan's Bilateral Kokusai-kydryoku 
and the Philippines 
This chapter studies Japan's bilateral international cooperation (kokusai- 
ky(5ryoku) within the broad context of Japan's external relationship of 'aid' 
and economic cooperation (keizai-ky5ryoku). This chapter examines the 
historical roots and development of Japanese international cooperation in 
the post-World War 11 era. In keeping with the focus of this thesis on the 
'greening' of Japan's foreign aid, key Japanese agencies are described in 
relation to the greening process of the 1990s. In addition, as the Philippines 
is the recipient of Japanese aid that is studied here, then the relationship of 
that country with Japan over aid is also considered before concluding with 
an overview of the two case study projects featured in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.1. Kokusai-Kydryoku and the History of Japanese Aid 
Japan officially celebrates October 6 th each year as kokusai-ky5ryoku no hi 
(International cooperation day) commemorating Japan's participation in the 
Colombo Plan' in 1954 that aimed to promote socio-economic development 
in non-Communist Asia. However, kokusai-ky5ryoku itself is an ambiguous 
process, given that the Japanese government has never provided a definitive 
interpretation of its role and nature (Orr and Koppel 1993; Dauvergne 
1997). 
Kokusai-ky5ryoku is often used interchangeably with Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), enjyo (aid)' and keizai-ky5ryoku (economic cooperation) 
reflecting the complex and even ambiguous nature of the aid process. The 
Japanese government in 1999, for example, established the world's largest 
bilateral development finance agency, in the form of the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIQ (Motoyama 2000). Yet, JBIC merged the 
two different operations of ODA and so-called Other Official Finance (or 
Other Official Flow, OOF) together. The latter clearly does not satisfy ODA 
1 Such participation was expected to promote amity with Southeast Asian countries, 
economic and technical cooperation, export of machinery accompanied by technology 
transfer, and the securing of raw materials (JBIC 2003b: 8). 
2 In general, aid indicates ODA. However in this thesis, the term aid shares the same 
meaning as enjj, o and keizai-ky6ryok-u both of which 
included "yen loans, export credits, 
and private foreign direct investment" (Nagasu 1971: 356-357). 
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criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)' since it includes private sector operations, such as 
export-import credit, overseas investment, and loan guarantees (See Figure 
4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Flow Chart of Bilateral Kokusai-Kydryoku 
Source: Adapted from FOEJ (2002b: 15). 
Unlike other Northern donors, Japan thus mixes two different types of 
development finance together under the label of kokusai-ky5ryoku. The 
reason for this aid strategy lies in its historical roots. The year 1954, 
officially known as the origin of international cooperation, was also the year 
when the first post-war reparation agreement was made (with Burma, see 
Murai 1999b; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999). Reparation activities were 
nonetheless then labelled under the name of keizai-ky5ryoku (economic 
cooperation), enjyo (aid), or even t5shi4 (investment) by the Japanese 
government. This tradition of economic cooperation, combining private 
' Grants or loans to developing countries should meet the following conditions to qualify as 
ODA: first, it is undertaken by the official sector; second, it promotes economic 
development and welfare as the main objective; third in case of a loan, it must have a grant 
element of at least 25 per cent (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). 
4 Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida once said, "our counter-parts disliked (kiratta-node) the 
term investment (t5shi), so, as per their wish, we used the term reparation. But, from our 
point of view, it is an investment" (Nishi 1970: 61 quoted in Murai 1999b: 2 10). 
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sector activities with public sector ODA, is still present in Japanese 
international cooperation, as the emergence of JBIC at the end of the 
twentieth century indicates (Orr and Koppel 1993; Arase 1995; see also 
below). 
Without studying the significant role played by economic cooperation in the 
history of Japan's international cooperation, it is not possible to understand 
any 'greening'. Thus, this chapter first examines the origin of economic 
cooperation in order to see how Japan has conceptualised aid in the post- 
World War 11 era. 
4.1.1. Keizai-Kydryoku: The Cradle of Japanese'Aid' 
Japanese aid originates in the requirement that the country pay reparations 
for the damage done during World War 11 and in the wake of Japan's defeat 
in August 1945. Indeed, the post-war reparation process helped define 
economic cooperation as a unique blend of political, economic, and 
humanitarian assistance (Suzuki 1989). 
The onset of the Cold War added impetus to the process. The rise of 
Communist China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
brought about an abrupt 'reverse course' in the US Occupation, which 
transformed the fortunes of Japan (Arase 1995; Schaller 1985,2002). The 
US Occupation thus urgently prioritised Japanese development by easing its 
burden of reparation through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 195 1, (NEK 
shuzaihan 1996; Murai 1999b). Japan became a key ally of the West in 
countering the Communist threat to Southeast Asia while also helping to 
keep that region's abundant natural resources from falling into communist 
hands (Schaller 1985). At the same time, Japan thus re-established the link 
with its fonner 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' (dait5a-ky5ei-ken) that provided both 
a strong trade position and raw materials for industrialisation. 
Two factors in particular facilitated the elaboration of Japanese aid policy. 
First, due to the US-Japan security treaty of 1952, Japan was protected 
under the US nuclear umbrella even as it had passed a peace constitution 
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(Auer 1990), ' meaning that there was no need for huge national defence 
expenditure (Arase 1995). Therefore, Japan could focus on economic 
development. Second, the 'reverse course' partially suspended the overhaul 
of a 'tainted' Japanese bureaucracy that meant that civilian economic 
bureaucracies in charge of aid policy were left untouched, giving them 
thereby unprecedented prestige within the Japanese government (Arase 
1995). As such, Japanese economic bureaucrats could begin keizai-ky5ryoku 
(economic cooperation) without serious challenge from other powerful parts 
of the bureaucracy (Nagano and Kondo 1999). 
The rationale for reparations is to compensate for war damage perpetrated 
by the aggressor. However, in the case of Japanese reparations, the rationale 
was expressed as "economic recovery and development ... 
(and) the 
improvement of social welfare" rather than as something associated with 
war guilt (Arase 1995: 28). As such, keizai ky5ryoku formed part of a wider 
geopolitical strategy to bolster pro-Western countries. This situation had an 
effect on how cooperation was defined. Reparations were thus based on an 
initial request from the recipient government (see below). ' Each reparation 
case was identified and then negotiated with the recipient government by the 
Japanese private sector (Arase 1994,1995; NHK shuzaihan 1996; Tsuda and 
Yokoyama 1999). ' The preparation stage of reparation was mostly 
performe Id by zaikai-gaik5 (business diplomacy)' (Ushiba and Hara 1979; 
NEK shuzaihan 1996; Murai 1999a). Japanese private corporations, 
approaching the recipient government with full knowledge about what was 
required for an application, 'helped' the recipient get through the 
complicated procedure. It not only encouraged the reparation recipients to 
make an official request for Japanese goods or services, but also worked to 
induce Japanese business activity (stewarded by the Japanese government) 
5 Article 9 of Japan's constitution declares the renunciation of war and military force, which 
many political parties and Diet members recently have been pressing 
for constitutional 
revision (Auer 1990; KajImoto 2005; The Japan Times 2005a, 
2005d; The Korea Times 
2005). 
6 It is known as y5sei-shugi (request based approach), and became one of the main 
principles of Japanese aid. 
7 This is still present in the relationship between Japanese consulting companies and 
recipient governments (see below). 
8 This was further developed in Japan's ODA which was later exemplified 
by the Marcos 
Rebate (Murai et a]. 1989; Yokoyama 1994; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; see also 
Chapter 
5). 
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into the recipient economy (Arase 1994,1995). As Figure 4.2 thus shows, 
reparation, carried out through private sector initiative with government 
support as well as the request-based approach, resulted in the opening of 
markets for exports as well as the securing of raw materials imports (JBIC 
2003a). Above all, it laid the basis of economic-oriented international 
cooperation. 
Figure 4.2. Reparation Payment Model 
Japanese 
Government 
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Finance) 
2. Submission 
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Source: Arase (1995: 33). 
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4.1.2. Reorienting Keizai-Kydryoku and the Emergence of 
Kokusai-Kydryoku 
In the 1960s and 1970s, export promotion and resource diplomacy were the 
raison d'&re of Japanese 'aid' (Orr and Koppel 1993; Dauvergne 1997). 
Keizai-ky5ryoku (economic cooperation) was integral to Japan's 
international economic policies but was, in any event, the only credible 
diplomatic means Japan could use in its relations with developing countries 
given continuing anger incurred by World War 11 (Rix 1980; Yasutomo 
1986ý 1990). 
As noted, 'enjyo' ('aid') differed significantly from its Western counterpart. 
Many official documents and reports stressed, for example, the importance 
of combining the government and private sector in economic cooperation 
(Yamamoto 1973). Indeed, economic cooperation was "promoted primarily 
... 
[on a] private sector basis" (MITI 1958: 23-24 quoted in Arase 1995: 
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38). Yet, this practice of combining ODA and OOF was criticised as being 
incompatible with a Western notion of aid (Arase 1995; see also MOFA 
2003a). For instance, the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) 
called for more non-commercial and concessional Japanese ODA in the late 
1960s (Rix 1980). Under external pressure, Japan made some alterations, 
such as an increase of aid volume' and concessionality, while separating the 
category of ODA from other economic cooperation activities. This process 
continued into the 1980s without any fundamental policy shift. The core of 
the existing economic cooperation system thus continued "to combine trade, 
private investment, and aid in a skilful manner" (Taigai-keizai-shingikai 
1976: 5). 
Unlike in previous decades, however, the 1980s was a prelude to major 
change involving ODA renovation in the early 1990s. The call for ODA 
reforin was driven by both domestic and international factors, such as public 
criticism triggered by the Marcos Scandal (see Chapter 5) as well as 
environmental and human rights issues raised by both international and 
domestic NGOs. Indeed, international cooperation was more prominent in 
the media, as well as in NGO reports and official documents, than ever 
before. 'o Moreover with an increase in its volume and use as a tool of 
foreign policy, Japanese 'aid' became a hot subject in a series of debates on 
the country's overall international contribution (Orr and Koppel 1993; 
Kusano 1997; Fujibayashi and Nagase et al. 2002). " This pressure led to the 
first ODA reforms in 1991 and culminated in the ODA Charter in June 
1992. 
As this brief history of keizai-ky(5ryoku and the emergence of kokusai- 
ky5ryoku shows, Japanese aid has been reoriented while retaining its 
9 In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced US$ 10 billion aid to ASEAN, which 
followed the t5nan-qjia-gaik5-sangensoku (Fukuda Doctrine) (JBIC 2003b). In 1978, 
Prime Minister Fukuda again pledged to triple Japanese ODA (Rix 1980; JBIC 2003b). 
10 The search result of JICA library shows that publication titles with kokusai-ky6ryoku has 
246 hits in the 1980s and 356 hits in the 1990s with only 74 hits in the 1970s. Although a 
somewhat crude indicator, it still gives some sense of the changes. 
11 Total 13 billion US dollar 'cash-contribution' to the first Gulf war in 1991 sparked the 
debates (kokusai-Wken-ron) (Takatsuji 1994; Murai 1999). However, again, this tenn 
kokusai-k5ken (international contribution) has been often interchangeably used with 
kokusai-kv6iyoku, ODA, 'enjyo', and also UN Peacekeeping Operations (Kusano 1997). 
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original objective. Economic cooperation has indeed been pre-eminent and 
has sought to serve Japan's "kokueki " (self economic interest) (Hasegawa 
1975: 7). 
4.2. Kokusai Kydryoku: Structure and Players 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 1990s Northern donors took environmental 
issues more seriously than in the past. In the case of Japan's international 
cooperation, this 'greening' process started in the late 1980s in step with 
other Northern donors. Having become the world's largest donor after 1989, 
Japan was under greater international pressure to promote environmental 
consideration (kanky5-hairyo) and environmental aid (kanky5-enjyo) (Potter 
1994). As a result, environmental guidelines were revised and 
environmental aid was increased (see below). In order to examine this 
'greening' trend in kokusai-ky5ryoku, the next section briefly sets out the 
basic structure and key players in Japanese international cooperation 
including both ODA and OOF. Fuller consideration of these agencies is 
given later in this chapter in the context of a discussion of the greening 
issue. 
4.2.1. Implementing Agencies 
There were three agencies that performed ODA and Other Official Finance 
(OOF) operations until the establishment of the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation in 1999. As this research focuses mainly on the 1990s, it 
considers those agencies that operated in the pre-JBIC system in relation to 
the ODA and OOF categories (Figure 4.3; see below). " 
12 As a new focus in Prime Minister Koizumils reform initiative, since November 2005 the 
Japanese government has been considering abolition of the JIBIC by transferring the JBIC's 
functions of providing yen-loans to the JICA - while the export credit agency function is 
being considered to be transferred to other national banks or completely privatised (Kyodo- 
tsushin 2005; The Japan Times 2005b, 2005c). However, in spite of its significance to 
present Japan's international cooperation, this event 
is beyond the remit of this study due to 
the focus on the 1990s - and therefore, is not investigated. 
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In the period under investigation in this thesis, ODA was implemented by 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), while the Export and Import Bank of 
Japan (JEXIM) performed OOF operations. Despite its public image as an 
ODA agency, some OECF operations overlapped with JEXIM's OOF 
operations (JBIC 2003a). However, in this thesis, OECF is mainly studied as 
an ODA implementing agency while JEXIM is examined as an OOF 
executing agency. For ODA, JICA has dealt with bilateral grants providing 
technical assistance (e. g. development studies, technical cooperation) and 
grant aid (e. g. disaster relief, food aid). OECF has mainly dealt with yen- 
shakkan (bilateral yen loans), such as project and non-project loans as well 
as debt rescheduling. As for OOF, JEXIM has carried out export-import 
credits, overseas investment loans, untied loans, and guarantees as an export 
credit agency (ECA), which mainly "supports Japanese corporations" 
(Hama 2005: 39). Each agency has been overseen by different government 
ministries (for instance, JICA by MOFA, OECF by EPA and JEXIM by 
MOF) and aid decision has been made by 19 government bodies. This 
suggests fragmentation and the power struggle within its aid mechanism 
(see below). 
This initial outline of the implementing agencies underscores the need to 
investigate both ODA and OOF as Japanese international cooperation since 
the distinction between the two has always been rather ambiguous (Rix 
1980; Potter 1996). The next section further investigates the unique features 
of Japan's international cooperation including the request-based approach 
(y5sei-shugi), self-help effort Yýyo-doryoku) and structure. 
4.2.2. Ydsei-shugi (Request-based Approach) 
The request-based approach (y5sei-shugi) has also made Japanese aid 
distinctive among Northern donors. Indeed, it is claimed that it is openly 
welcomed by developing countries (Yamamoto, interview, 2002). To the 
extent that this is true, the reason may partly reside in the fact that Japan 
waits for the formal request from recipients, thereby differing from other 
Northern donors who impose I intrusive' (oshitsuke-gamashij conditionality 
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on recipients. Being 'not intrusive' is indeed one of the most important 
cultural codes in Japanese society along with not causing inconvenience or 
trouble to others (meiwaku), while being indirect too in making any 
sensitive remarks (Tobin, Wu and Davidson 1988; Lee 1994). As the 
request-based approach fits these cultural codes, it thereby also gains 
legitimacy in Japan. 
This practice that is historically rooted as noted above as well as culturally 
based is important in the general evolution of the global aid process. 
Consider, for example, the practice of other Northern donors like the United 
States Agency of International Development (USAID) and the World Bank 
which have their own well-defined funding priorities and objectives (see 
Potter 1996; Ellerman et al. 2001; Weaver 2003). As such, both donors 
therefore conduct project identification in a proactive manner, and also 
formally and overtly shape the nature and conditions of the projects they 
fund. As a result, projects are already well formulated even before the 
recipients' implementing agencies step into the aid process (Potter 1996; 
Ellerman et al. 2001; Weaver 2003). 
In contrast, in the Japanese aid programme, recipient implementing agencies 
play a formal and key role by starting the project request process. Here, the 
recipient itself prioritises the projects to be requested. However, from 
project identification to implementation, Japanese aid bureaucrats also 
depend heavily on Japanese private firms for advice and support (Arase 
1994). The individual interests of these firms are thus incorporated into the 
aid project from the start, which makes the Japanese aid programme quite 
fragmented. As Japanese private corporations act as the 'middlemen', they 
wield great influence over political leaders and aid bureaucrats - resorting 
even to bribery where necessary (NHK shuzaihan 1996; Kerr 2001; Komori 
2002). 
Japanese aid programmes, meanwhile, are very attractive to political leaders 
in developing countries. Above all, these leaders attempt to adapt such aid to 
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suit their own political agendas. " Since recipient aid negotiators are often 
political appointees, their work can be easily guided by their bosses, albeit, 
subject to occasional disruption due to NGO or media exposure (see below 
and Chapter 5). 
Clearly, then, the request-based approach does not work only in Japan's 
favour, as it requires recipient government involvement from the start. Even 
when the recipient's request and Japan's interests match, scholars argue that 
there is often 'slippage' between the donor's conditionality and the actual 
performance of recipient governments (Connolly 1996; Potter 1996; 
Villanger 2006). The 'slippage' here can be due to different priorities, but in 
some cases, it is the recipient government that deliberately plans it so (Potter 
1996). 14 
The discussion here of the request-based approach confirms that, in 
investigating the implementation level of Japanese aid projects, it is 
essential to consider the role of aid players in the recipient country as 
integral parts of the Japanese aid system. 
4.2.3. Jijyo-doryoku (Self-help efforts) 
In addition to the request-based approach, there is also a unique philosophy 
that contributes to the distinctive nature of Japanese aid giving manners - 
that is, self-help efforts (jyyo-doryoku). Japanese aid has been widely 
criticised for emphasising loans over grants (Potter 1996; Sbderberg 1996). 
According to the Japanese government, however, providing loans is 
essential because it helps promote self-help efforts by recipients in terms of 
economic development because, unlike grants, loans must be repaid (MOFA 
2003a). 
13 in the Philippines, it is well-known that presidents often make use of those aid 
programmes for their own political agendas. 
For example, President Arroyo's face is put on 
all of the MRT (monorail in Metro 
Manila) stations and tickets, which is built with 
Japanese aid money (Direct Observation 2004). 
14 This is discussed in Chapter 6 with the El Nido-Tay Tay coastal road rehabilitation 
project. 
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Indeed, key top-level policy pronouncements confirm this stance. Both the 
ODA Charter (MOFA 1992) and Medium-term Policy on Official 
Development Assistance (MOFA 1999) thus emphasise that it is important 
to support self-help efforts and associated initiatives of developing countries 
for economic development. " This philosophy is seen mainly to derive from 
how the Japanese evaluate the success of their own economic development. 
It is thus widely perceived among the Japanese public that, for example, 
Japan's post-war economic 'miracle' has been achieved, above all, through 
their self-help (Arase 1995; S6derberg 1996; MOFA 2003a, 2003d, 2003e). 
Yet, once loans are disbursed, there is often little room for the Japanese 
government to actually influence how the recipient uses the loans, mostly 
due to bilateral diplomatic sensitivity (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986; Direct 
observation of JBIC's testimony at the Kotopanjang Court hearing 13 
November 2003). Moreover, since the money is borrowed (rather than being 
a grant), recipient governments are more reluctant than usual to be 
instructed about how to use the money. That said, recently, the term self- 
help is being increasingly replaced by the word 'ownership' (Gotou 2003). 
Since the mid 1990s, the Japanese government uses both English words to 
describe jýyo-doryoku (MOFA 1997a, 1997b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e). 
Ownership, like self-help, emphasises still the role of the recipient in 
successful aid delivery and economic development including 
implementation of appropriate environmental consideration (kanky5-hairyo) 
(MOFA 2002b; Usui, interview, 2004). However, it nonetheless supports a 
subtle re-positioning of the terms of engagement between donor and 
recipient. 
4.2.4. The General Pattern for the Aid Decision-making 
Process 
As noted under the request-based approach, Japan cannot act without a 
formal request from a recipient government through official diplomatic 
channels. 
16 However, preparing a request is not an easy matter because 
Some scholars praise this as an effective aid policy which has been vindicated 
by the 
successful economic development in 
Southeast Asia (Hanabusa 1991; S6derberg 1996). 
16 A request can also be made either during the state visit of a 
Japanese Prime Minister to a 
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recipients often do not understand the complicated procedures - therefore, 
expert assistance is required (Arase 1995; Potter 1996). Just like each 
reparation case was prepared by the Japanese private sector, so too there has 
been participation by Japanese consulting companies and powerful s5g5- 
sh5sha (general trading company) in all stages of the aid process 
(Dauvergne 1997; see below). 
When a recipient government finally makes an official request, assessment 
by the relevant Japanese government agencies starts. This process is not 
open to public view with much of the work carried on through a process 
known as yon-sho5ch(5-taisei or four-ministry consultation (see Figure 
4.3). " Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery and Ministry of Transportation are consulted when necessary (Hama 
2005). After a decision is made as a result of this process, an offer is 
conveyed to a recipient government with a draft agreement. Then, the 
agreement leads to an exchange of formal papers between the two 
governments, which is the last stage of the aid decision-making process. 
4.2.5. Power Structure and the Aid Bureaucracy 
To appreciate the evolution of Japanese aid policymaking, it is important to 
recognise that the process is not only "fragmented" but also "centralized" 
(Potter 1996: x; see also Orr 1990; Rix 1993). As a senior officer from 
MOFA (Kazuo Sunaga in MOFA 2003b Online) admitted "decision-making 
of Japanese ODA has been, to a large extent, done in Tokyo. " It is thus a 
centralised and bureaucratic exercise in Tokyo without much non- 
governmental player involvement (Forrest 199 1; Hama 2005). As Figure 4.4 
illustrates, it is simultaneously quite fragmented in the sense that these are 
many official agencies potentially involved - therefore, giving room for 
recipient country or vice versa. They are often called 'temiyage-anken' (gift project) (Sumi 
1991). The Japanese government usually announces the aid provision to the most wanted 
project by the recipient government during those state visits. This is also true in the case of 
the San Roque Multipurpose Dam (see Chapter 5). Moreover, during President Aroyo's 
state visit to Japan in December 2002, two projects worth 6.7 billion JPY were signed: 
(FOEJ 1997; MOFA 2002d, 2002e). 
17 This has consisted of MOFA, MOF, MITI and EPA who review project proposals and 
make decisions, particularly for loans, unlike other Northern aid agencies (Potter 1996; 
Sbderberg 1996). 
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inconsistency and power struggle among these agencies (Orr 1990; 
S6derberg 1996). While the four key ministries are most influential, other 
government bodies have their own aid budget and hence retain a certain 
degree of power regarding policy (Potter 1996; FOEJ 1997; Hama 2005). " 
Due to this fragmentation, inter-ministry communication, coordination and 
cooperation is vital yet rarely occurs in a adequate manner - causing much 
confusion not only among Japanese aid agencies but also with the recipient 
governments as well (MOFA 2002a; Potter 1996). 
Figure. 4.4. ODA Budget Allocation by Government Body 
G Ministry of Finance N Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
0 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 13 Ministry of Education 
M Econoimc Planning Agency D Ministry of Agriculture 
M Ministry of Health and Welfare 13 Ministry of Labour 
M Management and Coordination Agency M Ministry of Transportation 
[3 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication M Ministry of Construction 
M Environment Agency M Science and Technology Agency 
M Ministry of Justice M National Police Agency 
M National Land Agency [3 Ministry of Home Affairs 
0 Prime Minister's Office 
Source: Adapted from FOEJ (1997: 16). 
To a greater extent than in the case with many other Northern donors, 
therefore, there is intense politics that takes place within the aid bureaucracy 
18 Although MOF and MOFA are two major powers in aid bureaucracy, MOF is the most 
powerful player as it controls the budget (S6derberg 1996; FOEJ 1997). 
Indeed, the 
Financial Times (March 16 1995) reported the merger of OECF and JEXIM as a result of 
the Japanese government attempt to limit the power of MOF (S6derberg 1996) that was 
originally, according to one anonymous source, to abolish the 
JEXIM rather than merge 
with OECF (Hatake*, interview, 2004). 
It is also worth noting that MOF officials are also 
well-known for their arrogance and authoritarianism, which is shown in their 
lack of effort 
(or even an superficial attempt) to make good public relations 
(Hatae, interview, 2003; 
Matsumoto, interview, 2003; see also Dauvergne 1997). 
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in Tokyo - especially, as Japan lacks one single lead aid agency, such as the 
USAID in the US, or the Department for International Development (DFID) 
in the UK (see JACSES 1996; DFID 2001; USAID 2006). The 
fragmentation was accentuated by key aid agencies being controlled by 
different ministries: OECF in the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), JICA 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and JEXIM in the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; see 
Figure 4.3). As a result, political support for aid tends to be dissipated due to 
the different interests of ministries, which amplifies inconsistency as well as 
weakness in Japan's international cooperation (Potter 1996). Such 
fragmentation is exacerbated by the request-based approach which also 
builds into the system a myriad of Japanese corporate and recipient country 
actors' interests. These two factors greatly contribute to the Japanese 
government being unable to control aid policy effectively. 
Although key economic bureaucrats (in MOF, MITI and EPA) had been the 
dominant power at the beginning of economic cooperation, internal strife 
among ministries became more and more serious as the aid budget grew. 
The rivalry is particularly noticeable between economic bureaucrats and 
MOFA officials as the latter has increasingly relied on aid (economic 
sources) to win international prestige and influence since the 1980s (Arase 
1995; see Alesina and Dollar 2000). In so doing, the MOFA amplified its 
role in aid decision-making, which intensified the tension between 
economic bureaucrats (Hirai, interview, 2003; Murai, interview, 2003). The 
augmented power of MOFA within Japan's aid bureaucratic system can be 
also noticed from more frequent use of term international cooperation that 
the MOFA has preferably employed (see above). 
This section has considered the structure and key players of Japan's 
international cooperation in order to appreciate the overall practice of the 
system. The next section, in turn, examines the general greening process of 
Japan's international cooperation during the 1990s while focusing on the 
key agencies and policy shifts. 
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4.3. Strengthening Environmental Assessment 
In step with other Northern donors who began to take environmental issues 
on board in their aid agenda, the Japanese cabinet adopted an ODA Charter 
in June 1992 - considered to be the first Japan's ODA policy with basic 
principles and philosophy stated. The Charter notably emphasised the 
importance of sustainable development and environmental conservation as a 
global task, and also declared "[e]nvironmental conservation and 
development should be pursued in tandem" (Section 2.1 of MOFA 1992). 
This stance was reiterated in the 1999 Medium-term Policy on Official 
Development Assistance (MOFA 1999) which explicitly listed 
environmental issues (such as conservation and pollution) as a high priority. 
With such top-level 'greening' in place, individual agencies began their own 
6greening' processes, as environmental issues were pushed up by the 
bureaucratic agenda. 
This set of top-level policy pronouncements was quite a departure from the 
past. As the Japanese government lacked even a basic fori-nal philosophy 
and set of guiding principles concerning aid operations before the end of the 
1980s, there had never before been official guidelines to check or monitor 
the environmental impact of Japanese aid. However, with a series of 
recommendations and guidelines adopted by the OECD"and 'green' 
pronouncements emanating from the Japanese cabinet itself, the three key 
international cooperation agencies (JICA, OECF and JEXIM) began their 
own greening process by elaborating environmental guidelines as well as 
reorganising organisational structures (JICA 1992,2001a, 2001b; JEXIM 
1993,1999a; JBIC 1999c, 1999d, 2003b, 2003c). 
Like many other Northern aid agencies, the greening of Japanese agencies 
notably concerned the environmental assessment process in the aid project 
itself (JACSES 1996; JICA 1988,1990; OECF 1997). As a policy 
19 Recommendations of the Directorate on Development Assistance Projects and 
Environmental Assessment of Projects (1985), Environment Checklist 
for Development 
Assistance (1989), Good Practicesfor Environmental Assessment of 
Development Projects 
(1991), Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and 
Resettlement in 
Developing Countries (199 1), Good Practices for Country 
Environmental Surveys and 
Strategies and Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global 
Environmental Problems (1991). 
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procedure, the three Japanese agencies reinforced environmental 
consideration (kanky5-hairyo) and verification of environmental 
consideration (kanky5-hairyo-kakunin). 20 
As Figure 4.5 shows, the three agencies become involved at different stages 
of the environmental assessment process - for example, JICA in 
environmental consideration and OECF and JEXIM in verification of 
environmental consideration and monitoring. Due to their commitment to 
the different stages of the environmental assessment process, their 
dedication to it also varies in ODA and OOF operations according to their 
concessionality requirements and business orientation. For instance, the 
environmental assessment process of ODA agencies (JICA and OECF) were 
procedurally more committed than that of the JEXIM's (Dauvergne 1997; 
FOEJ 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003). 
The approach to environmental assessment in Japanese foreign aid also 
reflects domestic practices. Thus, EIA practice in the Japanese national 
context strengthened the predisposition of those agencies to implement 
environmental assessment. Crucially, it does so in a particular way. For 
example, EIA is used in Japan at the end of decision-making process simply 
to give a go ahead sign (Barrett and Therivel 1991; Broadbent 1998; 
Harashina 2000). Therefore, project approval is justified as the system is 
designed to ensure environmental consideration in the process while not 
causing unnecessary delays and costs. In fact, considering EIA practice is 
performed by the companies or consultants hired by them, 21 it is unlikely to 
find that a proposed project has environmentally harmful impacts (Glasson 
et al. 2005). 
20 As this research focuses on Japan's bilateral international cooperation, the environmental 
assessment process is studied according to Japanese policy terminologies. However, in 
order to avoid confusion, although the Japanese translation for the term kankv5-hairyo- 
kakunin is environmental consideration confirmation, this thesis uses instead verification of 
environmental consideration. 
21 Large Japanese corporations often have subsidiaries that specialise in environment/ 
development consulting or engineering. In most cases, those subsidiaries carry out the EIA 
practice for their mother companies. For instance, both Tokyo Electric Power 
Company and 
Kansai Electric Co. have such subsidiaries (Takahashi, interview, 2004; The General 
Environmental Technos 2004; Tokyo Electric Power Services 2002) 
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Chapter Four 
In addition, the close relationship between the Japanese government and the 
private sector means that EIA practice is readily manipulated; that is, 
Japan's closed decision-making system provides the Japanese private sector 
with significant power to influence government ministries (Arase 1994; 
Broadbent 1998; Imura 1997; Kerr 2001; Mason 1999; McCormack 1998; 
Revell 2003; Woo-Cummings 1999). 22 
It would be wrong, though, to dismiss out of hand the process of greening in 
Japanese aid despite this Japanese domestic context of superficial 
environmental assessment. In the following discussion, therefore,, the two 
main procedures (environmental consideration and its verification) of that 
process are considered as well as associated organisational changes in the 
key agencies involved. 
4.3.1. Greening of JICA: Assisting the Recipient's 
Environmental Consideration 
JICA was the first Japanese aid agency that responded to global green 
trends. By establishing an Aid Study Committee on the Environment in 
19885 it emphasised the significance of environmental consideration in aid 
projects. That committee thereafter produced an important report that set out 
the parameters of proposed policies as well as associated recommendations, 
while discussing a more systematic and comprehensive system to tackle 
environmental problems in general (JICA 1988). 
Based on the recommendations contained in this 1988 report, JICA 
produced the first aid-related JICA environmental guideline in 1990. Of 
particular interest to this thesis, it focused on the issue of the environmental 
impact of dams which was an important element in Japan's aid at that time 
(see Chapter 5). Later, JICA was to specify further guidelines on other 
sectors, including agriculture, forestry, harbours, roads, and tourism. In 
1989, it also established a dedicated Environment Section (Kanky5-sitsu) to 
22 For example, the role of the dominant national idea of 'dokenkokka' (the construction 
state) - which is related to public works - 
is attributed to many environmental problems in 
Japan (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 1998; Kerr 2001). This particular issue is often 
linked to the 'iron triangle' of private corporations, politicians, and bureaucrats who support 
(as well as benefit from) Japan's gigantic public works (Mason 1999; Kerr 2001) 
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coordinate all JICA activities concerning environmental protection. This 
Section later became the Environment and Women in Development 
Division in 1993, and the Global Issues Division in 2000 (JICA 2002a). 
It is important to note that JICA is usually the only Japanese agency that 
actually participates in the recipient's environmental assessment in order to 
reduce a project's potential environmental impact at the early stage of its 
preparation (JICA 1988,2002b; JACSES 1996; Hama 2005). Thus, any 
greening of JICA's organisational structure and policy would logically have 
a direct impact on the recipient's activities. Indeed, as Figure 4.5 shows, it is 
JICA as well as consulting companies commissioned by JICA that perform 
the environmental consideration work. However, formal responsibility for 
this activity rests in the hands of the recipient government, and hence not 
JICA since the latter merely assists the former (Usui, interview, 2004; see 
also JICA 1988). 23 
Central to making sense of possible JICA greening is the development study 
(kaihatsu-ch5sa) where environmental consideration is actually carried out 
by JICA (or consultants hired by JICA). The development study itself is 
comprised of several component studies that are related to the project 
assessment procedure including a preparatory study, a feasibility study and a 
master plan study. 24 However, it is only the preparatory study here that is 
subject to the JICA guideline - although it is important to note that this 
study is a pre-requisite for the subsequent master plan study and feasibility 
study (see Table 4.1). With the result of the preparatory study at hand, JICA 
or its commissioned companies then performs master plan studies or 
feasibility studies according to the recipient country's envirom-nental 
regulations (JICA 1989,1992; MOT 1996b). 
23 This point is often strongly emphasised by Japanese aid officials when asked about the 
implementation of environmental consideration and problems related to it. Thus, the 
Japanese government including JICA is "neither an owner or an executing body of the 
project [as] we only assist the recipient government with poor capacity " (Usui, interview, 
2004). 
24 The master plan study generally relates to a project with a bigger geographical scale and 
a more comprehensive development focus (such as a regional 
development plan as 
exemplified in Chapter 6) while a feasibility study 
(discussed in Chapter 5) is confined to a 
particular project and its technical, economic, and socio-environmental viability 
(JICA 
2001a). 
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Table 4.1. JICA! s 
Development Study 
Environmental Consideration Procedure for 
Project Implementation Stages Environmental Consideration Stages 
Preparatory Study Preliminary Environmental Survey 
- JICA environmental guideline applied 
Maste 
JICXS 
Implementation Full- Plan Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) 
scale Study 
study Feasibility Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
I Study 
Sources: JICA (1990,1992) 
Figure 4.6. Detailed Procedural Activities of JICA Development Study 
Stages of activity Details 
Project Requested study/project finding Preliminary screening: 
excavation 
(Purofal) estimating the needs 
(Anken- I of IEE or EIA 
hakkutsu) Terns of Reference (TOR) received I I 
TOR examined 
Screening: confirming 
preliminary screening 
Preparatory Study (Field research) (the need of IEE or 
Preparatory I EIA) 
study Agreement on Scope of Work (S/W) 
discussion ý Scoping: decision 
on priority areas in 
Producing preparatory study report IEE or EIA 
Selecting I Producing S/W 
consulting I 
company Consulting company selected 
I 
Producing Initial Check Report and its 
discussion 
Full-scale Conducting IEE or EIA 
study I 
Presenting Draft Final Report and 
discussion 
Producing Final Report 
Sou rces: JI CA (1990: 6-9; 1992). 
Figure 4.6 sets out detailed procedural activities which are integral to the 
overall development study. The latter starts with project 
4excavation' 
(anken-hakkutsu) as it assists the recipient to specify a project through so- 
called project finding (purofai). 
Thereby, this Tokyo-based activity 
essentially involves preliminary screening 
to see whether a recipient's 
proposal needs an 
Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or 
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). After the Terms of Reference are 
received and examined, the JICA research team is dispatched to a project 
site to carry out a 'scoping' activity whereby the detailed scope of work is 
agreed between JICA and the recipient. And finally, a scope of work for a 
master plan study or feasibility study is finalised, even as a consulting 
company is then hired by JICA to complete an IEE or EIA as well as to 
conclude the study report. 
This complex set of provisions provides ample scope, in theory at least, for 
a full environmental consideration of a proposed project. Indeed, even If a 
project was 'excavated' with minimal environmental consideration at the 
start, other elements in the chain of procedures can enable supplementary 
analysis. Still, there arise environmentally destructive projects in spite of the 
array of formal procedures adopted. To understand why this happens, it is 
necessary to address the implementation structure of the development study 
where there are major organisational problems within JICA as well as 
associated operational processes. Chapter 2 briefly mentioned concerns over 
these development studies as most of them are carried out by private 
consultancies. Indeed, the Japanese Special Investigation Committee on 
Economic Cooperation to the Philippines in 1986 (National Diet 1986e, 
1986f, 1986g) discussed such problems in assessing the San Roque Dam 
project fiasco (see Chapter 5). 
Given the importance of any implications for possible greening, these 
deficiencies merit close attention here. Five key institutional and operational 
problems within JICA as well as the associated commissioning process are 
thus considered. 
The first problem derives from JICNs own organisational structure, namely 
the lack of staff able to go into the field. As the request-based approach 
requires a recipient government to propose projects to the Japanese 
government, JICA through its project finding activities needs to assist 
recipients with poor institutional capability to make an official request. 
However, the former Vice President of JICA, Taiz6 Nakamura, explained 
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that due to the "scale of ... the staff, [number] 
" although it would be an 
ideal situation for JICA ... to excavate (hakkutsu) all projects, it is almost 
impossible to [do so, thus, JICA intends] to use private sector initiatives for 
these reasons" (cited in National Diet 1987: 18). Thus, "most of the projects 
are formed by the private consulting companies' hakkutsu-sagy5- 
(excavation) and not JICA itself, he added (National Diet 1987: 17). And 
yet, this argument is highly problematic considering the private sector's 
vested interest in promoting aid activities in recipient countries to their own 
benefit (see below). Indeed, it is especially problematic in the initial project 
stage since this one is dedicated to identifying the recipient's development 
needs and aims to "improve the people's life quality in the developing 
countries" (MOFA 2003a: 5). 
The second problem relates to the political influence that is wielded by 
powerful actors at the initial stage of the development study. This problem 
was acknowledged as a crucial one to be tackled by the Japanese 
government as early as 1973 (MOFA 1973; National Diet 1987). The 
leading role of the Japanese company in 'excavation' has a long history 
starting with the post-war reparation process. Further, given the nature of the 
aid process, the personal interests of recipient political leaders often become 
entangled in project formulation and selection. Indeed, two sets of interests 
are linked: consulting companies are usually subsidiaries of big Japanese 
corporations that enjoy close ties to Philippine political and economic elites 
(Boyce 1993; Takahashi 1993; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; MON 2003). 
The third problem concerns the business interests of the big Japanese 
corporations often camouflaged behind "dummy" subsidiaries (National 
Diet 1986e: 24). As discussed above, from the very start of project 
preparation, consulting companies reflect their 'mother' corporations' 
business interests during their input to the feasibility study and project 
finding. This close relationship was not opposed by the Japanese 
25 In the year (1987) that he made the remarks, JICA had only 7 employees in the Manila 
office, who were managing 12 projects worth II billion JPY (National Diet 1987; MOFA 
2002a). During the Committee, the number of Philippine-based employees of JICA (7) and 
USAID (3 1) were compared (National Diet 1987: 18). Although it is not strictly a fair 
comparison because USAID combines 
both the functions of JICA and OECF, one cannot 
dismiss the fact that JICA staff (or Japanese aid staff as a whole) is overworked and 
responsible for such large budget 
(Forrest 1991; Dauvergne 1997; Hirai, interview, 2003). 
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government. To the contrary, the latter even helped the private sector to have 
close ties with recipient governments. Thus, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry long subsidised a private consulting company, the Japan Consulting 
Institute (nihon-puranto-ky5kai)" from its ODA budget to work on project 
finding. The subsidy was for the company to establish close ties with the 
recipient country from the early stage of the project (National Diet 1986g). 
The implementing stage of the development study is thus designed, in part, 
to advance Japanese business interests with the blessing and support of the 
Japanese government. This dynamic sets up a possible mechanism for large 
Japanese corporation that provides an opportunity to even legitimise their 
business interests in aid projects and encourages them to strengthen the ties 
with recipient governments. 
The fourth problem is related to the JICA commissioning process itself and 
specifically, its perceived objectivity in selecting consulting companies to do 
the job. Up to 1986, a period encompassing the San Roque Multipurpose 
Dam Project considered in Chapter 5, the process involving JICA's 
development study had addressed 16 project proposals for official request 
relating to the Philippines (National Diet 1986e). However, five out of these 
16 proposals were contracted out to only two favoured companies: Sanyu 
Consultants and Japan Overseas Consultants Ltd. Indeed, while there were 
over 300 registered Japanese consulting companies, only 1% of this total 
accounted for more than 31% of the 16 projects. This sort of record led to 
the suspicion that favouritism was being shown to key firms. Most of the 
contracts were in fact strongly criticised as being subjectively selected by 
JICA officials (National Diet 1986h, 1986i; Murai et al. 1989; FOEJ 1997; 
Yamamoto, interview, 2002). This issue concerning bias in the selection 
process became even more controversial after one senior JICA officer was 
arrested on bribery charges in August 1986 (National Diet 1986h, 1986i). 27 
2' Nihon-puranto-ky5kai, if directly translated into English, is 'Japan plant association'. As 
the Japanese name implies, the company provides consulting on plant construction, 
operation and maintenance in developing countries. Still, Japanese government subsidises 
the Institute from its ODA budget (Japan Consulting Institute 2003). 
27 The case occurred during the selection process of a rural development project in 
Morocco. The JICA official received a bribe from the consulting company Chii6kaihatsu. In 
return, the official made a favourable arrangement for the company to enter a contract for 
the project. The official and the executive manager of the consulting company were arrested 
as a result (National Diet 1986h, 1986i). 
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Lastly, there were concerns raised in terms of the quality of corporate 
performance (i. e. 6value for money'). Thus, the performance of Japanese 
companies was widely regarded as being poorer than that of their North 
American and European counterparts (National Diet 1986e: 24; Aratame, 
interview, 2004). In this light, a former Japanese development consultant 
commented, "if you look at the contractor list of the World Bank, [an 
organisation] that requires a higher level of performance with stricter 
guidelines than [indeed] that of the Japanese aid agencies, you hardly see 
any Japanese consulting companies" (Aratame, interview, 2004; see also 
Forrest 1991). Between 2000 and 2004, the World Bank made a total of 97 
consultant contracts for its projects in the Philippines. Among 97 projects, 
only three were commissioned to Japanese companies (World Bank 2005). 
Clearly, big Japanese consulting firms were closely linked to and supportive 
of the great growth in Japanese aid in the post-World War 11 era, especially 
in East and Southeast Asia where more than 50% of Japanese aid has been 
allocated since 1970 (MOFA 1997a, 1997b). As Figure 4.7 shows, Japanese 
aid has indeed been concentrated there, albeit with a weakening focus, over 
the years. 
Figure 4.7. Japanese Aid Allocation to East/Southeast Asia 1970- 1997 
100% 
80%-V 98.2% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Source: Adapted from MOFA (1 997a, 1997b) 
Whatever the vicissitudes of Japanese aid flows, what is of greatest interest 
here is the significant role played by consulting companies in development 
study implementation throughout this period. 
It is critical therefore that we 
appreciate how the 'greening' of JICA 
in the 1990s may have affected the 
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consulting companies as aid project contractors even as the manner in which 
the latter may have influenced the former is also considered. Thus, the 
consulting companies are studied in relation to JICA in terrns of the 
environmental consideration practices of these companies. 
In theory, the practice of consulting companies has undergone 'greening' in 
step with JICXs ever more rigorously articulated environmental guidelines. 
However, the degree of greening in actual practice here has been described 
by one industry insider as "quite difficult and unsuccessful" (Kimura*, 
interview, 2003). 28 
This situation originates from the business-oriented nature of consulting 
companies discussed earlier. Yet, in turn, the "kou to otsu no kankei" (the 
relations between the client and the contractor) also constrains the potential 
greening of consulting companies (Hirai, interview, 2003). For consulting 
companies, JICA is the client but more importantly "okami" (Hashimoto 
2002; Murai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003). This power 
dynamic created a condition for the development study implementation to 
be 'quite difficult and unsuccessful' in terms of environmental 
consideration. The crucial condition limiting the possible effectiveness of 
Japanese aid in this respect was thus that JICA has no flexibility on either its 
budget or the time span by which a study must be completed. This process 
was strongly influenced by the fiscal year of the Japanese national budget 
within which a particular study falls, and hence not to the specific 
conditions of a proposed project (Kerr 2001; Hori, interview, 2003). This 
inflexibility limits possible greening during the development study stage 
since the consulting companies did not have control over time or budget to 
produce alternative plans to minimise envirom-nental degradation when a 
project was predicted to have serious adverse socio-environmental impacts 
(Kimura*, interview, 2003). This particular issue will be further considered 
in relation to JBIC's practice too (see Chapter 6). 
28 In order to protect informants, names have sometimes been changed for citation 
purposes. Thus, the names with * are anonymous informants. 
29 Okami (something or somebody high above) is still a very widely used term to refer to 
the government in Japan. According to Japanese dictionaries, the term refers to the 
institutions that administer the state affairs such as government or bakufu (the old 
expression for the government) in the most respectable way. This term clearly suggests the 
hierarchical relationship of the Japanese government with its people (see Mason 1999). 
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Indeed, the unique nature of the environmental consideration (comprising 
both social and ecological aspects) in the project procedure could mean that 
it was a costly element in the overall budget. Thus, for example, the 
procedure typically required two specialists: one for social assessment and 
the other for environmental assessment (Kimura*, interview, 2003; 
Tamondong, interview, 2004; see also JICA 2001 a, 2001b, 2004). However, 
attempts to allocate two specialists were often denied in practice with senior 
JICA managers ordering that there be only one specialist mainly in order to 
achieve cost reductions. 
A powerful added factor influencing the Japanese aid process was that the 
recipient government often simply desired to see a project accepted and 
without costly work on their part in the process (Ross 1994; Lee and George 
2000a). This point was critical since, as we have noted, it was the recipient 
government that is formally responsible for the environmental consideration 
procedure. Thus, the combination of a weak capacity and desperate wish to 
see projects realised could mean that the recipient might manipulate the EIA 
result to guarantee a positive outcome (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987; Ross 
1994). 
However, critics alleged that the Japanese government turned a blind eye to 
this process by simply checking in a cursory fashion the recipient's 
submitted report (Kimura*, interview, 2003; see also Miyako*, interview, 
2004). Without proper and rigorous review and checking, the EIA was thus 
66seen as a bureaucratic requirement needed to obtain project approvals" 
(Ross 1994: 217). What was more, due to the relatively weak capacity of 
most recipient governments in terms of completing the environmental 
assessment, there was an opportunity for both JICA and Japanese consulting 
companies to exert great influence on their client (Abracosa and 
Ortolano 
1987; Murai et al. 1989; FOEJ 1997). 
The development study was an important step in any effort to 'green' 
Japanese aid since it was at this stage that a recipient's needs were identified 
and where a project was assessed 
for its economic and socio-environmental 
feasibility. Yet, in spite of the need for highly scientific expertise to make 
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environmental consideration meaningful, the above discussion suggests that 
it was politics rather than science that was crucial to the outcome of the 
development study. From the start, this process was shaped by the interests 
of powerful actors in the aid business. This state of affairs, in turn, had 
important implications for understanding the specific kanky'5-hairyo 
(environmental consideration) of the two case study projects in the 
Philippines that are analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
So far, we have explored environmental consideration by looking at both 
policy procedures and practice in the context of JICA's development study. 
The following two sections examine the next stage in environmental 
assessment: namely, verification of environmental consideration. This 
aspect should be important too since, once the recipient's environmental 
consideration was completed, the donor had to "ensure that an EIA of the 
aid-assisted project takes into account ... (its) development co-operation 
standards" (OECD 1992: 10, emphasis added). This was the stage where 
Japanese agencies used their own Guidelines or Checklists to ensure that the 
recipient acted appropriately. Thus, the following two sections examine 
Overseas Economic Cooperation (OECF) for ODA projects and Export and 
Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) for OOF projects. 
4.3.2. Greening of OECF: Verifying the Recipient's 
Environmental Consideration 
Upon the recommendations of the 1988 JICA report, OECF devised in 1989 
its own environmental guidelines (OECF 1989). These guidelines included 
16 categories of projects including roads, airports, railways, sewage 
systems, power stations, mining, and so on. As most OECF-financed 
projects were infrastructure-oriented, there was a need for the recipient to 
conduct appropriate environmental consideration and for OECF to ensure 
that it was done well. 30 
30 A prior development fiasco was important here. Thus, 
Japan's lesson from initially co- 
financing the Narmada Dam in India expedited the establishment of the environmental 
guideline (Kimura 1990; 
National Diet 1990; Sumi 1992; IRN 1995a; JBIC 2003b). 
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The guidelines contained five main principles: strengthening kanky5-hairyo; 
expansion of environment-related programmes; improvement of 
environment-related infori-nation; reinforcement of kanky5-hairyo 
implementation system; and strengthening cooperation with other 
international aid agencies (OECF 1989). The guidelines were then related to 
inter-connected questions of pollution, the natural environment, and the 
associated social environment (e. g. community livelihoods and indigenous 
people). 
Table 4.2. Categories of OECF's guidelines (1995) 
Category For appraisal 
A Submission of Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report is 
required. The EIA report must be accompanied by a summary in 
English or Japanese. The project is then appraised in the light of the 
Guidelines. 
B Although submission of an EIA report is not required, the project is to 
be appraised in the light of the Guidelines. 
C Submission of EIA report is not required, and appraisal in the light of 
the Guidelines may be omitted. 
Source: OECF (1995). 
This system was elaborated and revised over the years. In 1995, for 
example, projects were classified into three categories (see Table 4.2). This 
system required notably submission of an EIA when a project is appraised 
as Category A, which is with considerable potential environmental impact. 
In addition, environmental consideration was extended to new topics 
including biodiversity, involuntary resettlement, and conservation (OECF 
1995). 
Finally, OECF also produced "A Guide to Preparing an Environmental 
Impact Assessment" that stated desirable procedures and evaluation 
methods as well as items to be checked and monitored (OECF 1997). 
The 
guide notably aimed to improve the implementation and administrative 
capacity of the recipient's EIA system in as much as that guide was 
distributed to them in advance (JBIC 2003c). 
In terms of organizational structure, OECF appointed its first environmental 
officer in 1988 in charge of environment-related issues. 
Subsequent 
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reorganisation was designed to strengthen environmental consideration. In 
1993, for instance, the Environment and Social Development Section 
(kanky5-shakai-kaihatsu-shitsu) was upgraded to a f-Lilly fledged 
Environment Section (Kanky5-shitsu), which later became the Environment 
and Social Development Department (kanky5-shakai-kaihatsu-ka). That 
said, OECF remains vague on the extent to which this apparent 
environmental focus is adequately staffed. Indeed, it proved impossible to 
even acquire basic data on staff numbers as they are "not available to the 
public" (JBIC 2004g), or simply "do not exist" (Kojima, interview, 2004). 
Whatever the reason, such institutional non-cooperation raises some doubt 
over the extent to which these sections are fully or adequately staffed - 
especially, considering all the three agencies were widely seen to be 
understaffed by international standards (Forrest 1991; Potter 1994; 
S6derberg 1996; Dauvergne 1997). 
Likely staff shortfalls have nonetheless not stopped OECF from extending 
its operations into new aspects of the aid project process. A key step here 
was the Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) programme 
created in 1988. SAPROF was designed to fix an apparent flaw in the 
Japanese ODA procedure. Thus, an officially requested project, even though 
given a high priority, may not be able to win through the strict OECF 
selection system due to financial and technological difficulties. SAPROF 
sought to address this flaw by giving guidance on 'upstream operations' 
even as projects are being first formulated and prepared (JBIC 2003c: 58; 
see Figure 4.8). 
The advent of SAPROF was also designed to reinforce the process of 
environmental consideration. Thus, for example, when the environmental 
assessments of recipient agencies are considered unsatisfactory, it is 
empowered to step in to carry out additional studies at the early stage of the 
project cycle (JBIC 2001b, 2002b, 2003c; Anda, interview, 2004; see 
below). This process is particularly relevant to this thesis as SAPROF is 
notably seen to demonstrate OECF's green commitment given its 
key role in 
environmental appraisal (JBIC 1999b; see Chapter 6). 
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Despite these various green policy commitments, OECF has been the 
subject of much criticism. The perceived problems here relate to OECF's 
complex role in Japan's international cooperation policy procedure. In 
effect, OECF's weakness is seen to reflect notably its overall place in the 
articulation of that system. Thus, OECF operations are based on the 
outcome of JICA's development study and the recipient's EIA (National 
Diet 1999; Tsuji, interview, 2004). Yet, if these activities are not properly 
conducted in the first place, then OECF's own operation cannot help but 
have the same flaws. 
True, this dilemma may be overcome by OECF)s own field survey work 
including such activities as SAPROF (National Diet 1990; JBIC 2001a). " 
However, even then, such work was not often performed in practice due to 
the shortfall of OECF staff (Kadowaki, interview, 2004). 
Further, even when an OECF survey for project appraisal has been 
conducted, the way in which the remit of the survey was narrowly defined, 
often limited the utility of this work. This was so because a survey team 
consisted of two people who were only in charge of economic and technical 
aspects of the project (S6derberg 1996). Difficulty occurred particularly 
when a targeted project had serious social and environmental problems like 
the Narmada Dam in India and the Kotopanjang Dam in Indonesia (National 
Diet 1990,2003). Thus, by defining the study area very narrowly in a 
technical fashion, the OECF team did not see the wider causes of local 
problems such as community eviction and displacement as well as 
environmental destruction of the surrounding area (National Diet 1990; IRN 
1995a; FOEJ 2002b). For example, in the case of the Narmada Dam project, 
the field survey was confined to the dam construction site as the OECF only 
funded power generation facilities there, and hence was not responsible for 
considering possible social and environmental effects elsewhere (National 
Diet 1990). 
31 The survey was to inspect economic, social, financial, technical, environmental, 
organisational and managerial aspects of the project 
(Soderberg 1996). 
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This section has considered OECF 'greening' commitment in relation to 
policy reform and organisational change, highlighting notably perceived 
problems with this process of change. Next, we turn to JEXIM - the agency 
that manages Other Official Finance (OOF) projects - to consider its 
environmental appraisal procedures. 
4.3.3. Greening of JEXIM: Verifying the Recipient' 
Environmental Consideration 
In contrast to JICA and OECF, the 'greening' of JEXIM has been less 
pronounced, undoubtedly because there was relatively little global 
consideration of this particular sector of the aid industry during the 1990s 
(Bern Declaration et al. 1998; Motoyama et al. 1998; Rich 1998,2000). 32 
Still, JEXIM did undertake some policy reform in order to improve its 
ability to verify the environmental consideration of project proponents. As 
noted above, JEXIM was the agency responsible for Other Official Finance 
(OOF) including export and import credits. 
The first action taken by JEXIM was the appointment of a senior advisor for 
environmental issues attached to the Project and Corporate Analysis 
Department in 1988. That single position later became a full-fledged 
Environment Division (kanky5-shitsu) in 1992 (JBIC 2003b). It began to 
compile sector-specific environmental manuals in 1989 which was indeed 
the first environmental checklist of its kind. Then, JEXIM established an 
Environmental Survey System" in 1991 which basically revised the 1989 
environmental manuals and further set out a policy on how to deal with 
environmental problems in loan projects. To facilitate this process, it also 
recommended employing external consultants where a project required 
monitoring with specialist knowledge. These steps culminated in 1993 
in the 
production of an Environmental Checklist designed to reinforce the 
32 This sector has come under greater scrutiny in recent years though 
(Hildyard and 
Gilfenbaum 2005; Yildiz and Hildyard 2004; see also The Comer House Online; 
ECA 
Watch Online) 
33 its official Japanese name is Purojekuto ni taisuru 
kanky6-chekku-tetsuzuki. Here, the 
Japanese term tetsuzuki is meaning a procedure. However, according to 
JEXIM official 
publications, it is translated in 
English as 'system' that Is more comprehensive and bigger in 
scale than standard use of procedures 
(JBIC 2002e, 2003). 
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verification of environmental consideration activity (JEXIM 1993; see also 
Chapter 5). 
The overall significance of these assorted measures should not be 
exaggerated, however. Thus, they did not have any basic orienting principle 
or objective as did the comparable moves by JICA and OECF around this 
time. Instead, there was simply a collection of basic checklists for II 
industrial sectors with three broad categories provided: natural environment, 
social environment, and monitoring. Clearly, JEXIM as an export credit 
agency did not establish the same depth of environmental consideration as 
the other two agencies seemed to do - it appeared rather cosmetic 
(Dauvergne 1997; Motoyama et al. 1999; see also Rich 1998,2000; 
Goldzimmer 2003). In September 1999, though, JEXIM did create fully- 
fledged Environmental Guidelines Oust before it was merged into JBIC) that 
included general principles, objectives and procedures, and that classified 
projects "in accordance with the extent of the environmental impact(s) 
and/or JEXIM's involvement in the project" (JEXIM 1999a: 2). This latter 
policy shift, nonetheless, came at the end of the period covered in this thesis 
- and hence,, does not figure significantly in our investigation. 
The limited extent of apparent greening at JEXIM has been made hard to 
verify given the notorious secrecy of this politically sensitive agency. 
Indeed, unlike the other two agencies just discussed, JEXIM's operations 
are even less well known and open to the public (FOEJ 1997,2002b; 
Motoyama et al. 1999). In a bureaucratic culture of non-transparency, basic 
institutional practice, such as the number of staff in the Environment 
Division and policy details are more often than not still classified 
(Dauvergne 1997; JBIC 2004c; see also Chapter 5). 34 
Notwithstanding patchy disclosure and field survey practices, then it is fair 
to say that environmental consideration and its verification as a policy 
procedure was elaborated in all three of the international cooperation 
agencies just considered during the 1990s. True, there are 
differences in the 
34 The 1989 environmental manuals are confidential (Dauvergne 1997), therefore are not 
available to public. 
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seeming degree of greening between the ODA implementing agencies. Yet, 
there is enough evidence - however partial and ambiguous - to suggest that 
4greening' may have been taken seriously in the 1990s. Indeed, further 
support for this view is provided by assessment of a new category of 
explicitly 'green' aid that Japan introduced in that decade. 
4.4. 'Green'Aid: Kankyd-enjyo 
Japan proclaimed its first Environmental ODA policy at the 1989 G7 
Summit pledging the disbursement of 300 billion yen over three years 
directly on environment-related matters. This policy was elaborated two 
years later when an environmental assessment system was introduced 
designed specifically to promote environmental conservation in recipient 
countries (MOFA 1999,2001c). At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Japan 
pledged a further disbursement of nearly one trillion yen over the following 
five years - the vast bulk of it in the form of highly concessional loans. As a 
result, Japan's environmental aid sharply increased (MOFA 2001 a). 
Figure 4.9. Trends of Japanese Environmental ODA Loans 
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Figure 4.10. Japanese Bilateral Environmental ODA as a Proportion of Total Japanese Bilateral ODA 
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As Figure 4.9 shows, bilateral environmental ODA loans neared the 500 
billion yen mark in 1999, then accounting for about one-third of total 
Japanese bilateral ODA (see Figure 4.10). Indeed, despite the economic 
dislocation caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, environmental aid 
continued to increase in both absolute and relative terms. Mostly, Japan's 
(green' aid was delivered on a loan basis (Potter 1994; Dauvergne 1997; 
Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Kitazawa, interview, 2006) - therefore, the aid 
component thus focused on the degree of concessionality in the interest rates 
that attached to the loans. 
Of interest here is the fact of the difference between ODA loans granted for 
regular 'development' projects and loans granted for 'environmental' 
projects. Thus, after 1995, by introducing lower rates" for environmental 
projects than those given for development projects, the Japanese 
government aimed to demonstrate its commitment to privileging 
environmental issues while providing a greater incentive to recipients to 
conserve or otherwise improve their environments (JBIC 2002c, 2003a, 
2004a). 
35 Standard environmental interest rates of 1.7% in 1995 and special concessional interest 
rates of 0.75% were introduced. The latter was applied to one of the case study projects 
(see 
Chapter 6). The typical interest rates for OECF loans were below market rates, for example, 
an average 2.65% in 1993 and 2.2% in 1999 and 2001 (Sbderberg 1996; 
JBIC 1999a, 
200 1 d). 
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Japan's formal commitment to 'greening' was publicly affirmed at the 
highest level befitting the country's growing role in global environmental 
issues and governance. Thus, former Prime Minister Ryiitar6 Hashimoto 
announced a comprehensive environmental cooperation policy in 1997, 
grandly titled 'Initiatives for Sustainable Development toward the 21st 
Century' (MOFA 1997a). This step was seen as a pivotal development in so 
far as it signalled Japan's involvement in a much wider array of 
environmental issues (such as biodiversity conservation, global warming 
and environmental capacity building) than had hitherto been the case (Potter 
36 1994; Taylor 1999; see also Revell 2003). This expanded prograrnme 
"reflected the changes in recipient's needs" (JBIC 2003b: 117). 
Yet, it was Japan's central role in the climate change negotiations and the 
hosting of the Kyoto Protocol talks that most vividly demonstrated the new 
national priority given to the environment (Mason 1999). Linked to that 
high-profile role, the 1997 Kyoto Initiative was specifically designed to 
support developing countries that were combating global warming (MOFA 
1997b). To that end, 'the most concessional terms' were offered - thus, a 
0.75% annual interest rate and a 40-year repayment period (MOFA 1997b). 
It was under this scheme that the Sustainable Environmental Management 
Pro . ect in Northern Palawan that is the focus of Chapter 6 was devised. I 
High-level support for a wider environmental remit proved to be a 'green' 
light for a series of new/ or expanded ODA initiatives. Aside from the three 
main agencies discussed above, a total of 10 other government ministries 
have participated in environmental aid since the early 1990s. 
" Indeed, the 
Green Aid Plan of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
was the best-known programme. Focused on Asia, MITI's programme 
had 
been first introduced back in 1992 to support the jUyo-doryoku (self-help 
effort) of developing countries to tackle energy and environmental problems 
36 Traditional issues covered included residential environmental improvement and 
rehabilitation, forest preservation and reforestation, ant, -Pollution measures, 
disaster 
prevention, energy/resource saving, and alternative energy 
(JICA 2001 a). 
37 These are: Science and Technology Agency; National Land Agency; 
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare; Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery; Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry; Ministry of 
Transportation; Ministry of Post and Telecommunication; 
Ministry of Construction; and Environment Agency. 
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in industries with low levels of energy efficiency (Evans 1999). By 
transferring Japan's advanced environmental technology, the subsequently 
elaborated programme aimed to help recipients work on anti-pollution 
measures for industrial activities, such as water pollution and air pollution, 
waste management and recycling, and energy conservation (MOFA 1997a; 
Evans 1999; JICA 2001a). The MITI plan was seen to be a quintessential 
Japanese contribution focused on environmental technology transfer 
because "it was not only something Japan was good at, but also [because ofl 
the achievements Japan has accumulated [in the sector] for years" 
(Takayanagi, interview, 2003; see also Barrett and Therivel 1991; Revell 
2003; Imura and Schreurs 2005). 
Top-level political support for 'greening' was reflected in other cases of 
Japan's international cooperation. Thus, the OOF component also started to 
feature more 'green' projects prominently involving such issues as 
conservation, pollution, and energy use. For instance, to promote alternative 
energy production, JEXIM co-financed with Global Environmental Facility 
the Leyte Geothermal Power Development Project in the Philippines to the 
tune of 13.3 billion yen" in 1994 (JBIC 2003b). 
And yet, this flurry of 'green' initiatives in the 1990s has provoked much 
criticism. Indeed, in spite of a significant increase in the volume of 
environmental aid, a common view is that such aid merely involves the 
same old project with a splash of 'green' paint (Potter 1994; Keohane 1996; 
Hori, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004). One high-ranking JICA 
official that I interviewed thus explained that, "as we were told to expand 
the share of kanky5-enjyo, what we eventually did was just re-categorise the 
projects under the name of kanky5-enjyo at the end of financial year as long 
as a project had any environment-related element in it" (Hori, interview, 
2003). This process was strongly criticised by Japan-based NGOs. Mekong 
Watch Japan, for example, asserted that, 
"[the Japanese] government put new names like environmental ODA 
on the old projects. For example, they continue to support 
38 This amount in Japanese yen is equal to US$ 133 million. 
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hydropower dam [construction] under the name of 'environment' by 
saying it reduces C02 emissions ... [foreign pressure] made the 
government change the label of the old schemes. Having the 'green' 
label on does not necessarily mean that the project Is 'green'. What 
the Japanese government did with kanky5-enjyo is just a matter of 
labelling, nothing else" (Matsumoto, interview, 2004; see also Potter 
1994; Keohane 1996). 
The reason why Japan can re-categorise its projects with a new green label 
in this manner is because it does not have strict official criteria on 
environmental aid as, for instance, the World Bank does (World Bank 1992; 
Franz 1996; Hama 2005). " Moreover, a definition of environmental aid has 
never been officially announced nor have there been coordination efforts 
among Japanese agencies on this matter. Considering the significant aid 
volume involved (Franz 1996; also see above), this certainly raises some 
questions over the possible 'green' contents of these enon-nous financial 
flows. However, such vagueness reflects a wider problem in the donor world 
(OECC 2001). Indeed, there has been no agreed definition or criteria for 
environmental aid among bilateral donors as "the majority of [donor] 
agencies ... have had problems in assembling conclusive information on 
specific levels of funding allocated to environment-related programmes and 
projects ... [due to confusion in conceptuali sing] what constitutes an 
environmental project (OECD 1997: 9). This absence of international 
consensus on environmental aid criteria has thus left Japan (as well as other 
donors) with considerable freedom to re-categorise existing development 
projects as environmental efforts. 
So far this chapter has explored selectively the general history of Japan's 
international cooperation and its greening efforts during the 1990s. We now 
finally turn in this chapter to the Philippines, one of the top recipients of 
Japanese aid and the recipient country focus of this thesis, in order to 
'9 In the case of the World Bank, (1992: 24): "a project is deemed 'primarily' environmental 
if either the costs of environmental protection measures included in the project, or the 
environmental benefits accruing from the project exceed 50 percent of the project's total 
costs or benefits. Projects are considered to have 'significant environmental components' if 
environmental protection costs or environmental benefits exceed 10 percent of the total 
project costs or benefits". 
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provide the necessary background for the following empirical chapters that 
provide in-depth analysis of two case study and projects. 
4.5. Japanese 'Aid'to the Philippines 
The Philippines has maintained a prominent place in Japanese aid flows due 
to historical circumstances. Thus, it was a major beneficiary of the 
reparation system discussed earlier. Indeed, it was the largest recipient of 
reparations, receiving about US$ 550 million in total (Ofreneo 1993; Tsuda 
and Yokoyarna 1999). 
Table 4.3 Japan's Reparations to the Philippines 
(JPY million) 
Sector Amount % Items 
Agriculture Irrigation and flood control (pump, tractor, 
and fishery 
12,851 6.8 etc), Farming equipment and machinery, 
fishing boat 
Electric power 1 461 0.8 
Power generator equipment, 
development , transmission wire, insulator, etc. 
Mining 966 0.5 Dump truck, refinery 
Cement plant, glass-bottle manufacturing 
Industry 30,074 15.8 plant, steel manufacturing and refinery 
plant, machinery/equipment/ materials 
for textile, paper manufacturing, car, etc. 
Rail-road coach, freighter, ferry boat, Transportation and 49,571 26.1 cargo ship, vehicle, communication 
communication device (wired and wireless devices) 
Water supply facility, airport and port 
related facility materials, school house Public works 65,402 34.4 construction material, bridge construction 
material 
Salvage of sunken 2,946 1.5 Salvaging sunken ships 
ships 
Education, Medical equipments, hospital facilities, 
sanitation, health, 9,316 4.9 equipment for education and research 
research 
Expenses of the Reparation Mission, 
Service 5,760 3.0 banking charge, bidding advertisement 
fees, export inspection fees 
Telecommunication system expansion 
Credit on reparation 6,686 2.7 and improvement plan, Manila railway 
expansion 
Consumer goods 5,102 3.5 Rayon fabric, fertilizer 
Total 190,135 100.0 
NB: Above amount equals US$ 550 million 
Source: Tsuda and Yokoyama (1999: 234) 
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Also as Table 4.3 shows, such reparations were heavily focused on 
infrastructure projects through capital goods and construction services 
(Ofreneo 1993; JBIC 2003a). 
In 1976, when the phase of official reparations had ended, international 
cooperation (kokusai-ky5ryoku) began in the form of economic cooperation 
(keizai-ky5ýyoku) with the Philippines. The basic form and objective of such 
assistance, though, was carried over from the reparation system. Thus, the 
key elements were y5sei-shugi (a request-based approach), a strong role for 
Japanese firms as suppliers and beneficiaries of economic cooperation, and 
the 'cosy' relationship between Japanese businesses, Japanese ODA zoku- 
giin'o and Philippine elites (Takahashi 1993; S6derberg 1996; Tsuda and 
Yokoyama 1999). 
Japanese assistance has therefore had a great influence on the political 
economy of the Philippines with Japan being the largest single donor to the 
country for more than two decades (Inada 1990; Embassy of Japan in the 
Philippines 2003). Such a prominent role has drawn criticism. For example, 
critics of the reparation agreement observed, that 'enjyo' "... peg(ged) 
Philippine industries to the raw-material needs of Japan... [and reduced] the 
Philippines into an economic vassal of Japan" (Ohno 1986: 123; see also 
Ofreneo 1993; NHK shuzaihan 1996; MON 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d). 
Indeed, although it was one of the most economically advanced developing 
countries before the mid-1960s in Asia, the Philippines has lagged behind 
neighbouring countries in terms of economic development ever since (Broad 
1989; Boyce 1993; Takahashi 1993). 41 That Japan's aid to the Philippines 
has generated debate is clear and diverse aspects of this controversial aid 
process are examined in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Before turning to 
that empirical analysis, the next section highlights general trends in the 
40 Diet members who act in the interest of certain government ministries and industries 
they regulate and benefit from their efforts. The most recent and famous case is Muneo 
Suzuki, who was a Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker. He was arrested on suspicion of 
accepting bribes for influence peddling regarding ODA projects 
in Kenya (Sondu-Minu 
hydroelectric power plant) and in Russian-held islands off Hokkaido (Komori 2002; see 
also Mainich Daily News 2002, Sankei-shinbun 2002; The 
Japan Times 2002a, 2002b). 
41 Many Koreans in the 1960s studied abroad in the Philippines due to its more advanced 
status among neighbouring countries 
(Kim 2003). 
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Japan-Philippines aid relationship, before concluding with a brief overview 
of our two case study projects. 
4.5.1. Trends and Case Studies 
The amount of Japanese assistance (both grants and loans) to the Philippines 
has clearly increased over time (see Figure 4.11 and 4.12). Aid operations 
there have become more complex too in terms of regional and sectoral 
distribution. On the one hand, ODA grants steadily increased until 1993 then 
started to drop thereafter. On the other hand, and specific oscillations aside, 
ODA loans assumed a broadly upward trend through the 1990s. 
Figure 4.11. Japanese ODA Loans to the Philippines from 1970 to 
1998 
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Figure 4.12 Japanese ODA Grants to the Philippines from 1970 to 
1998 
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Japanese assistance has been allocated to a great extent to develop 
infrastructure for economic growth (Potter 1996). It also shows a tendency 
to conform to the development plans of the Philippine government of the 
day - each with its own regional and sectoral priorities. Overall, though, 
geographical priority, has been given to heavily populated areas such as 
Metro Manila, surrounding regions in Central Luzon, and other regional 
centres (such as Cebu) where tourism-related industries are located. Sectoral 
priority has been given to power, energy, water, transportation and 
communication development (NEDA 1991,1993,2000). 
Figure 4.13. Top 10 ODA Grants Recipients 
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The important role of Japanese aid to the Philippines can be seen when that 
support is compared with that received by other recipients (see Figure 4.13, 
4.14, and 4.15). The Philippines has thus been ranked in the top 10 of the 
key elements of Japan's international cooperation, clearly demonstrating its 
status as a key recipient in all three types of Japanese international 
cooperation: ODA grants (Figure 4.13), ODA loans (Figure 4.14) and OOF 
(Figure 4.15). 
Figure 4.14 Top 10 ODA Loan Recipients 
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Figure 4.15 Top 10 OOF Recipients 
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Benefiting from the strong Japanese aid focus on basic infrastructure 
projects which have been the main priority (see Table 4.3), the Philippines, 
in spite of its size (in terms of economy, land mass and population), has 
retained its relative prominence in Japanese assistance compared with other 
(much larger) top ten recipients such as China, India, Indonesia and 
Thailand (Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; Yokoyama 1994; see also JICA 
2002a; MOFA 1999a, 1999b). 
Japanese aid to the Philippines has nonetheless experienced some change 
over time with shifts in both 'conventional' and 'new' projects reflecting the 
broader shifts discussed in this chapter. It is the task of Chapters 5 and 6 to 
assess these shifts in terms of possible 'greening'. Therefore, here, this 
chapter briefly situates the two case study projects, leaving a more detailed 
description to the following chapters. 
The first case study project is the San Roque Multi-purpose Dam in 
Northern Luzon (see Figure 4.16), our focus in Chapter 5. This project has 
been a conventional 'development' aid effort and will enable us to assess the 
extent to which 'greening' has occurred in the mainstream aid process. The 
project is a major economic infrastructure scheme linked to hydropower 
expansion. There have been many permutations to the project linked to 
wider political economic processes. Thus, in the 1980s, the Philippine 
government was preoccupied with development-linked structural adjustment 
policies that laid the foundation for neoliberal-style privatisation in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Broad 1988; Boyce 1993). 
Such privatisation privileged foreign investors especially under the Ramos 
administration in office during the period between 1992 and 1998 (Serrano 
1994; IBON 2003). As a key donor, Japan also recognised the significance 
of the minkatsujigy5 (privatization project) for the Philippines (JICA 
1999a, 1999b). The privatisation saga is of interest here because of the 
power sector - propelled by the massive blackouts of the 1980s and early 
1990s that hindered national economic development. In response, President 
Ramos pushed through legislation to prioritise the sector and its projects. As 
we shall see in Chapter 5, the San Roque Multi-purpose 
Project (SRMP) 
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was one of them and has played a key if controversial role in satisfying 
electricity demands in the Manila region. 
Figure. 4.16. Location of the Two Project Sites 
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While economic infrastructure projects like the SRMP have predominated, 
there has also been a 'green' theme to the bilateral relationship since the 
early 1990s. Along with change in Japan, the growth of an influential 
environmental movement in the Philippines (from the late 1980s) meant that 
NGOs pushed environmental issues and indigenous people's rights high up 
the political agenda. For example, there were outcomes in terms of the 
establishment of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 
1992 and the Indigenous People's Right Act of 1997. In particular, Palawan 
has appealed to Northern donors and middle-class Philippine activists alike 
as the Philippines' last frontier needed urgent environmental conservation 
(Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Arquiza 1996; Bryant 2002,2005; JBIC 
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2002a; Lawrence 2002; Conservation International 2003). Through the 
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSD) and other 
initiatives, the province of Palawan has been very successful in attracting 
aid money not only for conservation purposes but also for 'environmentally- 
friendly' development projects such as community-based ecotourism. As 
aforementioned, these new 'green' themes were also promoted in Japanese 
policy during the 1990s (MOFA 1991,1997a, 1997b). One project that 
emerged from this situation was the Sustainable Environmental 
Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) (see Figure 4.16), our 
focus in Chapter 6. The analysis there will enable us to gauge possible 
greening in one of Japan's new generation of environmental projects. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed in a selective manner the history and general 
features of Japan's international cooperation (kokusai-ky5ryoku) policy as 
well as the possible formal 'greening' of that policy, especially in relation to 
the three key agencies involved. It has also briefly contextualised Japanese 
international cooperation to the Philippines. This thesis accordingly now 
turns to the detailed empirical analysis of the two case study projects in the 
Philippines. Chapter 5 investigates the San Roque Multi-purpose Dam 
Pro ect in Pangasinan province on Luzon island, while Chapter 6 explores j 
the Sustainable Environment Management Project in Northern Palawan. 
These two chapters thereby examine development aid and environmental aid 
separately. Yet, each case investigates the role and impact of environment- 
related guidelines and policy procedures in order to assess the evidence of 
possible greening in Japan's bilateral aid in relation to the Philippines in the 
1990s. 
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Chapter 5. Greening of Kaihatsu-enjyo: San 
Roque Multi-purpose Project 
Chapter 5 considers the San Roque Multi-purpose Project (SRMP) in order 
to assess to what extent and in what ways a traditional kaihatsu-enjyo 
(development aid) project has been the focus of a greening process. Our 
concern here is to evaluate the degree of greening in the project in terms of 
the procedural framework developed to that end, that is, the environmental 
assessment process discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, three major 
elements are assessed: first, the kanky5-hairyo (environmental 
consideration) system; second, the kanky, 5-hairyo-kakunin (verification of 
environmental consideration) process of the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
(JEXIM); and third, the subsequent monitoring procedures. 
Figure 5.1. A Development Project 
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The thirty-year history of the SRMP demonstrates how a contentious project 
eventually led to a gigantic Yen loan agreement. It simultaneously enables 
us to see how this failed Official Development Assistance (ODA) project of 
the 1980s turned into an Other Official Finance (OOF) project in the 1990s. 
The project also needs to be explored in the context of a 
focused 
appreciation of the political economy of 
Philippine development. The 
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process from project formulation to approval enables us to consider, firstly, 
how JEXIM's kanky5-hairyo-kakunin process was put into practice, and 
secondly, how effectively the San Roque Multipurpose Project's kanky5- 
hairyo meshed with the Philippines' own system based on Environmental 
Impact Statements (EIS) and Environmental Compliance Certificates 
(ECC). ' There is too an ability here to gauge the impact of subsequent 
monitoring provisions. 
5.1. Project Overview 
The San Roque Multi-purpose Project divides into two main components: a 
power component (power generation) and a non-power component 
(construction of the dam and spillway). JEXIM funded both components by 
providing an untied loan to the Philippine National Power Corporation 
(NPQ for the non-power component, and an investment loan to San Roque 
Power Corporation (SRPQ for the power component. However, the core of 
the two components is the construction of the San Roque dam, still today 
the tallest hydro-dam in Southeast Asia. The project was formerly known as 
the San Roque Multipurpose Dam Project (or San Roque Dam Project) 
before its resurgence as an OOF project in the 1990s. The actual 
construction of the San Roque Dam started in March 1998 and was 
completed only in February 2003 (SRPC 2006a). It is built on the lower 
Agno River of Pangasinan Province in the Cordillera region of northern 
Luzon (Figure 5.2). This rock-filled dam is 200 meters high and 1,000 
meters long, generating 345 mega watts of power and irrigating 87,000 
hectares. It is also designed to 'improve' water quality by reducing 
downstream siltation and by cutting disastrous floods that often wipe out 
crops during the rainy season. 
SRPC financed and constructed the San Roque Dam under a power 
purchase agreement (PPA) with the NPC on a build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) 
basis (NPC 1997; SRPC 2006a). 2 The electricity generated by the dam is 
sold for 25 years at fixed rates to the NPC and provides power 
for diverse 
1 Any project must go through the Philippine system to comply with 
Philippine law. Both 
the EIS system and ECC are discussed briefly 
below. 
2 Details of both PPA and BOT are discussed below. 
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economic activities in northern Luzon, including mining, cash crop 
agriculture, and tourism (Valdes, interview, 2004; DOT 2005; FOEJ 
2005d). ' Yet, its task to solve power shortage in Metro Manila and Southern 
Luzon was more emphasised (Perez Jr. 2004; SRPC 2006a). However, the 
project is opposed by indigenous Ibaloi people who have been protesting 
against the construction of the third dam on the Agno River for five decades 
(see below). According to SRPC, a total of 720 households have already 
been relocated and are living at resettlement sites provided by NPC (Kurita 
2004a; SRPC 2006a). 
Figure 5.2. Location of San Roque Multipurpose Project 
Benguet 
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Source: Kurita 2004a: 3 
The San Roque Multipurpose Project required substantial financing, for 
which President Marcos had first approached the Japanese government for 
aid in 1983. Indeed, SRMP was never possible without funding from 
JEXIM and six associated Japanese banks. It was thus eventually 
implemented as an OOF project on the basis of a Power Purchase 
Agreement signed between the NPC and the SRPC on II October 1997. Yet, 
3 The NPC has a plan to boost 'eco-tounsm' in Luzon as a part of the national development 
plan. The plan involves the building of golf courses that are 'environmentally 
friendly' to 
attract tourists from overseas (Valdes, interview, 2004). However, according to the 
DENR 
EMB (2001), golf course development is classified as an Environmentally Critical Project 
along with other development project including 
(heavy industries, resource extractive 
industries, infrastructure). 
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looking at the key shareholders of the SRPC exemplifies the political and 
economic influence of two former rulers, the US and Japan (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. San Roque Power Corporation 
Corporate Shareholders Holding Company Percentage of 
(Headquarters) the shares 
Sithe Philippines Holdings, Sithe Energies, Inc. 
Inc. (New York, USA) 50.05% 
Marubeni Corporation Marubeni Corporation 42 45% (Tokyo, Japan) . 
KPIC Singapore Pte Ltd Kansai Electric Power Co. 7 5% (Osaka, 
_Japan) 
. 
Source: SRPC (2006a) 
Table 5.1 is instructive in several ways. First, and befitting colonial links 
between the two countries, there is a major American stake in the SRPC. 
Secondly, and reflecting close contemporary ties, there is a notable Japanese 
share in the consortium. Third, and most significant of all, is the role of one 
key Japanese firin in the enterprise. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that 29% of the shares of the US-based Sithe Energies company are owned 
by the Japanese corporation Marubeni (Berne Declaration et al. 1999; FOEJ 
2002; SRPC 2006a; see below). Sithe entered into the contract with the 
Philippine government to build, operate and maintain the dam for 25 years 
(Berne Declaration et al. 1999; FOEJ 2002). Although, Sithe has more than 
a 50% share in SRPC, considering Marubeni's share in Sithe itself, 
Marubeni is effectively the major player in the San Roque Power 
Corporation 
.4 
As the term marubeni-kosu' - coined to describe Marcos's 
4 special relationship' with Marubeni - suggests, this mammoth development 
plan from the 1980s was set up by Marubeni, of which the economic scale 
and political 'boldness' stunned even Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
senior officials (National Diet 1986d: 3 1; Abracosa and Ortolano 1989). 
4 In spite of its Japanese domestic ranking (fourth) among other general trading companies 
(s, 5g5-sh5sha), in 1986, Marubeni's business share in the Philippines was the largest, almost 
reaching 90% of total Japanese business deals in the Philippines (Tsuda and Deocadiz 
1986). 
5 This term is widely known among Japanese academics. The term is made by combining 
Marubeni and marukosu (Marcos) (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; 
Tsuda, interview, 2004). 
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As noted, the SRMP combines a power component and a non-power 
component, financed as follows (see Table 5.2). Figure 5.3 outlines the 
relationship between the key funders in the project, and when combined 
with Table 5.2, provides a revealing glimpse into the political economy of a 
mega-development project. 
Table 5.2. Financing the San Roque Multipurpose Project 
Power component by San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC): Total US$450 million towards the 
construction of power generation facilities and their management 
Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) - overseas investment US$300 loan. Amount million 
Lender to the 
SRPC Japanese private banking corporations: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Fuji Bank, Sumitomo Trust and US$150 
Banking Company, Sakura Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and 
Amount 
million 
Norinchukin Bank 6 
Non-power component by National Power Corporation (NPC): Total US$600 million towards the 
construction of dam and spillway 
Lender to the Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) - Untied loan Amount 
US$400 
million 
NPC 
the NPC's operating revenues Amount US$200 
allocated for socio-environ mental issues I million 
Source: Adapted from Berne Declaration et al. (1999) 
Figure 5.3. Relations between Key Funders in SRMP 
Six Japanese Banking 
Corporations 
I 
US$ 
150 million 
Overseas Investment 
Loan 
-US$300 millio 
SRPC 
JEXIM 
Untied loan US$ 
400 million 
The Philippine 
Government (Loan 
guarantor) 
NPC 
Power component I Non-power component 
San Roque Multipurpose Project 
Source: adapted from FOEJ (1999a); JEXIM (1999b), NPC (1997); SRPC 
(2006a) 
6 Fuji Bank was merged into Mizuho Bank in 2002, and Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank 
were merged into Sumitomo Mitsui 
Bank in 2001. 
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Thus, about 66% of total project costs were covered by JEXIM. While the 
risk of lending an untied loan to the NPC was fully covered by a Philippine 
government guarantee, the overseas investment loan was a huge risk for this 
agency to take due both to its commercial nature as well as the fact that the 
SRPC was the borrower and not the Philippine government itself 
The decision about an overseas investment loan is normally based on a 
financial evaluation, and is thus more business oriented than in the case of 
an untied loan. Considering the political and economic circumstances of the 
Philippines, funding a project that requires such financial resources is rather 
a risky business. But in this case, by combining an untied loan to the state- 
owned NPC with an investment loan and an associated commercial loan 
from the consortium of six banks, there were clearly some political tactics 
employed by JEXIM and the Japanese banks to arrange funding. Indeed, as 
it was impossible for the project to go ahead without JEXIM's US$ 700 
million disbursement being confirmed, politicised negotiations on the 
funding occurred from the start in early 1994 when previous studies of the 
project were reviewed (see below). Such politics left no room for socio- 
environmental issues, for example, raising concerns about the bypassing of 
standard procedures that ought to have been fully considered in JEXIM's 
decision-making process (FOEJ 2002b). Thus, JEXIM covered the risk of 
the commercial bank loans to SRMP while its own risk was ultimately 
covered by the Philippine government as SRPC was a contractor to the 
state-ownedNPC (JBIC 2000a, 2003c). 
JEXIM thus played a role of guarantor of a sort in order to cover the 
political and financial risks of the project. That role then created the 
necessary conditions for the Japanese banks to finance it. There is also the 
hidden guarantor of this project: the Philippine government. As discussed, 
San Roque Multipurpose Project is based on the Power Purchase Agreement 
between the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPQ as the independent 
power producer and the state-owned NPC under the 
Build-Operate-Transfer 
scheme. In short, therefore, the NPC commissioned 
SRPC to build the dam. 
Although the San Roque Multipurpose Project is an OOF project involving 
the private sector, it is thus the Philippine government that eventually pays 
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for the project, thereby putting a heavy debt burden on the Philippine people 
(Motoyama et al. 1999; Rich 2000). ' 
Combining huge financial commitments and immense perceived risks, the 
SRMP inevitably became the subject of both national and international 
criticism. Of particular note in this regard are a series of technical review 
reports published by the environmental NGO, the International Rivers 
Network (IRN). These reports were made by independent researchers based 
in the US, and focused on the most controversial issues surrounding 
SRMP's environmental impact assessment (Feld 1999; Grifoni 1999; Moran 
1999; Willing 1999; see also IRN 1999). They found that the SRMP's EIA 
was 'unreliable' and 'wrongly assumed' (Feld 1999). This conclusion was 
based on several grounds: the estimated sedimentation, water quality, 
earthquake-related risks to the dam, the consistency between the original 
and the updated EIA, technical problems in the watershed management 
plan, and flood control provisions (Feld 1999; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; 
Willing 1999). It is striking how the official EIA report and the IRN's EIA 
review reports present two very different pictures of the same development 
initiative. Indeed,, this discrepancy goes to the heart of the concerns of this 
thesis. It will thus be kept in mind as this chapter examines the 
environmental assessment procedure of the San Roque Multipurpose Project 
in relation to its kanky(5-hairyo and kanky5-hairyo-kakunin elements. 
Before turning to that procedure, the next section relates how the aid project 
has been influenced by the political decisions of successive Philippine 
leaders in a manner that contradicts any notion of objective or technocratic 
development. It is essential to investigate this aspect as political and 
economic factors have often influenced the environmental assessment 
process. 
7 The Philippine inter-government agency repayment arrangement for the untied loan 
further proves this point as it is three government agencies (National Imgation 
Administration, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and Department of 
Public Works and Highways) and the NPC that pay for the project (SRPC 2006a). 
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5.2. Political Economy of a Dam 
According to the Agno River Basin Development Programme in 1946, dam 
construction was designed to maximise the hydropower potential of the 
river with a total of six dams originally envisaged to be built along it 
(Carino 1999; Shalupirip Shantahnay Indigenous People's Movement 1999a; 
CPA 2003; Usui, interview, 2003). The San Roque Dam was specified as the 
third such structure (Itchon et aL 1986; Afable 1999; CPA 2003). However, 
that dam, the "Agno 111", was initially considered to be located at one of two 
possible sites: Tabu in Benguet province and San Roque in Pangasinan 
province (Afable 1999: 11; SRPC 2006b; see also Figure 5.2). 
According to a preliminary report by the NPC in July 1976, San Roque was 
deemed to be the more feasible of the two as Tabu raised complicated 
social, cultural and environmental issues (SRPC 2006b). Physically, the 
Tabu site was not appropriate for the construction of a dam since the 
mountain walls along the Agno River there were neither big nor strong 
enough to sustain the dam structure (Carling, interview, 2004; Hatae, 
interview, 2004; Mooy, interview, 2004; Direct observation March 2004). 
Socio-culturally, the site was contentious with forceful protests occurring 
during the study team's visit to Tabu for the 1976 NPC study. Indeed, news 
of a third dam construction plan triggered community protests all along the 
valley and comprised diverse tactics including the rolling down off the 
mountain of large rocks targeting the visiting researchers (Norina, interview, 
2004; Kurita, interview, 2004b). Indeed, the Tabu community protest was 
strong in part because former President Ramon Magsaysay had pledged to 
the community in 1956 that there would not be a third dam on the Agno 
river (Afable 1999; FOEJ 1999a). There was also a long-standing 
Communist insurgence in the area (Afable 1999; Antislavery Society 1983; 
CPA 2003; Hilhorst 2003; Kurita, interview, 2004b; Mooy, interview, 2004). 
The construction of two dams at Ambuclao and Binga in the 1950s and 
1960s had not affected the downstream community as significantly as it did 
the upstream community (see below). However, due to the location of the 
third dam, the downstream community had also joined in the protests. These 
protests emphasised specific adverse physical 
impacts where dams had been 
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already built to justify why they were protesting vociferously against the 
third dam. Thus , it was noted how sedimentation significantly affected the 
livelihoods of upstream communities which was caused by the original 
dams. The Ambuclao and Binga dams were among Asia's biggest dams in 
the 1950s and 1960s, yet by the 1980s were already seriously 
malfunctioning. Ambuclao dam had become impossible to operate by the 
mid-1990s due to heavy sedimentation (World Bank 1994) while the Binga 
dam only operated at half capacity then due to siltation (CPA 2003; Hatae, 
interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003; Carling, interview, 2004). 
The history of local resource use is also at issue here. Thus, Benguet 
province where these dams are located was once the heart of a mining 
industry (Rood 1988; ESSC 1999; Kurita 2001; Usui, interview, 2003). 
Mountains were cut and forests were felled as a standard step to permit 
mining (Carling, interview, 2004; Capulet*, interview, 2004; Kurita, 
interview, 2004b; Mooy, interview, 2004). The mountain valleys along the 
Agno River have thus been left barren resulting in land slides, soil erosion 
and flash flooding. When combined with earthquakes as well as the effects 
of mining operations themselves, heavy sediment movement into the river 
was inevitable (NPC 1997). Such sediment flows in the Agno River would 
normally empty into the Lingayen Gulf along the north-western coast of 
Luzon (Siringan and Mate 2001; SRPC 2006a). Due to the construction of 
the Ambuclao and Binga dams, however, sediment accumulated instead in 
dam reservoirs, eventually stopping the Ambuclao, Dam power generation. 
For this reason alone, therefore, the proposed third dam in the Agno River 
was contentious (Miyako*, interview, 2004). The two malfunctioning dams 
had also severely damaged local livelihoods. Thus, siltation reached up to 
the rice fields of Ambuclao and Banao situated along the valley floor, 
thereby making fanning impossible (CPA 2003; see Figure 5.4). 
In spite of such lessons and protests from the local community, the 
construction of the third dam nonetheless went ahead with a land breaking 
ceremony held in May 1997 - that is, before even the second ECC was 
issued in February 1998 (see below). 
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Figure 5.4. Siltation in Bokod Municipality 
lllýl -, 
Source CPA (2003) 
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Local community concerns were well placed. Thus, although the San Roque 
Dam was designed to improve water quality by reducing siltation and 
flooding, the downstream community at Barangay San Vicente in San 
Manuel Municipality still suffered from flooding and siltation in 2004 well 
after the dam had started operation (FOEJ 2004a; see Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5. Silted Rice Fields 
Aftermath of August 2004 Flooding 
in Barangay San Vicente in the 
'. - - 
Source: FOEJ (2004a). 
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Such local community concerns were no match, however, for the keen and 
long-standing political interest in this strategic dam project. Indeed, as noted 
briefly in Chapter 4, plans for the San Roque Multipurpose Project gained 
impetus in the early 1990s for a Ramos government desperate to build more 
power plants in order to stop damaging power blackouts that hampered 
industrial i sation (Serrano 1994; World Bank 1994; Thompson 1995; 
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Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a, 2002b; Samonte-Pesayco and Rimban 
2002; IBON 2003). ' 
The project, in spite of political controversy in both the Philippines and 
Japan, was thus speedily implemented from 1995 onwards. Indeedl it was 
still praised as a "spectacular hydropower dam ... worth visiting" by the 
Philippine Secretary of the Department of Energy even in 2004 (Perez Jr. 
2004, emphasis added). It is very important therefore to see how it was 
possible for a project with so many perceived socio-environmental 
deficiencies nonetheless came to be implemented in the post-Rio 'greening' 
era, especially at a time when some donors were ever more reluctant to fund 
this type of project (Ito, interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004; Tamura, 
interview, 2004). 
In order to see how and why the project was resurrected in the 1990s after 
falling by the wayside in the 1980s, it is essential to discuss the context in 
which the project was first formed and then reshaped via strategic political 
decisions based on national development goals. Without doing so, the 
possible 'greening' of Japanese international cooperation in regard to the 
San Roque Multipurpose Project cannot be appreciated. As such, the chapter 
next investigates the history of the SRMP from its origins as an ODA 
project to its resurrection as an OOF project. 
5.2.1. From Marcos Dream to Ramos Legacy 
The San Roque Multi-purpose Project is over 30 years old now. It was first 
conceived in the early 1970s by the Philippine government under President 
Ferdinand Marcos, fuelled by his dream of building the biggest dam in Asia 
near his home turf of Ilocos Norte. Hence, the San Roque site was his dream 
come true (Asahi-shinbun-shuzaihan 1985; National Diet 1986d). Under the 
NPC's Power Expansion Programme (1981-1990), the SRMP was identified 
as a key project contributing to Philippine development (Itchon et aL 
1986). 
This project had been originally proposed to the World Bank, the Asian 
8 it I said our first priority in terms of infrastructure is energy. Second is energy. Third is 
energy" (President Ramos cited in Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 
2002b Online; see also 
Rimban, interview, 2004). 
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Development Bank, and the Italian government. Yet in each case, the 
proposal was turned down due to the huge project cost and perceived socio- 
environmental risks including heavy siltation and strong community 
resistance (National Diet 1984c, 1984d, 1986d; FOEJ 2002b; Samonte- 
Pesayco and Rimban 2002; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto 
, interview, 
2003). Undaunted, however, Marcos then requested funding for this project 
from Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone during the latter's visit to 
the Philippines in May 1983 (National Diet 1986e). 
And yet, the project was also a problem for the Japanese government given 
the project's history of prior refusal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) in particular was aware of the risks here, based on input from 
Ambassador Yoshio Okawa in Manila (National Diet 1984c). Thus, and 
upon MOFA advice, Nakasone did not agree straight away with the 
president's "very enthusiastic" (netsui no hijy5 ni tsuyoi, National Diet 
1986e: 23) request concerning an "extremely important" (hijy5 nijyfiy5 na) 
project (National Diet 1986c: 23). Instead, Nakasone played for time by 
suggesting: "Let's do [an additional] feasibility study [to the NPC's initial 
feasibility study] for the San Roque Dam thoroughly first. At this moment, 
that study is our top priority. With the result of the study, then we can 
discuss the project as a potential ODA project" (National Diet 1984e: 23). 
This is probably the first and last temiyage anken (gift project; see Chapter 
4) that failed to go straight on to the Japanese ODA list. JICA took charge of 
this feasibility study as a part of its overall responsibility for doing 
development study (kaihatsu-ch5sa) work. 
The NPC's initial feasibility study had been completed by Electroconsult 
(ELC)' -an Italian transnational consulting company - 
between 1974 and 
1979. The necessary documentation had been then finished in 1982 (NPC 
1997). As requested, JICA reviewed the ELC report. JICA thereafter added 
three items for the new study that was notably more 'environmental' in 
nature and produced a report in 1985 (JICA 1985a, 1985b; see below). 
However, after the "People Power" Revolution in February 1986 
9 Electroconsult was established in 1955 by two major Italian private firms speciallsing in 
the planning, design and construction of hydropower schemes In 
Northern Italy (ELC 
2004). 
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(Thompson 1995), the National Diet organised a committee to investigate 
the marukosu giwaku (Marcos scandal) and its link to Japanese aid. The 
SRMP was investigated as a likely by-product of 'crony capitalism' linking 
Marcos and his cronies to Japanese corporations (NHK shuzaihan 1996; 
Manapat 1991; Thompson 1995; Tsuda and Yokoyarna 1992,1999). The 
San Roque Dam project was thus one of the most heavily discussed cases 
during the Diet hearings (National Diet 1984a, 1984b, 1986c,, 1986d). This 
controversy eventually put an end to this ODA project - and hence, is worth 
a closer look here in order to appreciate the shifting nature of the Japanese 
aid process with attendant implications for the possible greening of aid in 
the 1990s that is our central concern in this thesis. 
Three issues in particular were raised at the hearings: the cost of the project; 
the process by which the SRMP became a top priority on the request list of 
1983; and corruption and rebate issues involving Marubeni. These issues 
were hotly debated and seen by many participants as obstacles to effective 
aid delivery from project formulation right through to subsequent 
monitoring. 
First, there were serious concerns surrounding the cost of the scheme. The 
official estimate for the dam was 125 billion Japanese Yen (JPY) in 1983 
(National Diet 1986e: 23). '0 The concern here partly stemmed from the fact 
that the Japanese government had decided to spend on a single project a cost 
equivalent to one third of the total aggregated Yen loans to the Philippines 
over a fourteen year period, between 1971 and 1984. " That the Japanese 
government was fully aware of the high project cost, as well as the 
perceived social and environmental risk, suggests that the funding decision 
might not have been based on 'rational' development planning per se, 
alleged critics (FOEJ 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; Murai, interview, 
2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Rimban, interview, 2004), but rather on 
the narrow interests of the Philippine elites and the Japanese business sector. 
10 1 USD = 250 JPY in July 1983 (IUSD =I 10 JPY in May 2006). Thus, the total project 
cost was 900 million USD. 
1 The aggregated total Yen loan to the Philippines from 1971 to 1984 was 400 billion JPY' 
and the total amount that Japanese contractors received was 103.3 billion JPY for the same 
period (National Diet 1986e: 23). 
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Second, there was the issue of perceived political favouritism for this 
project. Thus, the Philippine National Economic Development Authority 
had had a 'shopping list' for Japanese ODA of a total of 42 projects in 1983. 
Among the 42 nominees, 16 projects were confirmed as being on the official 
request list on March 23,1983. The San Roque dam project was not among 
them (National Diet 1986d). Interestingly, on May 5,1983, that was one day 
before Prime Minister Nakasone's visit, the San Roque dam was suddenly 
included. And yet, given limited funds, not all projects were guaranteed 
funding. Thus, and in order to ensure that the San Roque dam received 
funding, five other projects were 'checked' personally by Marcos and then 
removed from the list (National Diet 1986d: 3 1; Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986). 
Figure 5.6. Structure of Marcos Rebate 
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Third, the relationship that Marubeni had with President Marcos raised 
troubling questions about the involvement of Japanese firins in 'crony 
capitalism 1) -a relationship also known as "marubeni-kosu" in Japan 
(Yokoyama, interview, 2003). This kind of relationship emerged through 
Marcos9s distinctive aid controlling mechanism - shown in Figure 5.6 - that 
was only found with Japanese aid not with other Northern donors' (Tsuda 
and Deocadiz 1986; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; Yokoyama 1994). This 
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special Yen loan mechanism only existed in the Philippines during the 
Marcos era, which was revealed by the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government organised by President Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s. 
Unlike Japan's own bilateral Yen loan programme to other developing 
countries (not to mention other bilateral ODA relationships such as that of 
the USAID), this Japan-Philippine specific mechanism had a dedicated 
Philippine government official called the Japanese ODA Implementing 
Officer (10). " This position was created by Marcos in 1972 via Executive 
Order No. 338 with full control over project contracts and all dealings with 
the Yen loan implementing agency Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. 
Thus, it was Marcos who appointed contractors for ODA projects thereafter 
receiving rebates from them. Averaging 25% to 30% of project costs, these 
rebates were channelled to Marcos's Swiss Bank account through an agent 
company (Smith 1986; Boyce 1993). However, unlike the usual rebate route 
of Japanese aid to the Philippines, Marubeni had a "direct hotline" with 
Marcos (National Diet 1986d: 32). Before the Japanese Prime Minister's 
visit, Marubeni was even strongly suspected of advising Marcos that "the 
Japanese government had already infon-nally agreed to the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project" (National Diet 1986b: 3 1). 13 
Although the amount of the rebate to Marcos in this case is not known, 
applying the general rebate 'rule' - that is, a minimum 25% of the project 
cost (National Diet 1987; Yokoyama 1994) - 31.25 billion jpyl4 is quite 
likely to have gone into the Marcos's Swiss Bank account for the San Roque 
Dam alone. 
As the above three points show, the San Roque Dam was not an aid project 
based purely on technical design and 'rational' planning in 
keeping with 
12 Oscar Rodriguez was then the 10 while at the same time being the Undersecretary of 
Department of Public Works and Highways. He acted as President Marcos' agent in charge 
of contracts for the Japanese aid projects and who said to 
be one of the most trusted men of 
Marcos (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999). 
13 MOFA officials refused to comment on whether they gave such 
informal consent. Thus, 
MOFA officials neither admit nor deny the fact. MOFA staff members also questioned 
whether they later called 
in some of Marubeni's top ranking managers to give them a 
46scolding" over Marubeni's advice to Marcos (National Diet 1986d: 
32). 
14 Considering the exchange rate of 1983 (1 USD = 250 JPY), this amount equals to 
125 
million USD. 
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Philippine law. Rather, it was a product of crude political intervention and 
corrupt dealings with a Japanese corporation with the possible complicity of 
senior Japanese government officials. Under these circumstances, the 
project was never confirmed as an ODA project once the Marcos scandal 
erupted. The Dam's life as an ODA project thus ended abruptly. And yet, 
Marcos' dream eventually returned in the guise of a Ramos-inspired project 
in the 1990s. 
A bit like Marcos before him, President Fidel Ramos displayed much 
"personal involvement in all power projects" during and even after his 
presidency (NPC 1993a: 4). Thus, Ramos himself visited the project site to 
mitigate the dispute over the dam (noted above), and later returned for the 
land breaking ceremony in 1997 (Kurita 2004a; Rimban and Samonte- 
Pesayco 2002b). As part of his 'dam interest', he paid special attention to 
the San Roque Multipurpose Project because, also just like Marcos, Ramos 
wanted to have the largest dam in Asia to be located in his home province of 
Pangasinan (Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; 
Matsumoto , interview, 
2003; Rimban, interview, 2004). 
Figure 5.7. Ramos Showing Two Aerial Photographs of the SRMP 
-qqq 
Source: Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco (2002b). 
This personal interest meant that he demanded to be kept informed on the 
progress of the dam even after his presidency had ended 
in June 1998. 
Indeed, in his office in the Makati district of central Manila, 
" Ramos had 
two aerial photographs of the San Roque Multipurpose Project nearing 
15 Makati is the leading financial and commercial centre of the Philippines, and the 
location 
t onal corporations as well as multilateral institutions. of many leading national and transna I 
135 
Chapter Five 
completion in Pangasinan dated February 2002 given to him by the US 
construction contractor Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd" (Berne Declaration 
et al. 1999; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b; see also Figure 5.7). 
Here, too, presidential involvement was critical. It was based on a close 
personal relationship with the contractors and showed how the interests of a 
top political leader could make the entire process run much easier. In spite 
of its financial, technical and legal 'infirmities' (IPP Review Committee in 
PCIJ 2002; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b), " therefore, the Ramos 
legacy project in his home province of Pangasinan has been operating since 
February 2003. 
5.2.2. Privatisation of the Philippine Electric Power Sector 
During a public lecture at the University of the Philippines on March 11, 
2004, the Secretary of the Department of Energy, Vincent S. Perez Jr. 
concluded his presentation on energy sector reform with the observation 
that, "energy is apolitical". This observation was vigorously rebutted by the 
next speaker, Pete Eagan, President of the National Association of 
Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc., who declared: "Excuse me, 
Secretary Perez. But energy is political, very political. " Although Secretary 
Perez did not seem to take this comment seriously, " this exchange does 
indeed underscore that energy is very political in the Philippines. To 
appreciate this point is to understand in turn the political changes to the 
energy sector that enabled Ramos to bring the SRMP to life once more. 
More importantly, these changes have influenced the possibility of 
'greening' in the SRMP which is our core concern in this chapter. 
16 Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd., a unit of Lexington-based Raytheon Co., the third- 
largest U. S. defence contractor, was the contractor hired to design and build the San Roque 
dam in 1996 (Boston Business Journal February 28,2002). 
17 The inter-agency IPP review committee was organised by Administrative Order No. 14 
and No. 10 of May 26,2001 to review all the IPP contracts. The Committee reported the 
San Roque Multipurpose Project as one of five independent power producer (IPP) projects 
with infirmities. The inter-agency committee organised by Republic Act No. 9136 consisted 
of the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, and the National Economic 
Development Authority (GOP 200 1). 
18 Secretary Perez was laughing while Mr Ilagan was making his point (Direct observation 
11 March 2004). 
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After the overthrow of the Marcos regime, President Corazon Aquino 
created three major conditions that enabled her successor Fidel V. Ramos to 
put private-sector-led infrastructure projects on a 'fast track' (see below). 
First, the Aquino administration abolished the Department of Energy (Viray 
1998; Manila Times 14 June 2003; also see Perez Jr. 2004). This step was 
taken because the view was widespread that this Department, especially 
under the Marcos regime, had "become synonymous with corruption" 
(Manila Times 14 June 2003 Online). Yet, the abolition of the Department 
was criticised because it was seen to have created a policy vacuum for the 
country's future energy plan; not having a single government institution 
dedicated to the energy sector was linked to a serious power crisis in the 
Philippines (Viray 1998; Manila Times 14 June 2003; Perez Jr. 2004). 
Second, in 1987, Aquino also liberalised power generation under Executive 
Order 215. A huge blow to the National Power Corporation (NPQ's 
monopoly, this Order opened up power generation to the private sector for 
the first time in Philippine history (GOP 1987; Rimban and Samonte- 
Pesayco 2002a). Third, the Aquino administration stopped the operation of 
the Bataan nuclear plant when international inspectors diagnosed the plant 
to be unsafe due to its geographical proximity to major earthquake fault 
lines and the Pinatubo volcano. This plant had been built by the Marcos 
administration during the early 1970s energy crisis but later became 
infamous for its role in the Marcos corruption scandal (Broad 1988; Sales 
1992; AFP I July 2004). In response to this move, the NPC appealed to 
Aquino to construct additional power plants to make up for the 600 
megawatts that were supposed to have been generated by the Bataan nuclear 
plant (Sales 1992; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a). This appeal went 
unheeded. As a result, crippling power shortages became more frequent in 
Manila and beyond and that subsequently contributed to the end of her 
presidency. 
In order to solve the severe power crisis that he inherited upon assuming the 
Presidency in mid- 1992, Ramos urgently worked on three major tasks. First, 
in May 1992, he brought the Department of 
Energy back to life again with a 
focus on delivering an energy programme predicated on both short and 
long 
term energy projects (GOP 1992d). Second , in 
April 1993, the Congress 
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gave him special powers to negotiate the independent power producer (IPP) 
projects by passing Republic Act No. 7648. This Act enabled him to 
circumvent the existing time consuming process so that he could enter into 
contracts with mostly foreign owned private corporations quickly. The so- 
called "Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993" became widely known as the 
Ramos 'fast track' act (GOP 1993; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a). 
Third, he also pushed through Congress Republic Act No. 7718, also known 
as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law, that provided an array of 
incentives to the private sector to undertake infrastructure and development 
projects (GOP 1994). " 
The 'fast track' contracts with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) under 
the BOT law made it easier for foreign investors to enter the Philippine 
energy sector under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) scheme as the 
Philippine private sector has had limited financial resources to enter into 
huge infrastructure projects (Bosshard 2002; IBON 2003). BOT law 
emphasised the role of the private sector in Philippine development, and 
thus provided incentives such as minimum government regulations as well 
as government support for BOT projects (GOP 1994). Despite these 
generous incentives, the efficacy of IPP projects has been questioned. 
Although it is natural that excess supply brings the price down, the more 
power generated by the NPC paradoxically resulted in higher electricity 
rates for Philippine consumers. The major cause for this unnatural 
phenomenon is the 'take or pay' provisions in IPP contracts stating that NPC 
has to buy for resale more than 80% of planned IPP-produced electricity 
thereby assuming most of the market risk as well (World Bank 1994; 
Bosshard 2002; IBON 2003). Also the high energy rates of IPP projects such 
as the SRMP meant that the NPC's price remained artificially high (ADB 
2005). The NPC has entered into a total of 48 IPP contracts of which more 
than half were made during the Ramos Presidency (1992-1998) (Rimban 
and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b). The SRMP is one of them. 
19 This BOT law is in fact the second and expanded BOT law. The BOT scheme was first 
introduced by Republic 
Act No. 6957 in July 1990 during the Aquino administration 
allowing private 
firms to build and operate power plants through the BOT schemes (GOP 
1987,1990; MON 2003). 
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This chapter has so far described the political economy of the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project in order to clarify the context in which 'greening' was 
meant to take place. From the next section, the chapter will explore that 
greening process in the kaihatsu-enjyo (development aid) type of project by 
focusing on the environmental assessment procedure of the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project from the JICA feasibility study of 1985 up 2005, 
thereby encompassing JBIC monitoring efforts. 
5.3. Greening the Dam: Implementing Kankyd-hairyo 
As noted, the San Roque Multipurpose Project started with a preliminary 
study by the Italian consulting company Electroconsult (ELC) in 1974 in 
order to assess the hydropower potential of the lower Agno River 
(Abracossa and Ortolano 1989). Considering that actual project 
implementation only took place in 1999, the SRMP has had a long and 
complex history both in terms of environmental consideration and formal 
confirmation as a project. This section thus begins to investigate the possible 
greening of kaihatsu-enjyo (development aid) by focusing on the first or 
preliminary stage of the project cycle where the environmental 
consideration procedure (kanky5-hairyo) involves JICA interacting with 
Philippine counterparts to conduct a feasibility study linked to the 
Philippine EIS system. To appreciate this dynamic partnership, a brief 
discussion of the latter is in order here - given that it is integral to Japanese 
4 greening' as a whole (see Chapter 4). 
5.3.1. The Recipient's Environmental Consideration: 
Philippine EIS system 
The Philippine EIS system was established in 1977 by Presidential Decree 
No 1151 (PD 1151) (Smith and Wansem 1996). Section 4 of Presidential 
Decree 1151 was key here because it required that "all agencies and 
instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned 
and controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, 
firms and entities 
to prepare an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) for every action, project or 
undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment" 
(GOP 
1977a). Since 1977, further legal changes have been made (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3. The Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment: Legal 
and Regulatory Framework 
V- i bar Law/ Regulations Features 
Philippine Environmental Policy: Requiring 
Presidential Decree sponsors of all government and private projects 1977 (PD) No. 1151 affecting the quality of the environment to 
prepare an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA). 
Environment Code: Reinforcing land use 
1977 PD No. 1152 management regulation and systems to 
consider serious environmental impact. 
Establishing an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) System: centralising the EIS 
System under the National Environmental 
1978 PD No. 1586 Protection Council (NEPC: predecessor of 
DENR), setting up a screening mechanism for 
Environmentally Critical Areas and 
Environmentally Critical Projects classification. 
President Proclaiming certain areas and types of projects 
1981 Proclamation No. as environmentally critical and within the scope 
2146 of the EIS System. 
1982 Letter of Instruction Authorizing the NEPC to issue Environmental No. 1179 Compliance Certificates. 
1983 NEPC Office Circular Technical definitions of ECAs and ECPs by No. 3 NEPC. 
1987 Executive Order Establishment of DENR: transferring all work (EO) No. 192 from NEPC- 
1992 DENR Administrative Revision of PD 1586: Decentralising DENR's Order (AO) 21 EIA operation; necessity of public participation. 
Revising DAO 21, Series of 1992, to further 
strengthen the implementation of the EIS 
1996 DENR AO 96-37 System and Environmental consideration in the 
earliest possible stage, using EIS as a planning 
tools and maximising public participation. 
Sources: adapted from Smith and Wansem (1995); DENR EMB (1996a); 
Usui (2003). 
The chronology of this process is crucial since the San Roque Multipurpose 
Pro . ect's original EIS report as well as the 1997 update (both examined 9 
below) have been prepared in light of these changes. Here, therefore, a brief 
summary of the key elements is provided to facilitate analysis. 
In 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586) provided a basic screening 
mechanism with Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) and 
Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) as the categories. " The National 
Environment Protection Council (NEPQ then became the lead agency to 
20 ECPs are projects that "will most likely have high risk or negative environmental impact" 
and ECAs are certain areas which are 
"ecologically, socially, or geologically sensitive" 
(DENR-EMB 2001 Online). ECPs have three major undertakings such as heavy industries, 
resource extractive industries and 
infrastructural Projects. And ECAs are classified with 12 
categories (GOP 1981). 
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review Environmental Impact Statements (GOP 1978). Any project falling 
on to the ECP and ECA lists was required after 1982 to secure an 
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the NEPC (which 
later became part of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources). An ECC is only issued when a project is considered to be 
acceptable following review of submitted documents that are required by 
this system. 
All ECPs are required to submit Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) to 
the DENR in order to obtain ECCs. An EIS is "a document of studies on the 
environmental impacts of a project including the discussions on direct and 
indirect consequences upon human welfare and ecological and 
environmental integrity" (DENR 1996). The DENR Environmental 
Management Bureau (EMB) is formally responsible for evaluating ElSs but 
the actual evaluation is carried out by an independent interdisciplinary 
review committee that makes recommendations to the EMB director. For 
projects with an EIS requirement, the committee on occasion recommends a 
public hearing. Compliance monitoring is also a means used by the DENR 
to ensure compliance with the conditions of the ECC and other 
environmental regulations. If a project proponent fails to comply, the ECC 
issued for the project is to be revoked. 
This system just sketched was designed to respond to "an urgent need to 
formulate intensive, integrated program of environmental protection" (GOP 
1977a). However, it also has "special economic significance" (Smith and 
Wansem 1996: 39) because the EIS system has an effect on the 
implementation of a project deemed to be critical to national development. 
Further, the issuance of an ECC as a procedural item is a prerequisite for 
project implementation. 
In practice, the EIS system has often been used simply to provide legitimacy 
for projects. Some Environmental Compliance Certificates were applied 
while a project was under construction or even after project completion 
(Ross 1994; De Quiros, interview, 2004). Despite such irregularities, the 
system is there to satisfy those proponents who 
"wish to comply with the 
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law; that is the EIS system as a bureaucratic requirement creates a desire to 
comply" (Ross 1994: 223). 
5.3-2. Feasibility Study and the Original EIS 
The San Roque Multipurpose Project went through the environmental 
consideration process as required by both the Philippine government (under 
the EIS system) and the Japanese government (under JEXIM's 
environmental checklist). Interestingly, the Philippine EIS system was first 
established in June 1977 two months after the original feasibility study of 
the SRMP started in May 1977. However, during the first phase of SRMP 
(between 1977 and 1985), this EIS system had "legal and technical 
loopholes" which then created room for disagreements and resistance in 
enforcing the system (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989: 66). Thus, it is crucial 
to discuss the sort of context in which the environmental consideration was 
undertaken. 
In the early years, there were many obstacles to an effective EIS system. 
Indeed, it was doubtful how influential either the EIS system or the National 
Environmental Protection Council (NEPQ created in 1977 and charged 
with that system's introduction would be in terms of halting socially and 
environmentally controversial projects such as SRMP (GOP 1977a). " Not 
surprisingly, the system was not taken seriously by government agencies. " 
Given that the NEPC reflected a "decentralized regulatory process" 
(Abracosa and Ortolano 1987: 294), those agencies involved with projects 
maintained power over the way that the EIS system operated. As Section 4 
of PD 1151 thus declares, "before an environmental impact statement is 
issued by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or special 
expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft 
environmental impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) 
days from the receipt of the same" (GOP 1977a). Progress was indeed 
hampered by bureaucratic opposition to "a central environmental 
21 As noted, there was the matter of high-level political interaction by President Marcos and 
his cronies through crony capitalism (Manapat 199 1). 
22 The EIS system was not perceived as 'effective' by government agencies until 1982 when 
detailed rules and regulation were published in the Philippine Official Gazette (Abracossa 
and OrtolanO 1989). 
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r. superagency"' (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987: 295). Thus, under 
Presidential Decree No. 1586, the NEPC was annexed to the new Ministry 
of Human Settlement in 1978 and was provided with a centralised EIS 
review and approval process centred on the issuance of ECCs. Many 
government officials feared that Imelda Marcos, the powerful first lady, 
would use this mechanism to meddle in their activities . 
2' The revised system 
thus predictably failed to overcome the resistance of agencies such as the 
Department of Public Works and Highways which, in any event, had their 
own connection to the President. 
It was during this time that SRMP underwent its first environmental 
consideration. Before the National Power Corporation began to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the first feasibility study for the 
SRMP had been carried between May 1977 and March 1979 (ELC and 
EDCOP 1979). This work reported favourably on the project - highlighting, 
for example, its prospective positive role as a huge mine tailing dam which, 
by trapping and diluting water in its reservoir, would improve water quality 
in the Agno River. " Accordingly, the study concluded that the SRMP was 
technically sound and economically feasible despite an estimated cost of 
US$ 1.2 million (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989; see also ELC and EDCOP 
1979). 
Responsible for an ambitious power expansion programme, the NPC ranked 
the SRMP as a high priority and the Philippine government swiftly 
approved it in 1982. With President Marcos's personal support, the NPC 
began its implementation plans. In the ensuing bidding process, the 
Japanese corporation Marubeni submitted a proposal with the most 
attractive funding package based on financing from Japanese ODA through 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). As discussed earlier, 
Marubeni's proposal was approved by Marcos before Nakasone's visit in 
May 1983. 
23 Imelda Marcos, the first lady, was in charge of the Ministry of Human Settlement. 
24 Three 
i 
mining companies are operating in this area: Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., Benguet 
Corporation, Inc. and Philex Mining, Inc (Usui 2003). 
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Nothing seemed capable of delaying this priority project. Thus, project 
preparatory works, including site development and access road construction, 
had already begun by February 1983. " And yet, it was only after the 
financial arrangements were confirmed in May 1983 that the NPC belatedly 
approved a contract for an EIA for the project as it needed to submit an EIS 
for ECC issuance (Test Consultants 1984). Project implementation thus 
began before an EIA was even started let alone completed (Ross 1994; De 
Quiros 2004). Further, as the first ECC was only issued on November 26, 
1985ý NPC had also thereby started the project without receipt of an ECC. 
As such, it can only be concluded that the initial 1984 EIA was merely 
conducted to gain legitimacy rather than to be a decision-making tool 
designed to minimise environmental damage (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987; 
Ross 1994; De Quiros 2004). Indeed, the NPC finalised and sent out the bid 
documents for dam construction to bidders before the EIA contract was 
made. There was no room for an EIA report, therefore, to influence project 
decision-making process at this juncture. 
5.3.3. The JICA Re-study 
With President Marcos's approval, the San Roque Multipurpose Project was 
thereafter put on the 13th Yen Loan request list as the top priority of the 
Philippines. This action came at a time of great political tension. The 
country was politically and economically unstable due to intensifying 
political oppression and protest under the Marcos dictatorship. In this 
context, the US was urging Japan to aid the Philippines in order to stabilise 
the situation (National Diet 1984a; Boyce 1993). Yet, as noted, and in spite 
of a strong personal request by Marcos, an additional feasibility study 
based 
exclusively on environmental criteria was required by the Japanese 
government before a decision would be formally made (National 
Diet 
1984e). This requirement was made because the initial 1979 feasibility 
study had been carried out in a situation where 
both the Philippine 
goverm-nent and the NPC were desperate to present the 
SRMP as a perfect 
product with no harmful impacts 
in order to attract funding. Therefore, 
Japanese government with recommendation from the OECF representatives 
25 San Roque Bridge at the dam site was also built during this time (Direct observation 
24 
March 2004; Valdez, interview, 2004) 
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and Japanese embassy officials in Manila thus decided that it was necessary 
first to review the original study. A JICA team subsequently arrived in 
Manila in July 1983 and carried out three additional studies including a 
review of the NPC hydrological analysis as well as an additional assessment 
of the reservoir and irrigation water quality (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989; 
JICA 1985a, 1985b). 
Yet the utility of this JICA 're-study' as a fonn of development study 
(kaihatsu-ch5sa) amenable to careful environmental evaluation proved to be 
quite minimal. Since no environmental guidelines on proposed dam 
construction existed in 1983 for JICA to work with, it is not therefore 
possible to assess compliance in any meaningful manner in ten-ns of our 
concern with ODA 'greening' here. " Not surprisingly, therefore, JICA 
produced a report that covered few of the possible negative socio- 
environmental impacts that were later highlighted in independent reviews 
(Feld 2004; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999). Instead, it mostly 
confirmed the original study concluding that the project was "kigy5ka-kan5" 
(feasible) (National Diet 1986d: 32). 
That said, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the JICA 're-study' as a 
prototypical element of a later 'greening' process. For this work, team 
members with different specialities were allocated to each component, albeit 
with a strong contingent drawn from civil engineering. Out of a total of 17 
specialists on the team, II worked on the reservoir water quality component 
while the irrigation water quality and hydrological analysis components 
shared the remaining 6 members. Thus, two-thirds of the team was allocated 
to the study of reservoir water quality as the effect of mine tailings on the 
project was the biggest concern raised by the JICA preliminary 
investigation. This clear focus can also be seen by comparing it with that of 
the NPC's original EIA (Test Consultants 1984; JICA 1985a). While the 
latter studied water quality with a focus on soil erosion and siltation caused 
by the physical construction of the dam itself, the former studied the water 
quality issue mainly in terms of the effects of mine tailings. This difference 
26 The first JICA environmental guidelines for dam construction appeared in 1990 (JICA 
1990). 
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mainly derived from the purpose of the JICA study: to review and 
complement the original study; and to conduct an environmental survey 
(JICA 1985a: i; National Diet 1986d: 32). 
It is worth recalling in this regard that JICNs aim here was simply to assist 
the NPC's own environmental consideration efforts. In order to do so,, the 
JICA team was supposed to coordinate with the NPC in its activity to 
complement the NPC's initial EIA . 
2' However, the JICA study was not 
properly coordinated and hence overlapped with the NPC's EIA (Abracosa 
and Ortolano 1989). 
The lack of systematic coordination and cooperation (which was seemingly 
deliberate)" between the two environmental assessment activities was 
revealing on two counts (National Diet 1984e). First, the JICA activity was 
not serving its formally stated role of assisting the recipient's environmental 
consideration activity (here, the NPC's EIA). Instead, the JICA report was 
used as an independent review of the project for the Japanese government's 
own reference even while the project EIA was the NPC's own responsibility 
in order to satisfy the EIS procedural requirement. Second, this situation 
strongly suggested therefore that the recipient's EIA had little or no 
influence on the funding decision of the Japanese government given that the 
1984 EIA was not even referred to by the JICA team (JICA 1985a, 1985b). 
True, the JICA 're-study' was officially requested by the Philippine 
goverm-nent. In reality, however, it was zproposed' by Japan during the 
Prime Minister's state visit, and the Philippine government was in no 
position to disagree as the project was not possible without the Yen loan 
(National Diet 1986b, 1986d, 1986e; FOEJ 2002b). There is a paradox here: 
a last minute condition was attached to proposed aid that opened up the 
possibility of a greener project via further environmental assessment that 
then failed at its own formal aim to assist the recipient's environmental 
consideration, let alone reduce the potential environmental 
damage of the 
dam through the new requirements. Here, a sense emerges of a new 
condition simply added to the process to show environmental concerns were 
27 In 1983, NPC commissioned an EIA to Test Consultants, Inc. in order to apply for an 
ECC which was completed in May 1984 (Test Consultants 
1984; SRPC 2006a). 
28 See below. 
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not neglected - but also to buy time for an embattled and clearly 
embarrassed Japanese leader. 
In the end, the JICA Re-study took one year to complete. This time- 
consuming procedure thus played a significant role in ending the first 
'phase' of the project. Two particular events are worth noting in this regard. 
First, since this study took a year to complete, it delayed the SRMP's formal 
acceptance which, in turn, meant that the project lost an opportunity to be 
funded under the 13 1h Yen loan arrangement. The entire process suggested 
that the Japanese aid industry was dragging its heels on the matter. Thus, 
although the NPC was already committed to doing an EIA for the SRMP, 
JICA had nevertheless insisted on the need for a further "mainly 
environmental study" (JICA 1985a: i; National Diet 1986d: 32). Due to its 
widely known socio-environmental problems, there was a sentiment that 
Japanese aid officials according to one insider simply "wanted to crush 
(tsubushitakatta)" the project (Usui, interview, 2004; see also National Diet 
1984c, 1986d). Indeed, by behaving in this matter, the Japanese actors 
involved gained several advantages. On the one hand, the Japanese 
government was able to ensure that it had done or was at least seen to have 
done a 'rigorous' vetting procedure in order to avoid future criticism, 
especially if the project became even more controversial than it had already 
become. On the other hand, JICA scepticism about it meant that the need for 
delay to await the report cost the Marcos regime crucial time as the funding 
opportunity 'closed' due to budgetary rules. 
The second event to note is that, in the midst of the additional delay, 
Philippine opposition leader Benito Aquino was assassinated on August 21, 
1983 - dealing thereby a huge blow to the project's prospects. 
Turmoil 
increased thereafter until, in early 1986, President Marcos himself was 
thrown out of office. This event was a trigger for the Special Investigation 
on the Marcos scandal in the Japanese National Diet 
in April 1986. As a 
result, SRMP had no chance to be on any Yen 
loan list at this delicate 
juncture. Indeed, the Japanese government quietly buried it since the project 
had been seen as an archetypal case of corrupt Japanese aid to Marcos 
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(National Diet 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e; Tsuda and Yokoyama 
1999). 
The JICA Re-study itself, which was entitled "Final Report on the 
Development Planning Study of San Roque Multipurpose Dam", remained 
undisclosed to the public (National Diet 1986d). According to senior MOFA 
official Kimio Fujita during his testimony to the 1986 hearings, the report 
was not made available to the public because the Philippine government had 
provided classified information for the purpose of the feasibility study and 
hence, the Japanese government needed to respect inter-state confidentiality 
(National Diet 1986d; Tsuda and Deocardiz 1986). However, it is even more 
likely that the lack of disclosure reflected a wish on the part of key players 
in Japan to bury a politically embarrassing and 'diplomatically sensitive 9 
chapter in Japanese aid giving (Asahi-shinbun-shuzaihan 1985; Tsuda and 
Deocadiz 1986). 29 
5.3.4. The 1997 Update EIS and ECC 
If particular events in both the Philippines and Japan served to undermine 
the SRMP in the mid- I 980s, altered political and economic conditions in the 
early 1990s meant that this project was soon re-visited. As noted, a 
desperate need for greater power capacity in order to fuel Philippine 
industrialisation meant that there was now, once more, top-level political 
and economic support for new dams. At the same time, however, growing 
environmental concerns were reflected in fervent opposition to dam 
construction (Carino 1999; Shalupirip Shantahnay Indigenous People's 
Movement 1999a, 1999b; CPA 2003). 
Here, reviving the SRMP looked to be the politically expedient thing to do. 
After all, it had 'passed' key planning requirements at both the Japanese and 
Philippine ends of the process. Thus, the San Roque Multipurpose Project 
29This view was corroborated by a later yet similar inicident involving Japanese aid. Thus, 
I close loan agreement related documents, a JBIC lawyer during the when challenged to ds 
Kotopanjang Dam hearing at Tokyo district court told the court that they were unable to do 
so due to 'respect for the recipient's sovereignty' and 'secrecy for the sake of diplomacy' 
(Direct observation 13 November 2003). However, it is important to note that the same 
comments were made as the Marcos scandal was 
investigated in the National Diet hearings 
(Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986). 
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had been the subject of an environmental consideration procedure under the 
Philippine EIS system between 1978 and 1985 in order to obtain an ECC for 
project implementation as required under Philippine law. As noted, the EIA 
for the EIS was prepared in 1984, while the ECC was thereafter issued in 
1985 by the National Environmental Protection Council (the predecessor of 
the DENR). 
Although the original ECC of 1985 was still "in 
, 
full 
, 
force and effect" in the 
1990s (SRPC 2006b: emphasis added), the NPC was required by the DENR 
to update the original EIS in order to enhance the social,, environmental and 
technical credibility of the project (SRPC 2006a). The updated EIS was 
therefore submitted to fill the 10 year time gap during which time changes 
in erosion and sedimentation patterns needed to be accounted for. DENR- 
EMB thus attached additional terms and conditions to the original ECC of 
the San Roque Dam in February 1998, which is the revised 1998 ECC, as a 
part of a process designed to revalidate the ECC and thus,, thereby permit 
implementation. 
As with the original environmental consideration, the treatment of the 
SRMP reflected complex political and bureaucratic negotiations, as a variety 
of actors and issues become embroiled in the affair. Given the stated 
importance of the recipient's regulatory framework to the Japanese aid 
approval process (discussed in Chapter 4), our analysis here focuses 
inevitably on the Philippine decision-making process. This detailed 
discussion serves to underscore the clear ambiguities of a process of 
Japanese international cooperation that is so thoroughly implicated in the 
vicissitudes of recipient environmental consideration. 
A central question in the 1990s phase of the project deliberations was 
whether this was a new project or the same project as in the mid-1980s. 
Linked to this was another question, namely why the original ECC issued 
ten years earlier was still in force despite notable changes to the EIS system 
in the intervening period. Very clear answers were given here by both the 
DENR and the NPC. Thus, the NPC stated that the "SRMP... is essentially 
the same project in the same location as originally evaluated by the [NEPC] 
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in 1984 for which an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has 
already been issued" (NPC 1997: P-1, emphasis added). The DENR-EMB, 
meanwhile, stated that the 1985 ECC was still valid as the EMB considered 
the SRMP to be the same project as before, albeit, subject to significant 
amendment to the original ECC (see below) (NPC 1997). 'o 
Despite this effort to smooth the process, there were clearly major 
differences between SRMP phase I and 11 (NPC 1997). Due to the effects of 
a major earthquake that struck the area in 1990, and the fact that simply ten 
years had elapsed since the original study, " the SRMP was required to make 
further design changes to the project based on the updated 1997 EIA (see 
below) as following. First, it had to account for the fact that the project 
proponent itself had changed from the NPC to the San Roque Power 
Corporation (SRPQ based upon a Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement 
signed in 1997. Second, the planned height of the dam had to be lowered 
from 21 Om to 200m to allow for altered estimated ecological impacts. Third, 
the power generation capacity also had to be reduced from 390MW to 
345MW Finally, the size of the storage reservoir had to be reduced from 14 
km 2 to 12.8 k_, n2 (NPC 1997). 
Upon a formal request from the NPC to confirm the validity of the original 
ECC, the DENR-EMB was broadly supportive but required that the ECC be 
amended to account for the altered circumstances noted above. Specifically, 
the DENR-EMB required that the NPC address five new items (DENR 1997 
letter in NPC 1997: P-2). The NPC was thus required: first, to update the 
1984 EIA; second, to conduct an Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA); 
third, to prepare a detailed Resettlement Plan as a part of the updated EIA; 
fourth, to secure endorsement from Local Government Units (barangay 
32 
, 
municipal, provincial levels); and lastly, to address all other critical and 
relevant environmental issues identified in the updated EIA. 
30 The 1985 ECC's validity is stated in both the DENR-EMB's response dated 15 June 1995 
and the DENR Secretary Victor 
0. Ramos's letter dated 22 April 1997. 
31 The 1990 earthquake in this area caused severe landslides that threw soils from 
neighbouring mountains into the 
Agno River (NPC 1997). 
32 Barangay is the smallest unit of administrative district in the Philippines. 
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In accordance with DENR-EMB instructions, the 1997 update was thus 
based on the first EIS conducted on questionable grounds in 1984, albeit 
with some modification. In the process, the resurrected SRMP was able to 
avoid being assessed under the more rigorous EIS arrangements put in place 
in the 1990s. The five items noted above are nonetheless meaningful in 
terms of the 'greening' process in development aid (kaihatsu-enjyo) as they 
addressed potential environmental and social impacts of the SRMP. 
The 1997 update was not therefore merely a cosmetic exercise done for 
political effect. Indeed, the term 'update' makes the 1997 EIA sound like a 
minor affair. In fact , it was completed in October 1997 after a major 
undertaking that resulted in a hefty volume plus seven annexes, including 
detailed accounts of the Environmental Management Plan, NPC 
Resettlement Programme, Proof of Social Acceptability, a 1997 
Anthropological Study on the Proposed San Roque Multipurpose Project, 
and an Environmental Risk Assessment (NPC 1997). Apart from the 
Resettlement Programme Annex, the other annexes were new by-products 
of a post-Rio 'green' discourse enthusiastically adopted by Ramos (GOP 
1992cl 1996a, 1996b; Philippine Council for Sustainable Development 
1992; Bryant 2005). As such, there were elements such as a proposed 
sustainable livelihood programme with community capacity building as well 
as an indigenous people's rights provision that included reference to 
ancestral domain. Well aware of this important discursive shift in the 
Philippines and beyond, the updated EIS shows both the NPC and the SRPC 
6voluntanly' incorporating these other elements into their revised project 
design (NPC 1997; SRPC 2006a). 
The updated EIS was nonetheless soon beset by criticism. The content was 
widely challenged. Thus, for example, technical reviews by the International 
Rivers Network (Feld 1999; Moran 1999; Grifoni 1999; Willing 1999) used 
such phrases as 'unreliable' and 'underestimated' with reference to 
sedimentation estimates, water quality evaluation, and the level of risk 
due 
to the project being located in a region prone to earthquakes and flooding 
(see also FOEJ 2002b; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a, 2002b; CPA 
2003). The updated EIS was also criticised for what it did not contain or 
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even down-played such as the impact of an illegal quarry discussed below. 
In this regard, the NPC was seen to have taken advantage of an anomaly in 
the EIS rules. This anomaly related both to the scoping activity of the 
project and the nature of the ECC itself. 
First, the scoping guideline (DENR-EMB 1996b) only included items 
derived from broad issues covering the physical environment (geology, 
soils, topography, water, air), the biological environment (terrestrial 
flora/fauna, aquatic ecology), and the socio-economic environment (health, 
culture, employment, livelihood, displacement). Thus, it used descriptive 
rather than technical criteria to decide what should be included in an EIS. 
Such vagueness could mean that a proponent might omit or understate 
socio-environmental or technical issues that are 'inconvenient' but 
nonetheless critical to implementation. Yet, scoping is indeed a critical stage 
in the EIS procedure since it is where most key issues are identified, 
thereafter producing a narrower focus for the remainder of the EIA review 
(DENR-EMB 1996a). This means that a project proponent, by manipulating 
the scoping stage, can influence the overall EIA. Since an ECC is issued 
based upon the information provided in a submitted EIS/EIA, it also 
inevitably omits to consider those issues not featured in the original scoping 
activity. There is the likelihood that in the SRMP case, then, the NPC 
intentionally omitted to consider issues that would highlight adverse socio- 
environmental impacts (Reyes-Boquiren 1996; Carino 1999; Glasson et al. 
2005). A case in point here is that this would thereby have complicated 
approval. 
Second, the DENR-EMB states that the ECC itself "is not a guarantee by 
DENR that no adverse effect will be caused by the proposed project or 
undertaking" but rather an official recognition that the proponent has 
committed to undertake or implement mitigative measures to reduce the 
negative impacts to 'acceptable levels' (DENR-EMB 1996a). 
" Therefore, 
although the SRMP indeed had an ECC for its quarry activities (discussed 
33 Here again, there are no concrete criteria to define what is an 'acceptable level'. One 
senior DENR official defined social acceptability as: "holding public 
hearings where issues 
are addressed and discussed with the local stakeholders 
by the [project proponent] 
sufficiently whether they (local people) agree to the project or nof 
' (Peha, interview, 2004, 
emphasis added). 
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below), it failed to guarantee that negative environmental impacts would 
not thereby occur. 
The case of the illegal quarry is of greater interest here then its immediate 
biophysical impact might suggest as the SRPC carried out quarrying 
activities around the project site for the raw material for the dam 
construction. Indeed, it is central to a thorough understanding of the possible 
greening of a kaihatsu-enjyo project such as the SRMP. To the extent that an 
argument can be made as to the greening of this sort of Japanese aid, it is 
likely that evidence of meaningful environmental consideration would be 
most likely to be found in the 1990s phase of the SRMP when 
environmental concern was at its greatest. As we shall see in a later 
discussion of the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project, there is 
indeed some evidence - albeit quite limited - to suggest that a measure of 
greening did occur in the process via the recipient's own environmental 
initiatives. And yet, the case of the illegal quarry is particularly revealing 
because, in contrast, it shows how the project proponent still sought, even in 
the late 1990s, to circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the Philippines' 
environmental legislation - thereby raising doubts as to the ultimate utility 
of a Japanese aid process predicated on recipient country environmental 
management systems. 
5.3.5. Greener EIS: 'Illegal' Quarrying, Executive Order and 
Special Mineral Extraction Permit 
The controversy that erupted over a quarry was linked to SRMP-related dam 
construction work. However, the San Manuel municipal government raised 
concerns on SRPC's quarrying taking place in an area without ECC 
sanction. Thus, the EIA did not have a "clear and detailed burrow/quarry 
plan, ... 
[although c]lay and gravel burrowing/quarrying will definitely alter 
the existing environment with greater impact seen on the existing river 
channel and the adjacent agricultural lands" (DENR-MGB 
1999: 2). The 
Municipality's concern was indeed correct. It was an illegal quarry as there 
was neither a specific ECC nor a necessary mining permit issued 
for this 
activity (DENR-MGB Regional 
Office 1 1999). Raytheon Ebasco Overseas 
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Ltd (REOL)" had been found extracting sand and gravel materials within an 
area that an official directive (dated 14 September 1983) had already 
defined as a 'banned area', and hence, one that required a special mining 
permit (Ministry of Natural Resources 1983). The DENR-Mines and 
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) therefore conducted an investigation based on 
an appeal lodged with it by the San Manuel municipality. 
As a product of this investigation, DENR-MGB produced a2 page 
memorandum dated 31 August 1999 in which it commented on two issues: 
the possible impacts of quarrying on the local hydrology and an 
environmental assessment of the proposed clay, sand and gravel extraction 
by the SRPC. This memorandum is revealing because it provided the sort of 
technical insight that the EIA process had itself failed to produce in this 
case. First, it stated that, after construction, those excavated areas would 
enhance erosion of the river banks, such that villages in adjacent areas were 
liable to be submerged as a result of the quarrying. Second, the 
memorandum pointed out that clay and gravel quarrying was having an 
ecological impact by altering river channels near adjacent agricultural lands. 
Mass quarrying along the Agno River was thus intensifying existing erosion 
and sedimentation problems (DENR-MGB 1999). The memorandum 
therefore concluded that this sensitive area should remain classified as a 
'banned area' since the environmental impact of the quarrying had not been 
properly addressed by the proponent. 
However, the project proponent did not take kindly to this memorandum. In 
reply, the SRMP Project Director Raymond Cunningham (1999), " wrote 
directly to Manuel B. Gaite, the Undersecretary of the DENR, making three 
key claims against it. First, he argued the data used in the MGB 
investigation was 'biased'. The tactic here was to seize on the MGB's own 
admission that the memorandum was "basically limited" and "merely based 
on the information gathered/interview[s] with the stakeholders and actual 
observations in the field" (DENR-MGB 1999: 1). Cunningham 
(1999: 1) 
thus criticised it as a "superficial document" with allegations made rather 
34 it was the subcontractor for construction work at the quarry site. 
35 He is also Senior Vice President of SRPC (SRPC 2006a). 
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than facts presented since "the 'stakeholders' ... adopted the rhetoric of the 
Cordillera Peoples Alliance 36 and other NGOs", who were implacable 
opponents of the SRMP. Cunningham's second claim related to the actual 
ban. Here, he suggested that the ban was not set to "prevent the 
environmental impacts of quarrying... but rather to preserve these resources 
... and to prevent the acquisition of mining rights/concessions for 
speculative purpose" (1999: 1). Third, and most importantly, Cunningham 
claimed that the positions of the EMB in Manila and the regional MGB 
office contradicted each other over this matter. This was so because, 
although the EMB issued the ECC for the SRMP, the DENR-MGB Region I 
office later ordered the project proponent to cease and desist from the 
"illegal activity" (DENR-MGB Regional Office 1 1999). By raising this 
particular point, he was suggesting that the DENR was itself negligent in its 
duties in reviewing the SRMP's EIS. As the DENR did not comment in the 
first place on the absence of a clear and detailed burrowing/quarrying plan 
and environmental programmes in both EISs, the ban was therefore wrong. 
Accordingly, Cunningham (1999: 2) strongly urged Undersecretary Gaite 
"not [to] wait for the NPC and the SRPC to prepare a detailed technical 
response to the DENR-MGB report alleging environmental impacts and any 
debates or reconciliation of the findings. Instead, the above arguments are 
sufficient to justify exempting NPC from the ban and issuing the proposed 
Presidential Order creating the Special Government Permit without further 
delay. " In spite of this SRPC intervention, the DENR Region I" office 
(1999) ordered a suspension of quarry activity through a Cease and Desist 
Order (CDO) issued on 5 October 1999 based on the MGB's memorandum. 
However, Cunningham's claims over the negligence of the DENR missed 
the core of the issue raised by both the local community and the regional 
DENR-MGB office. Illegality was derived from two accounts: first, the 
quarrying by Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd (REOL) took place in the 
banned area as defined in Minister Teodoro Pefia's official memorandum 
36 Cordillera Peoples Alliance is the leading Philippine NGO in the anti-SRMP campaign. 
At the same time it is a well-known left-wing organisation. Under its umbrella, there are a 
few small local people's organisations and NGOs. It works as the 'window' for global 
networking and appeals (Clarke 1998; Hilhorst 2003). 
37 Region I is Illocos region where SRMP-affected Pangasinan and Benguet Provinces are 
located. 
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dated 14 September 1983, and second, it occurred without the necessary 
mining permit for the specific area having been attached to the ECC 
(Ministry of Natural Resources 1983). In addition, the regional office's 
order was based on the Mining Act of 1995 that gives the regional director 
power to issue instant orders to suspend mining or quarrying operations 
when there is imminent danger to life or property in terms of safety and 
environmental protection (GOP 1995). The DENR Region I office clearly 
felt this to be the case. Further, it was clearly stated in the DENR-EMB's 
fax to the SRMP consortium dated 12 February 1998 that "any expansion 
and/or modification of the approved operation will be subject to EIA 
requirements" (DENR-EMB 1998a). And yet, since REOL had been 
quarrying in an area not covered by the 1998 ECC and EIS, the SRPC was 
therefore automatically subject to a new EIA. In short, the SRPC was on 
weak ground for a number of reasons. 
As the stakes were raised, the political pressure on the Philippine EIA 
system's particular role here was increased. On 15 October 1999, ten days 
after the Cease and Desist Order was issued, the three affected companies 
(NPC, SRPC and REOL) sent a letter to the DENR-MGB Region I Director 
requesting that the CDO be reconsidered. The three corporations argued that 
it was "inconsistent with numerous legislative and executive issuances" 
recognising the SRMP as "the Philippines largest Presidential Flagship 
project" (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 1). The letter further argued that, without 
an immediate lifting of the CDO, it would jeopardise "social benefits" of the 
project to the affected local communities. And, it would also mean that the 
Philippines would be less able to "secure international financing for other 
infrastructure projects" because of its inconsistent legislative and executive 
issuances such as the CDO (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 3). In this context, the 
most important fact to be noted was that the NPC had already applied to 
Office of President for a special ('waiver') permit rather than opting to 
apply for an additional ECC for the contested quarry - which suggested that 
the project proponents were seeking a political solution to a contentious, and 
perhaps unwinnable issue . 
3' The tone of this letter was sharper too than the 
38 This permit, according to Section 49 of the Mining Act, may be granted by the provincial 
governor to any government entity to quarry materials needed in 
infrastructure construction 
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earlier intervention by Cunningham. Indeed, it was decidedly 
confrontational: the "NPC will not withdraw these applications until and 
unless it can obtain the special government quarry permit discussed herein" 
(NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 3 emphasis added). Clearly, the authors were 
undoubtedly confident of their ability to acquire the special permit as they 
had already gone over the head of the Regional Director straight to the 
DENR Manila office and even to the President himself who did not hesitate 
to even organise several committees to assist the completion of the project 
(NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999). 
Events were soon to prove them right. In January 2000, that is, barely three 
months after the CDO was issued, President Joseph Estrada issued 
Executive Order 200 (GOP 2000). " This EO 200 was about "the issuance of 
onshore special minerals extraction permits to qualified government 
entities/instrumentalities for government projects". It clearly stated that "... 
quarry, sand, gravel, clay and related materials from onshore areas are 
highly suitable raw materials for government infrastructure projects, 
especially flagship projects, and other related civil works(. ) ... it is in the 
national interest to prioritize government projects in the utilization of these 
materials to enhance the delivery of services vital to the Government's 
economic and social development programs" (GOP 2000, emphasis added). 
EO 200 thus provided the legal cover that the SRPC needed to proceed with 
quarrying in the contested area. On 7 July 2000, it therefore acquired an 
Interim Special Mineral Extraction Permit (Natural Resources Development 
Corporation 2000a), and, three months later, a 'permanent' Special Minerals 
Extraction Permit (Natural Resources Development Corporation 2000b) was 
issued, which allowed SRPC to quarry 2,606 hectares in San Manuel and 
San Nicholas in Pangasinan province. 
The quarrying incident is revealing for our purposes on two counts. First , it 
clearly demonstrated how an illegal quarry was later 'covered' by a belated 
Special Mineral Extraction Permit based on direct Presidential intervention 
- in other words, 
it underscored the politicised nature of the recipient EIA 
for public use (GOP 1995). 
39 Joseph Estrada who was elected in 1998 was impeached by the House of Representatives 
in November 2000 for alleged corruption. 
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system. Second, it is of particular interest here in as much as, instead of 
applying for an ECC specifically to cover the quarry, the NPC and the SRPC 
clearly chose to avoid further environmental assessment (that they might 
lose from) - instead by-passing the EIS framework altogether via a 
Presidential EO, thereby underscoring how easy it still was in the 'green' 
1990s to circumvent basic environmental procedures. 
5.3.6. Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project 
In contrast to the 'old style' and 'non-green' politics revealed by the case of 
the illegal quarry, the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project is 
critical in understanding areas of possible greening in an aid project of this 
sort. Here, the main objective was "ecological stability" and the project 
involved four main actors - SRPC, NPC, DENR Regional Office and J13IC - 
in its implementation (IIWMP-PMO 2000a: 1; IIWMP-PM02000b: 3). 
In the 1998 revised ECC, there were three conditions that did not appear in 
the original ECC issued in 1985: an Environmental Management Plan, a 
Comprehensive/Integrated Watershed Management Plan, and an 
Environmental Guarantee Fund (DENR-EMB 1998b; see also DENR 1996). 
These topics had already been addressed in the updated EIA upon which the 
ECC was based . 
40 The original ECC from 1985 in fact had only addressed 
the immediate socio-ecological problems that surrounded construction of 
the dam. In contrast, and based on the additional conditionalities specified 
by the DENR-EMB, the revised ECC was expanded to include 
environmental management of those surrounding areas that would also be 
affected by the dam. 
The watershed management project was particularly important here since, as 
the NPC itself observed, the SRMP was "one of the major water resource 
projects essential to the economic development of the country" (NPC 1997: 
E2-3) . 
4' As such, this can be considered as one of the most likely 'green 
40 Annex E and J in NPC (1997). 
41 Behind this green 'curtain', there is another story. The water resource in this area is 
particularly important as the upstream mining 
industry is greatly affected by it. There are 
some private mining companies trying to 
buy the water source in the upstream Agno River 
to secure water for their refining process 
(Carino 1999; Carling, interview, 2004). 
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elements because this project sought to "attain ecological stability of the 
watershed by providing sustained protective and productive values 
supportive to the specific development objectives ... and at the same time, 
address socio-cultural and economic concerns in the area" (NPC 1997: E2- 
3). 
The Lower Agno Integrated Watershed Management Plan was thus set up in 
June 1998 during President Ramos' consultation with the affected 
communities as part of his quest to advance the overall project (IIWMP- 
PMO 2000a; IIWMP-PMO 2000b; Capulet*, interview, 2004; Fionza, 
interview, 2004; Tobias, interview, 2004). The plan, better known as the 
Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project (IIWMP), evolved as a 
response to the concerns raised by the affected communities in Itogon about 
the San Roque dam construction. 42 The IIWMP was also formulated to 
comply with the amended ECC conditionalities. The project was therefore 
met with (initially) great expectations from the local communities, as it was 
to use a bottom-up 'community-based' approach and was to fon-nulate an 
incentive mechanism to protect forests in the watershed area. IIWMP also 
had five specific components: soil and water conservation, forest and 
environment protection, livelihood and research, land tenure, and 
biodiversity conservation (IIWMP-PMO 2000b). This array of issues to be 
covered seemed to augur well for the project in terms of accounting for (or 
(covering') an array of hitherto neglected social and environmental issues 
(Mori*, interview, 2004). 
And yet, although the IIWMP was set up to contribute to ecological 
sustainability as well as to address the socio-economic and cultural concerns 
of the Itogon communities, implementation of the project has caused 
problems to local communities. Individuals, as well as individual 
households from local communities, were thus certainly chosen as 
contractors to this project, mostly for the reforestation and livelihood 
projects. However, some people in Itogon soon became suspicious about the 
way contractors were chosen as well as how the contractors then used the 
42 Sanggunian Bayan Resolution No. 126 by the Municipality of Itogon (Office of the 
sangguniang Bayan 1998) and No. 16 (Municipality of San Manuel 1999). 
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allocated money (Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, interview, 2004; Besitan, 
interview, 2004; Mooy, intervi 
. 
43 ield lew, 2004) Indeed, my own f 
observations suggested all was not well: thus some of the planted trees were 
already bumt, and those remaining were dying due to a lack of management 
(Direct Observation 26-27 March 2004). Joan Carling (2004), the President 
of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), even maintained that reforestation 
contractors who did not receive payment from the local government burnt 
the trees on purpose in retaliation. While debate over who is to blame for 
local project deficiencies persist, what is clear is that the IIWMP has had a 
patchy record in terms of achieving its stated aims. 
Doubts over land tenure have further complicated project delivery. Ibaloi 
people are anxious about losing their ancestral land titles as prime watershed 
areas are declared protected areas (Rood 1998; Bryant 2000; Lawrence 
2002; see GOP 1992a, 1997). Once their ancestral land is declared as a 
protected area, Ibaloi people fear that they will not be able to continue their 
economic activities in the area. This is because the National Integrated 
Protected Areas System limits certain types of activities such as hunting and 
cutting plants or trees without permit within the protected area in order to 
promote environmental conservation (GOP 1992a). Whatever the merits of 
this view, its seeming prevalence among the -lbaloi underscores the 
local 
obstacles that exist even when the SRMP seems to incorporate selected 
environmental concerns into its planned activities. 
The mixed record of the IIWMP occurred even despite financial 
intervention by JBIC that made the project more economically viable. Thus, 
based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)44,137.79 million Philippine 
Pesos (about US$ 3.12 million) were put into the DENR's annual budget 
starting in 2000 (DENR 2000; IIWMP-PMO 2000a; Fianza, interview, 
43 A remark from one interviewee in a local village is revealing in this regard. Luisa had a 
contract and built a medium size (2.5m x 1.5m) gate on the way to the rice fields. 
She 
explained about being a contractor as follows: "people think that the house I built with my 
own savings was built with the contract money. People gossip about my 
family. Dalupirip 
people were not like this before. We used to respect and value the wisdom of the elderly 
people, experience, and ties between Ibaloi before. Here now, people 
become more and 
more [money oriented]. Everything is about money. "(Besitan, 
interview, 2004) 
44 This MOA was entered into by the DENR with other government agencies, i. e., 
Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, Department of 
Agriculture, National Irrigation Administration, and NPC in September 1998 (DENR 2002) 
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2004). This money was the DENR's share in the interest payment for the 
NPC loan (i. e. from the non-power component of SRMP) that was normally 
due to the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) but which was 
channelled instead by this agency to support the Itogon Integrated 
Watershed Management Project. JBIC had waved the interest payment in 
this case as there was no definite funding source to meet the Philippine 
government's commitment to implement IIWMP and JBIC wished to see the 
latter proceed (Fianza 2004; Tobias 2004). However, in spite of JBIC's 
gesture, implementation of IIWMP has not been particularly successful even 
since 2002 due in part to the DENR's ongoing funding difficulties. 45 Thus, 
what had been originally a project based on a seven year plan was further 
delayed - indeed, there was not even a budget allocated for it in 2004 
(Fianza 2004; Tobias 2004). 
Despite such difficulties, for our own purposes the fact of JBIC's voluntary 
financial contribution (via the interest payment waiver) is interesting 
because it suggests at least some 'green' aspect to its operations. These sorts 
of interest repayment are obligatory under Japanese banking law and thus 
tend to restrict the room for maneuvre of Japanese aid agencies in practice, 
especially the more business-oriented ones (Hayashi, interview, 2004). 46 
Thus, JBIC's contribution can be seen as a partial step towards greening by 
the agency in as much as the diverted money went to support an 
environmental management project in jeopardy. 
5.4. Greening the Dam: JEXIM's Verification of 
Environmental Consideration and Monitoring 
In the preceding section, the concern was to analyse the role of the recipient 
in carrying out environmental consideration in order to meet its own 
environmental laws - but more importantly from our perspective, the 
environmental standards required by the Japanese donor. Based on the 
45 One anonymous interviewee stressed the role of corruption within the Philippine 
agencies: "if DENR had used all JBIC's funding, 100%, then the reforested area by the 
IjWMP should reach the other side of the earth" (Capulet, interview, 2004*; see also Azafar 
et al. 2000). 
46 One JBIC high ranking official (a former OECF official) during my interview 
emphasised the difficulties of complying with Japanese banking laws that obliges profit 
making (Hayashi, interview, 2004). 
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record of the SRMP since the 1980s, however, doubts have been raised 
about the efficacy of such (largely) devolved responsibility - at least with 
regard to kaihatsu-enjyo (development aid) projects. And yet, there is also a 
further role for Japanese aid agencies in this greening process, notably at the 
stage of project appraisal (that is verification of environmental 
consideration) and monitoring. Here, where the Japanese can directly 
control the agenda, it might be expected to find maximum environmental 
concern - at least, that is, if the greening of Japanese aid is a serious 
objective. As such, this section will assess Japan's appraisal and monitoring 
system with a focus on the SRMP. After first setting out that system, the 
discussion will then consider how effective it was in relation to the SRMP. 
5.4.1. The Appraisal System 
For a project of the type discussed here, and over the time period in 
question, our attention needs to be focused on the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan (JEXIM) since this was the key agency in charge of the environmental 
appraisal procedure. As noted, the SRMP phase I was ended without it 
becoming an ODA project. Nonetheless, it was resurrected with JEXIM's 
help. Japan's reconsideration of SRMP in relation to the role of this agency 
can be explained on three grounds. First, and most importantly, the second- 
time around, it was not funded as an ODA project but as an OOF project. As 
OOF projects do not require strict environmental standards as well as public 
scrutiny like ODA projects (see Chapter 4), therefore, financing the project 
through JEXIM was not as 'risky' as before for Japanese government in 
terms of satisfying social and environmental standards. Second, since 1989 
JEXIM has increased its financing operations in order to respond to the 
growing trend towards privatisation in developing countries, especially vis- 
a-vis BOT and PPA projects (JBIC 2003b). Lastly, there were growing 
demands for overseas investment loans since the late 1980s by Japanese 
corporations as their business strategies became increasingly global (JEXIM 
1990; JBIC 2003b). These three factors coincided with the SRPC (and 
ultimately, Marubeni) project proposal, and thereby helped in the 
resurrection of the SRMP in 1990s. 
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As noted in Chapter 4, JEXIM 'greening' was less pronounced than that of 
either JICA or OECF in the 1990s. Nonetheless, it did feature in the 
introduction of an Environmental Checklist. That Checklist was used in turn 
for the Bank's environmental appraisal (kanky5-shinsa)47 prior to a funding 
decision and was devised to improve the system by verifying (kakunin) the 
environmental consideration (kanky5-hairyo) procedure implemented by the 
recipient (JBIC 2003b). The Checklist itself consists of a schema 
comprising eleven industrial sectors as well as three 'Y5inbetsu 
chekkupointo' (checkpoints by causes) (see Table 5.4). The three 
checkpoints by causes were specifically prepared for projects that would not 
otherwise fit into the scheme but were also applied to each of the eleven 
industrial sectors on the main list (JEXIM 1993). 
Table 5.4.11 Main Industrial Sectors and Three Checkpoints by 
Causes in JEXIM's Environmental Checklist 
11 Main Industrial sectors 
1. Thermal power plant projects 
2. Hydropower Projects 
3. Steel Mill Projects 
4. Copper Smelting Works Projects 
5. Paper and pulp Projects 
6. Petrochemical Projects 
7. Port and Harbour Projects 
8. Mining Projects 
9. Road Construction Projects 
10. Forestry Projects 
11. Petroleum/Natural Gas Development Projects 
Chec points by causes 
1. Air pollution 
2. Water pollution 
3. industrial waste 
Source: JEXIM (1993) 
The Checklist does not have any stated objectives or principles as do, for 
example, the JICA and OECF guidelines (see Chapter 4). Instead, there is a 
one page summary that explains how to use the Checklist as well as factors 
that appraisers should keep in mind during appraisal. Despite its brevity, this 
summary has important things to say about the Checklist's implementation 
47 Appraisal here is an overall assessment of the relevance, feasibility and potential 
sustainability of a development intervention prior to a 
decision of funding (MOFA 2003f). 
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and by extension, about how the appraisal functions in the overall greening 
process. 
The first striking feature about the JEXIM Checklist is the considerable 
flexibility that is built into the process. Thus, appraisers are told that, where 
a project is to be subject to environmental appraisal, they must "take each 
project's specific features into account, and add and alter the industry 
sectoral checklists [categories] if needed" (JEXIM 1993: 1). Hence, rather 
than being a rigid guideline, the Checklist is open to modification in 
recognition of the wide variety of projects to be appraised. Further, the 
appraiser also has leeway in terms of how detailed the investigation is. Thus, 
once the project has been initially reviewed, it is up to the appraiser to 
decide whether there are any issues requiring further investigation. 
Given the power of the appraiser, it is rather surprising that the Checklist 
does not require that this individual be an environmental specialist. Thus, 
the summary notes, almost in passing, that when further investigation is 
required "if needed, the Environment Office as well would like to be 
consulted regarding the matter" (JEXIM 1993: 1; emphasis added). This 
passage is revealing on several grounds. First, it suggests that the 
environmental appraisal is not usually conducted by Environmental Office 
staff based at JEXIM despite the intrinsically environmental nature of the 
topic. Considering the fact that the more 'environmentally conscious' 
OECF's appraisal teams usually consisted only of financial and technical 
experts (see Chapter 4), it is even less likely that JEXIM had an 
environmental specialist on board. In fact, it was a senior officer in each 
loan department48 was responsible for environmental assessment of a project 
(Dauvergne 1997). Even for current JBIC operations (which represent a 
continuation of prior JEXIM practice after the merger), although now it is 
officially the Environmental Office S41 job to conduct an environmental 
appraisal (JBIC 2002e, 2003d), that appraisal in practice is often carried out 
by other non-environmental staff who are located in finance departments or 
48 JEXIM had five loan departments responsible for the Bank's financial commitments: 
international loans to Asia, Oceania; Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas; 
overseas investment, etc (FOEJ 1997). 
49 It is called in JBIC the Environmental Analysis Department (JBIC 2005c). 
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in JBIC regional offices (Hatae 2005; Hama 2005). 50 Second, the Checklist 
indicates that even when there is an issue requiring detailed investigation, 
the Environmental Office is not necessarily consulted. Indeed, the identity 
and training of the JEXIM appraiser is not written anywhere in the 
Checklist. This omission matters as other official documents describe the 
role of JEXIM's Environmental Office as "reinforcing the environmental 
appraisal function/system for loan projects" (JBIC 2003b: 231). Simply 
reading this sort of passage would intuitively lead to the view that it is the 
Environmental Office that implemented environmental appraisals. This 
vague line of accountability was also a part of the Bank's secrecy 
(Dauvergne 1997). And yet, the Checklist documentation itself gives a 
different picture of the process (see below). 
Without an environmental science background, moreover, it is doubtful that 
a designated JEXIM appraiser could appropriately conduct an 
environmental appraisal. And yet, to be able even to check the contents of 
an EIA, produced after all by environmental consultants, would require a 
certain minimal level of environmental knowledge. Thus, the use by JEXIM 
of non-experts suggests that the process could never amount to much more 
than a mechanical matter of ticking boxes. Indeed, that the Checklist is 
designed simply to elicit yes/no responses would only appear to confinn the 
superficial nature of the exercise (i. e. a question such as "will the 
construction of projects such as large dams in tropical dry areas bring about 
localised climate changes and cause damage such as localised heavy 
rains? ") (JEXIM 1993: 2; see Appendix 2 for a complete list of the 
Checklist questions). 
Although JEXIM's Environmental Office was officially designed to provide 
input in that organisation in terms of environmental appraisal, there is 
nonetheless little publicly known about the work done by that office or even 
the number of its staff complement (JBIC 2004g). Thus, for example, when 
I made an enquiry about it, JBIC replied that it did not disclose 
information 
on the number of staff in the Envirom-nental Office because that information 
50 This point was made both by a JBIC employee and by a knowledgeable NGO employee 
in interview (Hama 2005; Hatae 2005). 
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was 4 classified' (JBIC 2004g). It was again suggested that such secrecy was 
'standard practice' among Japanese aid agencies (JBIC 2004g). " This 
response does raise questions, though, as to why this particular data is 
'classified',, and suggests a basic unease about their environmental appraisal 
system - and, even perhaps about the quality of the appraisal itself Indeed, 
various scholars have highlighted precisely this point (CPA 2003; Feld 
2004; FOEJ 2003ý 2004; Grifoni 1999; Mori* 2004; Moran 1999; Willing 
1999). 52 
A further striking feature of the Checklist is that it is largely, if not entirely, 
dependent on the previously completed EIA report upon which the project 
was based. Thus, JEXIM appraisers must rely on data provided by 
proponents as per EIA procedures under the Philippine EIS system 
discussed above (JEXIM 1993; Tsuji 2004). One former Japanese aid 
official candidly explained that staff "have no choice but to trust" those 
submitted EIA reports due to the lack of human and financial resources in 
the Japanese agencies themselves to investigate sites (Miyako*, interview, 
2004; see also National Diet 1987). In addition, the Checklist does not 
provide any guidance on how to review EIA reports, let alone how to check 
whether they were appropriately conducted in the first place. 
This seemingly casual environmental appraisal system flies in the face of 
JEXIM's own recognition that this system should be an integral and 
significant part of the overall aid disbursement process. Thus, the Checklist 
summary clearly states that given a particular environmental appraisal 
outcome, "... if needed, necessary measures in contracts or Loan Agreement 
must be arranged" (JEXIM 1993: 1; emphasis added). This is a very 
important passage as it shows that JEXIM was well aware of its need to 
assess and, if need be, reinforce the recipient's environmental consideration 
(kanky(5-haityo) process. By adding environmental issues raised during 
appraisal to conditions that frame loan agreements, JEXIM thus 
had the 
51 JBIC's email reply to my query stated that "we are afraid that the number of staff 
for 
environment-related work is classified therefore the 
data is not open to the public. This is 
the same case with OECF and JEXIM as well" 
(JBIC 2004g; see also Chapter 4). 
52 One senior JBIC official commented on the quality of 
SRMP's environmental appraisal 
as "too badly done ... which eventually cost more money 
to cover the problems caused by a 
badly done environmental appraisal in the first place" (Mon*, interview, 
2004). 
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power to suspend a loan when the standard of environmental consideration 
of a proposed project was seen to be poor and/or the project proposal was 
not deemed to comply fully with its own EIA report. Indeed, senior 
Japanese officials at the agency readily acknowledged this obligation. Thus, 
for example, during the Committee meeting on Public Administration 
Monitoring in the National Diet on November 20,2000, the former 
president of JBIC (i. e. JEXIM's successor agency), Hiroshi Yasuda, 
confirmed that "regarding socio-environmental consideration ... there are 
measures devised in the loan agreement to suspend loan disbursement if any 
illegal condition occurs" (National Diet 2000: 12). 
However, even when environmental concerns are added to the conditions of 
a loan agreement, those conditions are not usually disclosed to the public. 
For example, in the case of the Kotopanjang dam project in Indonesia, 
"three conditions , 53 were apparently included in the Loan Agreement as 
related by the relevant OECF official, T6ru Shinozuka, during National Diet 
hearings (National Diet 1999: 13). Those three conditions became the centre 
of a lawsuit over the legality of the Kotopanjan Dam project. Yet, and as 
noted before, JBIC refused to submit the loan agreement document either to 
the National Diet or to the Tokyo district court. JBIC's reasoning was that 
"the loan agreement documents cannot be disclosed and submitted to the 
court as they are very much diplomatically sensitive. Disclosing them would 
damage the bilateral relations between the Indonesian government and our 
[government]" (a JBIC legal representative at Tokyo District Court 13 
November 2003). 
However, unlike the JICA and the OECF environmental guidelines and 
checklists, JEXIM's checklist is occasionally made available to the public, 
albeit, only to those prepared to be tenacious in their search. A personal 
anecdote from fieldwork is relevant here. Thus, in January 2003, a librarian 
53 Those three conditions mostly concern the social and environmental aspects of the project 
such as protecting biodiversity (Sumatran elephant), maintaining the local livelihoods of the 
affected households, and fair process in obtaining agreement from affected households on 
resettlement (National Diet 1999: 13). The non-compliance of the three conditions 
led to a 
lawsuit filed in Tokyo district court by four thousand Sumatran residents against Japanese 
government, JICA, JBIC and T6den-sekkei, a Japanese consulting 
finn (Direct observation 
13 November 2003). 
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at the JICA library" helped me to locate the 1993 JEXIM environmental 
checklist. Yet, the librarian only found it when searching an internal library 
system which the public cannot access. On that internal system, more than 
50 items relating to JEXIM's operations were classified 'for internal use 
only'. Apparently, I was told, this was at the express wish of JEXIM. 
As the appraisal takes place before any funding decision is made by the 
Japanese government, the role of the appraiser (whether based at JEXIM, 
OECF or since 1999 JBIC) should be critical to the donor's confirmation 
process and constitutes the main opportunity to incorporate environmental 
elements into decision making. However, the Japanese system is opaque to 
the outside scholar even as what is visible comes across as being rather 
superficial at times - superficial, at least, when compared to Japan's formal 
and high profile commitment to 'green' its aid. Next, we examine how this 
secretive appraisal system worked in our case study. 
5.4.2. Implementing Environmental Appraisal: San Roque 
Multipurpose Project 
It is not surprising that my efforts to learn about the environmental appraisal 
of SRMP were hindered by the secretive Japanese system just discussed. 
Thus, JBIC (2004f) reluctantly and, ultimately quite poorly, responded to 
my questions" concerning the SRMP's environmental appraisal by 
providing a positively bland statement on that project. Specifically, JBIC 
(2004f) replied: "JEXEM (at that time) confirmed the appropriateness of 
environmental and social consideration which includes environmental 
compliance with the relevant regulations and laws in the Philippines as well 
as the properly planned resettlement action plan. Furthermore, JEXIM 
confirmed the appropriateness of the envirom-nental and social management 
plan in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prepared 
by the project 
proponent of the Philippines". Despite the blandness, this JBIC summary 
is 
revealing on at least two counts. First, it affirmed the 'appropriateness' of 
54 In Tokyo, most accessible 'aid' related references and environmental guidelines can 
be 
located in the JICA Library in Ichigaya, Shinjuku ward. 
55 1 asked specifically how the 1993 JEXIM environmental checklist was applied 
for the 
sRMP with additional questions including scoping and screening activity and 
JEXIM's 
monitoring activity for the project. 
But JBIC did not mention the environmental checklist or 
monitoring activity in its reply to me. 
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the recipient's work including its 'compliance' with Philippine 
environmental laws and regulations. However, our own discussion above 
concerning the illegal quarry occurred after the JEXIM verified the 
recipient's environmental consideration was appropriate - apparently 
suggests a poor appraisal by the JEXIM. Second, the JBIC reply suggests 
the 'appropriateness' too of the project proponent's social and 
environmental management plan for the SRMR And yet, such a plan is only 
as good as the data used to underpin it. Here again, though, our discussion 
above highlighted controversy over the proponent's data (e. g. the IRN 
reports) as well as the more general manipulation of the Philippine EIS 
system to minimise any SRMP pitfalls. In short, JBIC's response to my 
detailed questions raised doubts over the seriousness with which the 
environmental appraisal was conducted. 
There was, too, though, the possibility that JBIC secrecy here was partly a 
result of institutional embarrassment over SRMP - in other words, that JBIC 
officials were only too well aware of the pitfalls of this project and its 
Philippine recipient's environmental consideration (Dauvergne 1997; JBIC, 
interview, 2004h; Mori*, interview, 2004; see also JICA 1997,1999a, 
1999b). My interviews with JBIC staff support this point. As discussed 
above, Mori* (2004) admitted the environmental appraisal was 'too badly 
done'. Also during my interview with JBIC Philippines department staff 
regarding the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern 
Palawan (SEMP) project, I briefly asked why the SRMP was so 
controversial. JBIC interviewees (three from the SEMP team and two from 
public relations office) suddenly became silent and did not speak a word on 
that matter (JBIC 2004h). Evidence to support this view also came in the 
form of a special briefing that JEXIM undertook for National Diet member 
ShUichi Kat6 on the matter in February 1999 (JEXIM 1999b). This briefing 
report sheds further light on the environmental appraisal process undertaken 
in this case. It thus notes how the appraisers had assessed both the EIA 
report and the ECC for the SRMP. According to that report, moreover, 
JEXIM had already completed by February 1999 an environmental appraisal 
for the hydropower plant construction and was in the midst of completing an 
additional environmental appraisal 
for the multipurpose dam construction. 
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Recall that under the terms of the Checklist, an additional investigation only 
occurs "when there is an issue that needs further attention" (JEXIM 1993: 
1). In the case of SRMP dam construction, JEXIM had focused the 
supplementary enquiry on socio-environmental issues (e. g. the resettlement 
of affected communities) - thereby suggesting that there were some 
potential problems in this area that were flagged during the original 
appraisal (JEXIM 1999b; Mori* 2004). 
In general, and based notably on the National Diet briefing, the available 
evidence suggests that the standard operating procedure discussed in the last 
section seems to have been followed - however much this seems to have 
been done in a basic fashion or even again superficial. Thus, the EIA report 
and ECC were both reviewed as per the Checklist - although there is little 
indication of the appraisers' detailed response to them. For the hydropower 
plant, JEXIM conducted the appraisal by visiting the project site as well as 
resettlement sites. In the process, staff met with officials at SRPC, NPC, 
DENR's Region I office and Local Government Units. JEXIM appraisers 
also consulted with local communities and concerned NGOs such as the 
Cordillera Peoples Alliance and Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway ti 
Agno (TIMMAWA) 56 (JEXIM 1999b; FOEJ 1999b, 2002a, 2005a, 2005d; 
Barangay San Nicholas Villagers, interview, 2004; Doton, interview, 2004; 
see below for detailed discussion the JEXIM's visits). 
Based on this appraisal process, it would seem derived from the evidence 
available to me that JEXIM staff had three particular concerns about the 
SRMP. First, there was some doubt as to whether the proponent's 
environmental consideration satisfied the Philippine EIS system. Second, 
there was also a practical worry as to whether SRPC and NPC 
environmental consideration would actually mean that the project would 
avoid serious adverse environmental impact as was claimed. Third, there 
was some question over whether the environmental management plan 
56 TIMMAWA (Alliance of Peasants to Free the Agno) is an alliance of farmers along the 
upstream and downstream Agno River who are affected 
by the SRMP. TIMMAWA through 
its alliance with other national/international organizations and 
individuals, has been 
protesting against the SRMP (RWESA 
2003; FOEJ 2005a). 
170 
Chapter Five 
(including monitoring) was appropriately detailed given the likely impact of 
this complex mega-development project. 
Needless to say, JEXIM has never made public either its misgivings or its 
specific response to those misgivings. Thus, while the 1999 briefing report 
did not specify the JEXIM reaction to what it saw and heard about the 
SRMP, on the basis of the appraisal that was submitted, JEXIM later 
decided to put in place a lengthy 15 year monitoring system to cover the 
period during and after construction of the hydropower plant (JEXIM 
1999b; FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). In fact, JBIC implemented this decision 
after the merger of JEXIM and OECF in 1999 (see Chapter 4). However, 
such lengthy monitoring was in addition to the usual procedure and is rarely 
done given the cost involved and the aforementioned staff shortage in the 
Japanese aid agencies. It can thus be confidently surmised that JEXIM 
indeed had some strong reservations about the efficacy of the Philippine EIS 
process, at least as it was conducted at the SRMP site. Nonetheless, the 
overriding point in all of this is that the JEXIM environmental appraisal 
gave a green light to the SRMP, thereby enabling it to move forward 
smoothly - beginning with the destruction of houses at the project sites in 
February 1998 (FOEJ 2002a). 
JEXIM's environmental appraisal of the San Roque Multipurpose Project 
was criticised for having been done inappropriately. Both local and 
international NGOs as well as Local Government Units protested about it - 
and even appealed to JEXIM, the JBIC and even to the Japanese 
government for a suspension of loans to the SRMP (FOEJ 1999c; Shalupirip 
Shantahnay Indigenous People's Movement 1999b; CPA 2000). Yet, the 
loans, and hence the project went ahead anyway. This discussion may have 
been a good thing for the project proponent. However, it simply stored up 
trouble for the Japanese aid bureaucracy itself This was because an 
inappropriately conducted environmental appraisal tends to make the 
subsequent monitoring even more costly than would otherwise be the case 
in so far as the donor simply tries to 'cover up' past mistakes (Hirai, 
interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004; 
Mori*, interview, 2004; Murai, interview, 2004). 
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5.4.3. Monitoring: Kankyd-jissa 
The monitoring process is the final stage of environmental assessment, and 
hence the final occasion at which Japanese officials can encourage 
'greening'. True, there are clear constraints at this final stage, given that this 
aspect is about checking the compliance between prior agreement and 
implementation - rather than assessing whether those agreements were 
sufficient to begin with. Yet, here too, and despite these constraints, 
evidence should be available to demonstrate Japan's commitment to 
greening - for example, by insisting on the full completion of all prior 
environmental undertakings. 
The key agency at the monitoring stage for this project was JBIC. Such 
monitoring was thus based on JBIC's guidelines with the specific purpose of 
ensuring compliance with socio-environmental commitments at the SRMP 
based on prior stages in the environmental consideration process (FOEJ 
2004c). According to the Japanese Ministry of Finance and JBIC itself, the 
monitoring system for the SRMP was established in accordance with the 
delegated monitoring plan set by JEXIM in light of its own environmental 
appraisal noted above (FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). JBIC thus was to be 
regularly updated by reports from the NPC and the SRPC, even as it was to 
conduct its own field investigations by dispatching an environmental 
mission team to the area biannually. Thus, monitoring is mostly undertaken 
remotely from Tokyo, and based on the project proponent's own reports 
while the field investigation is to be carried out regularly at times "when [it 
was] perceived opportune" (MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2). It is further 
emphasised in the monitoring plan that, in order to check compliance with 
regard to the project's environmental consideration, JBIC monitoring is "in 
the first place, based on the report and information provided by the project 
proponent" (MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2). However, monitoring reports 
submitted by the NPC are not available to the public as there is no bilateral 
agreement to disclose them (MOF in FOEJ 2004e). " 
57 My request to JBIC in this regard was thus predictably tumed down. 
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The field investigation itself is usually carried out by a JBIC kanky5-jissa 
team. In practice, this team has been regularly (biannually) sent to the 
project site and neighbouring areas. The team consists of five members from 
the Environmental Analysis Department (Kankyo-shinsa-shitsu), the project 
office (International Finance Department 1), and one external 'Independent' 
environmental consultant hired by the JBIC "if necessary" (hitsuy5 ni 5jite) 
(MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2,2004b, 2005c). The regular dispatch of this team,, 
though, is a costly affair for JBIC- notably because it often needs to hire a 
consultant and must pay for staff travel to and from, as well as around the 
Philippines, including helicopter hire to get to remote areas (Kaori Nakajima 
in FOEJ 2004c: 4). " Hiring third party (daisansha de aru) environmental 
consultants - so far, only white male consultants according to locals (see 
below) - also contributes to the monitoring expenses. Yet, the presence of 
the third party within the team is critical in that it provides professional 
expertise and at the same time gives international legitimacy to the JBIC 
monitoring activity (FOEJ 2004e: 2). Again, just like other examples of 
secrecy at JBIC, information on consultants' identities as well as their roles 
are not disclosed (but see below). 
In spite of the costly nature of the kanky5-jissa team, its activities at the 
SRMP site were simply described as "covering up the dirt" by one Japanese 
aid official "rather than ultimately solving the actual problems" (Mori*, 
interview, 2004). This is due to the strong tendency within the Japanese aid 
bureaucracy to deny failure in their aid delivery (Hirai, interview, 2003; 
Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004; Mori*, interview, 
2004; Murai, interview, 2004). Such an attitude can be seen in the 
perfunctory nature of the site visit itself. Thus, and although the mission is a 
field investigation, the mission team usually only spends two days actually 
at the project site, (out of a total of four days) with the rest of time spent in 
Manila (FOEJ 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). 
58 It is, in fact very dangerous, time consuming and painful to travel to the SRMP site area 
including the affected communities because public transport Is extremely poor. I travelled 
to the affected communities by 'jeepneys' that were the only public transport connected to 
the area. The return trip from Baguio (Capital city of Benguet Province) to the Dalupinip 
(Ibaloi village, see Figure 5.1) takes 7 hours along deadly mountain roads. Jeepneys are 
small converted minivans (originally US military 
jeeps) in the back of which a lot of people 
(as many as can be squeezed in) are transported. There is no health and safety consideration 
here (Direct Observation 24-29 March 2004). 
173 
Chapter Five 
Whatever the precise merits of this critical view, it does indeed raise 
questions about the utility of monitoring as an independent and thorough 
mechanism by which to ensure that environmental consideration has taken 
place in project implementation. Given the various flows of the 
environmental appraisal system noted above, to the extent that monitoring is 
tantamount to 'cover up', then little can be expected at this final stage by 
way of sanction for unfulfilled environmental commitments. 
Indeed, there is rather little evidence of any substantive impact on the 
ground arising from Japanese monitoring. Thus, and in sharp contrast to 
both JEXIM's report (JEXIM 1999b) and JBIC's pronouncements on its 
commitment to environmental monitoring (FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 
2005e), local people have seen little evidence of the team in action. For 
example, one indigenous community leader described the mission team's 
visits dismissively: "Every time they come and ask the same questions over 
and over. That is all. But I have seen them very few times. Not many. " 
(Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, interview, 2004). As well as this leader, 
other local people also told similar stories about the mission team - above 
all, that they rarely saw the team in their communities (Besitan, interview, 
2004; Mooy, interview, 2004). One Ibaloi woman did recall, though, an 
Australian consultant's visit, " but remained quite unclear as to what he was 
exactly doing in their community - despite this field investigation 
purportedly involving local consultation (Mooy, interview, 2004). Even the 
SRPC social and environmental department officer Tom Valdez said he had 
met the monitoring team only once (Valdez, interview, 2004). 
In spite of its key purpose being to investigate the project site and to consult 
with the affected communities, therefore, the Japanese team was not that 
visible locally, seemingly even for the SRPC officer who was in charge of 
socio-envirom-nental issues. Several issues are thereby raised over kanky5- 
fissa itself as a monitoring activity. First, as mentioned earlier, the team 
spent only two days around the project site out of a total of four days. It is, 
however, very unlikely that five investigators can appreciate the complex 
59 During interview, Norma Mooy said she met an Australian consultant who was called Mr. 
Gordon (Mooy, interview, 2004). 
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socio-environmental conditions of the affected area and its communities 
including four resettlement areas covering three municipalities (San 
Manueal, San Nicholas and Itogon) in such a short time (see Figure 5.2). 
Second, as the investigation team was mainly guided by NPC and SRPC 
staff even when there, the nature of the consultation with local conununity 
and hence the associated assembled data were inevitably biased (FOEJ 
2004e: 3). '0 Takuya Miyazaki, a senior MOF official, thus explained NPC 
and SRPC attendance at the consultations: "it is because the responsibility 
of SRMP's environmental consideration lies with the project proponent. 
JBIC only checks as a lender, therefore monitoring without the project 
proponent at all is difficultftom the beginning" (Miyazaki in FOEJ 2004e: 3 
emphasis added). What has been underlined here, therefore, is the JBIC is 
gonly' a lender which is (ultimately) not responsible for the environmental 
consideration, but rather needs NPC and SRPC involvement as the key local 
players in that process. And yet, such dependency inevitably raises 
questions about the ability of the Japanese agency in charge of monitoring 
(here JBIC) to conduct this task in a independent manner benefiting the 
serious formal intent of Japan's 'green' aid policy. 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined to what extent and in what ways a traditional 
development 'aid' (kaihatsu-enjyo) project has been 'greened' in terms of 
the procedures adopted. In order to assess this topic, the chapter analysed 
the three stages of the environmental assessment procedure (namely, 
environmental consideration, verification of environmental consideration, 
and monitoring) where both JEXIM and the project proponents were to 
make efforts to ensure that environmental concerns were incorporated into 
the project. Now, since the San Roque Multipurpose Project is a business- 
oriented and profit-driven mega-development 'aid' project, the degree of 
greening was always expected to be relatively minor, as green concerns are 
sidelined in favour of standard economic calculations. 
60 Even community meetings including interpreters were also arranged through the SRPC 
and NPC (FOEJ 2005b). 
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Yet, it is fair to say that there was nonetheless some evidence of limited 
greening. Such limited greening was seen here and there in the process: 
notably, in the JICA Re-study, the envirom-nental appraisal, the IIWMP. The 
IIWMP in particular showed JBIC's 'green intent' on the socio- 
environmental issue (i. e. watershed management and sustainable livelihood 
programmes) in that a purely voluntary interest repayment waiver enabled 
extra funds to go to this SRMP component. 
The Philippine EIS system also clearly played a role in environmental 
consideration here by requiring an EIA report and an ECC issuance before a 
project could formally proceed. As noted in Chapter 4, the Japanese 
international cooperation system is reliant on a recipient government's 
actions - such that, the greening of a Japanese aid project cannot be 
assessed only by the donor's efforts alone. Indeed, in the core of SRMP, 
specific environmental management plans (such as the watershed 
management plan) were produced that incorporated 1990s discourses on 
conservation, sustainable livelihoods, and indigenous people's rights and 
ancestral land titles - and hence, that suggested some recognition of the 
need to account for socio-environmental issues by relevant Philippine 
agencies. 
That said, the analysis of this chapter also observed how practices at all 
stages revealed serious deficiencies that were notably linked, in tam, to 
political and economic dynamics. Although project procedures were thus 
technically 'greened', political and economic interests often subverted such 
greening in the implementation phase - for example, through the issuance of 
a special permit under EO 200 to allow illegal quarrying. Some procedural 
practices - for instance, the JEXIM environmental appraisal - meanwhile, 
were seemingly not conducted by environmental specialists, while 
subsequent JBIC monitoring was apparently perfunctory. Thus, there were 
clearly gaps between 'green' promises made and practical project-related 
measures taken which meant that, overall, environmental concerns 
surrounding the SRMP were imperfectly addressed. 
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However, it still might be argued that the greening of Japanese international 
cooperation (kokusai-ky5ryoku) is most likely to occur in a new generation 
of aid projects linked to envirom-nental conservation (rather than in the 
'traditional' development project covered here). Using a second case study, 
therefore, Chapter 6 next assesses this matter to further probe the extent to 
which green procedural commitments have been met in the Japanese aid 
sector. 
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Chapter 6. Greening of kankyd-enjyo: 
Sustainable Environmental Management Project 
in Northern Palawan 
This chapter investigates the Sustainable Environmental Management 
Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) in order to assess to what extent a 
'kankyO-enjyo' (environmental aid) project in the 1990s was able to 
incorporate green elements. Our concern here is thus two fold. First , it is to 
investigate how the greening process may have differed from that of a 
traditional development aid project such as the one examined in Chapter 5. 
Second,, and if different, the concern is to assess what tools and procedures 
were used in the environmental aid project. Overall, then, the purpose is to 
map the greening process in Japanese aid with a particular focus on 
environmental assessment procedures such as environmental consideration 
and its verification. 
Figure 6.1. A Tourism Development Project 
Source: Glasson et al. (2005: 1). 
The process from project formulation to approval in SEMP 
directs our 
attention to how the formal greening of policy and procedures 
has affected 
the practices of the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) and the 
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Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). The main objective of 
SEMP is to promote 'community-based' and 'environmentally sustainable' 
tourism. This sort of development was a key theme in aid discourse in the 
1990s promoted through a series of policy statements (see Chapter 4) - and 
became, in turn, one of the most popular project types of the decade. 
Unlike the project discussed in Chapter 5, where all stages of the 
environmental assessment process were considered, this chapter mainly 
focuses on environmental consideration and its verification as well as the 
implications for this project's implementation. This is because, on the one 
hand, the project is still being implemented as of writing, and thus, 
monitoring is yet to be undertaken, and on the other hand, these two 
particular procedures show the degree of greening most effectively in this 
case since the SEMP was designed to be an environmental management 
project from the start. 
This chapter first introduces the SEMP and its specific setting of Northern 
Palawan, including its unique political ecology. Next, it examines in depth 
the donor's input to the recipient's own environmental consideration 
procedure by assessing two key documents: the JICA Master Plan study and 
the OECF Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity 
document. Such analysis enables us to assess the wider procedural 
compliance in this environmental aid project in keeping with the concerns of 
this thesis. 
6.1. Project Overview 
The Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan 
(SEMP) is the first Japanese environmental aid project in the Philippines 
that specifically targeted environment conservation (JBIC 2000c; Chan 
2004). Moreover, during the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, this particular project was registered by the Japanese 
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delegation with the United Nations as a type 11 project' under the category 
of "environment-related assistance for developing countries" (MOFA 2002f) 
- thus, indeed, it is one of the 'star' projects of the current Japanese ODA 
system. 
Its fon-nal goals are to "conserve the precious environment and natural 
resources in Northern Palawan by ... the establishment of 
E[nvironmentally] C[ritical] A[rea] N[etwork] zoning2 [as a tool for 
producing a conservation map], the prevention of soil erosion, and the 
provision of substitute income methods for community residents in order to 
deter the conduct of activities detrimental to the environment" (JIBIC 2003d: 
I, 2004c: 1). The project is made up of sites located in II municipalities: 
Busuanga, Coron, Cullion, Linapacan, El Nido, Taytay, Aracell, Dumaran, 
San Vincente, Roxas, and Puerto Princessa (see Figure 6.3). ' 
A total of 2.034 billion yen (or about US$ 17 million) was agreed to be 
disbursed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIQ to fund 
this project. As the project is categorised by JBIC as a natural environment 
conservation project (JBIC 2002a), 'the most concessional terms' (MOFA 
1997b) were applied: specifically, a special 'environmental' interest rate of 
0.75% and a repayment period of 40 years (including a 10-year grace 
period) owing to its status as a conservation project (JBIC 2003d, 2004c; see 
also Nishigaki 2000). 
Although the actual loan agreement was only made on May 30,2001, the 
environmental consideration process had begun long before that with the 
project formation and preparation stage occurring between 1994 and 1999. 
With both JICA and OECF involved at various stages, a master plan study 
and a Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity were 
conducted. Both of these activities were designed to assist the recipient 
1 'Type 11' projects are voluntary projects carried out in partnership between different 
stakeholders such as governments, NGOs and business in order to contribute to the 
implementation of Agenda 21 (see UNDESA 2003). 
2 See below 
3 However, according to the ECAN Zoning Component's report (2003: 1-3), project sites 
total 14 sites with the additional three sites being Magsaysay, Agutaya, Cuyo. 
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government to strengthen its environmental consideration (kanky5-hairyo) 
activities. Thus, below, this chapter will consider them in some detail. All of 
these activities need to be understood in order to see how, together, they 
may have defined the project in terms of possible greening (see Figure 6.2). 
Recall what was discussed in Chapter 5 in this regard. There, we saw that 
the presence of the donor was less significant in the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project - even at the stage of environmental appraisal where 
Japan had to play a direct part. However, in the environmental aid project 
examined in this chapter, the presence of Japan as a donor is visible from the 
early stages of environmental consideration due to a more rigorous 
environmental consideration procedure including master plan study and 
Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) - and hence not just in 
the verification of environmental consideration stage (kanky5-hairyo- 
kakunin). 
Figure 6.2. The SEMP Project Cycle 
Philippine government request for Technical Assistance 
I 
Sustainable Tourism Technical Assistance to support 
JICA Development Master Plan for recipients' environmental 
Northern Palawan consideration - Grants 
I 
OECF Special Assistance for 
Strengthening recipients' 
environmental consideration - JBIC Project Formation 
Grants 
II 
I 
Verification of environmental V qU, JBIC Environmental Appraisal 
consideration 
I 
Implementation by JBIC 
Source: This Author 
Project formulation thus began in 1994 with a JICA development study 
comprising a preparatory study and master plan study (JICA 
1995a, 1997). 
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In 1997, the Master Plan was finalised, but in order to (apparently) 
strengthen environmental consideration and local community participation 
in the Master Plan, OECF, the Yen loan implementing agency, conducted a 
Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) initiative with the well- 
known international environmental NGO Conservation International as the 
key subcontractor (see below). The SAPROF final report (JBIC 1999b) was 
completed in 1999 and was based on two key principles: biodiversity 
conservation and community participation (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, 
interview, 2004). Later, these principles were incorporated into the ensuing 
SEMP project design so as to implement an effective environmental 
guideline through project practices such as ECAN Zoning (see below). 
Figure 6.3. Organisational Chart for Project Implementation 
DOT 
Leading Executing 
Aciencv 
Executing Agencies i PCSDS 
Component ECAN- I 
Zoning 
Source: JBIC (2003d) 
DPWH 11 DOT 
Soil Environmentally 
Erosion Sustainable Tourism 
Protection Development 
The SEMP itself has been composed of three components: an 
environmentally sustainable tourism development component 
(often called 
SEMP Tourism); an Environmentally Critical Area Network (ECAN) 
Zoning component; and a soil erosion protection component (JBIC 
2003d, 
2004c). Although the Philippine Department of Tourism (DOT) is the 
leading executing agency for the overall project management, each 
component is controlled and 
implemented by different agencies: DOT, 
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSDS), and the 
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) (see Figure 
6.3). 
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These agencies in turn have contracted their work out to private companies 
(see Table 6.1). As Table 6.1 shows, most of the companies are either based 
in or linked to the Philippines, Japan or the European Union (EU). 4 
Table 6.1. Four contracts in place (as of February 2004) 
Project Component Details of Contractor (Consultants) 
Soil erosion protection PCI in association with Filipinas Dravo Corporation, 
component (DWPH) Philipps Technical Consultants Corporation, TCGI 
Engineers, J. F. Cancio & Associates and Sustainable 
Ecosystem International Corporation Philippines 
Japanese/ Filipino) 
ECAN Zoning PCI in association with Almec Corporation, Daruma 
Component (PCSDS) Technologies, Inc., Certeza Surveying and Aerophoto 
Systems, Inc., and Geo Survey and Mapping, Inc. 
Japanese/Filipino) 
Project Management/ CHL Consulting Co., Ltd, in association with CEST, 
Tourism Development Inc. (Irish/Filipino) 
Component (DOT) 
Civil Works Component Welex Construction/Gold rock Construction and 
(DPWH) Development Corporation (Filipino Joint Venture) 
Source: Adapted from JBIC (2004c) 
The three project components reflected a multi-faceted engagement with 
environmental issues. Thus, the environmentally sustainable tourism 
development component (hereafter SEMP Tourism) aims mainly to prepare 
standards and guidelines for tourism by producing a tourism development 
plan for the environmentally diverse but endangered Coron-Busuanga and 
El Nido-Taytay sites. It also aims to enhance community participation and 
introduce an environmental conservation fee into the areas where the plan is 
to be implemented in order to generate funds through carefully targeted 
tourist activity. 
The Envirom-nentally Critical Area Network Zoning (ECAN Zoning) 
component was one of the critical areas identified by both JICA (1995a, 
1997) and JBIC (1999b) as needing support if the overall conservation effort 
4 The EU has a significant presence in Palawan as well as elsewhere in the Philippines in 
terms of environmental conservation (Bryant 2002; Lawrence 2002; 
GOP 1997). An EU 
funded Palawan Tropical Forestry Protection Programme (PTFPP) was started for example 
in 1995 and finished in 2004 with a two year extension (PTFPP; De 
Vere Moss, interview, 
2004). 
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was to proceed. Such an identification reflected the fact that, although 
ECAN Zoning had been adopted as the main tool by which to implement the 
Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) Act (GOP 1992b), very 
few municipalities had produced an ECAN map due to difficulties linked to 
local corruption as well as the lengthy negotiation process among the 
stakeholders (Arquiza 1996; Lawrence 2002; see below). This component 
thus includes such activities as resource inventory surveys, GIS mapping, as 
well as support mechanisms such as capacity building for the PCSDS and 
local government units. 
Finally, the soil erosion protection component, unlike the other two 
components, has been involved in carrying out assorted civil engineering 
works. This component is designed to rehabilitate an existing 59.3 km road 
between El Nido and Taytay that runs inland as well as along the coastline 
(SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component 2004). It aims to prevent further 
environmental degradation to the road and adjacent areas by using 
environmentally-sound technology - providing good drainage, a gravel 
surface with improved highway geometry, and planting indigenous trees for 
slope protection (Mangubat, interview, 2004). ' 
Table. 6.2. Allocation of Loan 
Loan 
Category Details allocation % 
(Million JPY) 
Soil erosion protection Civil works, Consulting 
component services 1180 58% 
ECAN Zoning Procurement of 547 27% 
component Equipment, Consulting 
services 
SEMP Tourism Consulting services for 284 14% 
component project management and 
tourism development 
Conting ncy 1 23 1% 
TOTAL 1 2,034 100% 
Source: Adapted from JBIC (2004c) 
5 The Soil Erosion Protection Component used the Palawan indigenous species of Calabaw 
grass of which roots grow vertically to hold soils. The grass does not spread horizontally, 
therefore does not affect the road either (Magubat, interview, 2004). 
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While each component stressed the importance of 'green' elements, the 
actual loan allocation suggests a technologically-driven project with more 
than half of the loan being allocated to mainly civil works for physical 
infrastructure development (58%) and expensive ECAN Zoning equipment 
procurement (27%) (see Table 6.2. ). This allocation is, in fact, critical in 
assessing the SEMP as an environmental aid project - because this project is 
indeed heralded as one of the key "projects for environmental protection" 
(JBIC 2004b, 2004e). 
Furthermore, although the soil erosion protection component promised to be 
based on environmentally sound technology, it still involves constructing 
ten new 301 meter bridges and rendering concrete 4.2 km of the road 
(SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component 2004). Such new work is hardly 
ggreen'yet stems from OECF's re-categorisation of project contents because 
the annual budget for a 'regular' development aid project in the same area 
had run out (Hillel, interview, 2004). Indeed, 're-categorisation' can also be 
seen in the JICA 1997 Master Plan Study, as the project devised there was 
originally a mainstream tourism development project and not an 
environmental management project (Hillel, interview, 2004; JICA 1995a, 
1997). 
This project overview enables us to see both its complexity and possible 
contradictory nature. As reiterated elsewhere in this research, the role of the 
recipient and the local context is crucial to understanding the 
implementation of 'green' Japanese aid projects. Thus, the next section 
explores the Palawan context in order to appreciate how the SEMP has 
fitted into that setting. 
6.2. Palawan: the Philippines' Last Frontier 
To appreciate why Japan's 'green' aid targeted 
Palawan is partly to 
recognise the unique environmental 
history of this province. Palawan is the 
fifth largest island in the Philippines with 21 municipalities, 419 barangays, 
one main city and 1769 islands/islets 
(CEC 1994; see Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4. Map of Northern Palawan with Planned Road Rehabilitation 
Route and Project Sites 
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This province was once malaria infested 'backwater' as well as being used 
as a leper and convict colony. However, since the late 1980s, the province 
has been widely known as the last natural frontier of the Philippines (Broad 
with Cavanagh 1993; Plantilla, inter-view, 2004; Ylaya 2002). ' This 
reputation has been seized on, meanwhile, by the Department of Tourism 
(DOT) as it stresses Northem Palawan in particular as one of the country's 
most beautiful and soc 1 o- environmentally sensitive areas (DOT 2005; see 
Figure 6.5). ' 
Figure 6.5. Northern Palawan 
At 
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Source: Own Photo 
K 
Coron Island - Mangrove Forests 
Source: SEMP Tourism Component (2003). 
6 Yet, this image was threatened due to excessive logging and mining according to 
environmentalists and anthropologists (CEC 1994; Arquiza 1996). 
7 DOT and CEC's demarcation of Northern Palawan area is slightly different from SEMP 
project sites. DOT (2005) demarcates it as encompassing "Puerto Princesa and the 
northward islands including Cuyo, Cagayancillo, and Busuanga" while CEC (1994: 7) 
more specifically identifies it as "Puerto Princesa city and the municipalities of San 
Vincente, Roxas, Taytay and El Nido in mainland and the Island municipalities of 
Busuanga, Coron, Culion, Calauit, Cuyo Islands, Dumaran Islands, and other islands north 
of Puerto Princesa". 
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The report by the Commission of European Communities (CEC 1994: 7) 
also underlined that the area is "the most easily accessible therefore ... is 
most at risk". Out of a total of 7 protected areas in Palawan, ' 5 of these are 
located in Northern Palawan, which suggests the latter's rich socio- 
ecological heritage has thus been recognised at both the national and 
international levels: El Nido-Taytay Managed Protected Area, Puerto 
Princesa Subterranean River National Park, Malampaya Sound Land and 
Seascape Protected Area, Coron Island Protected Area, and the Calauit 
Game Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary. Indeed, Puerto Princesa 
Subterranean River National Park is even designated by UNESCO as a 
World Heritage Site. ' 
However, this status as a biodiversity 'hotspot' was not gained in one day - 
rather, long-standing concerns over the state of the Palawan environment 
played a prominent role in this process. Following the downfall of President 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, Philippine NGOs promoted new national 
agendas such as environmental conservation and indigenous people's rights 
(Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Bryant 2000,2002,2005; Leonen 2000; 
Silliman and Noble 1998). A series of environmental disasters in the late 
1980s and early 1990s gave additional public attention to the consequences 
of irresponsible commercial practices caused by excessive logging 
(Lawrence 2002; Vitug 1993). The Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) responded by cancelling the operations of all timber 
licenses (Vitug 1993). This was regarded as a significant victory by 
environmental NGOs which further led on to a national strategy for 
community forestry (Gauld 2000; Steinberg 2000). 
This movement developed into the 'greening' of Palawan in the 1990s, 
through both state and civil society action. Donors played a key role in this 
greening process, as they both reflected and encouraged this shift (Ross 
1996; Lawrence 2002). For our purposes, this can be seen in the context of 
' Two other protected areas are Ursula Island Game Refuge and Bird Sanctuary as well as 
Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park. 
9 The Philippines has three UNESCO's World Heritage Sites: Puerto Princesa Subterranean 
River National Park (Palawan), Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park (Palawan), and 
Banaue Rice Terraces (Northern Luzon). 
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Japanese aid, as expressed through the main concerns of the SEMP. Unlike 
the case of the San Roque Multipurpose Project studied in Chapter 5 and 
which was framed in the broader context of the Philippine political 
economy, then, the SEMP is examined in the specific setting of a province 
that is the most advanced nationally in terms of environmental awareness as 
well as local participation (Balcos, interview, 2004; Bryant 2000). Thus, the 
next section focuses on more particularly Northern Palawan in order to 
situate SEMP's concerns of biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
tourism in the wider setting of the province's environmental governance 
structures, thereby highlighting the local recipient's environmental 
consideration mechanisms that are linked to Japan's overall 'greening' 
procedures. 
6.2.1. Environmental Conservation: SEP, PCSD, and PCSDS 
The Philippines is well known for its rich biodiversity and much attention 
has been paid to the quest to conserve one of the hottest of the world's 
biodiversity 'hotspots' (National Geographic 2002; Conservation 
International 2003). Unfortunately, biodiversity loss is rapid and caused by 
both natural and human processes (JBIC 2000c, 2002a; Lawrence 2002). 
Rafts of donor-encouraged laws were propagated in the 1990s to tackle this 
problem. In order to provide a legal framework for environmental 
management and protection, the National Integrated Protected Area System 
(NIPAS) was established in June 1992 (GOP 1992a). Shortly thereafter, a 
Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) was set up (GOP 1992b). " 
While NIPAS is to govern the protected areas in the Philippines nationwidel 
SEP is specifically designed for Palawan's sustainable development. 
" This 
province's fairly progressive initiative is central to projects like SEMP since 
special local rules affect project implementation. 
10 Considering that the Rio Summit was held in June 1992, symbolically important gestures 
were shown for conservation and sustainable 
development by passing the two Republic 
Acts during that time. 
" SEP is the first law introduced to totally ban commercial logging that plundered the 
province for decades (Section 
2 of RA 7611: see also Arquiza 1996; Arzaga, interview, 
2004; Matulac, interview, 2004). 
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Establishment of these new laws did not emerge in a political vacuum. They 
were products of a series of political battles since the late 1980s (Broad with 
Cavanagh 1993; Bryant 2005). Palawan in particular was a key battleground 
for environmental protection - and notably, the Philippine NGO Haribon 
Foundation's campaign to protect forests against powerful opponents such 
as the logging tycoon Jose Alvarez. Eventually, with national and 
international support, Haribon led the way in achieving a total commercial 
log ban in Palawan (Plantila, interview, 2004, Bryant 2005). Therefore, it is 
critical for this thesis to consider that the SEP was created in this turbulent 
time in Palawan's history. 
The SEP was funded under the Palawan Integrated Area Development 
Project originally begun in 1982 by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and European Economic Community (EEC) (Arquiza 1996; Miguel 1997; 
ADB 1998). While the ADB's 47 million US$ loan was used to improve 
physical infrastructure, 12 the 7 million US$ EEC grant funded the Integrated 
Environmental Programme for Palawan which prepared and implemented 
an envirom-nental plan (AD13 1998). " SEP was, in fact, one outcome of the 
Integrated Environmental Programme (Arquiza 1996; ADB 1998; Miguel 
1998; OIDCI 2001). With the support of Palawan's two powerful 
Congressional leaders", SEP became a law (GOP 1992b) that finally 
provided an "adequate or applicable (legal system) to ... the ecologically- 
sensitive frontier" (Arquiza 1996: 47). 
The SEP Act set up a comprehensive framework to guide actors involved in 
the formulation and implementation of local development plans and 
programmes (GOP 1992b). Importantly, although it is strictly only a 
provincial matter, the Act allotted a share of the Philippine national budget 
12 The ADB's funding pattern is heavily focused on physical infrastructure leading to its 
nickname as "Asian Dam and Bridges" (Itoh, interview, 2004; Tamura, 
interview, 2004; 
Tanaka, interview, 2004). ADB's operation and its organisation culture is said to be very 
similar to that of Japanese aid agencies as Japan is the 
largest shareholder of the Bank 
(ibid. ). 
13 It is also interesting to notice that those consulting firms that worked on the report the 
Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) Towards Sustainable Development were 
mostly English companies. As the 1EP was 
funded through an CEC grant, two companies 
out of three were English consulting 
firms: Hunting Technical Services Limited, England 
and Sir MacDonald and Partners, 
England (PIADPO 1987). 
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to assist Palawan (Arquiza 1996). The Act coordinates both development 
and conservation activities that protect the ecosystem and rehabilitate 
exploited areas (GOP 1992b). Three major implementing elements were 
identified: Environmentally Critical Areas Networking (ECAN), the 
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), and the Palawan 
Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSDS). As these elements are 
vital to appreciating the implementation of SEMP, the discussion now 
explores the role of each element in the environmental management process. 
Environmentally Critical Areas Networking (ECAN) serves as the main 
planning strategy of SEP in that it divides the province into areas meant for 
economic activity, human settlement and strict envirom-nental protection. In 
effect, it is a land use plan with legally binding force (JICA 1997). It has 
three main components (terrestrial, coastal/marine area, and tribal ancestral 
lands) and zoning categories (core, buffer, and multiple use) (GOP 1992b; 
see also below). By using ECAN, the SEP established a system that seeks to 
ensure forest conservation by imposing a total commercial logging ban in 
core and buffer zones, even as it promotes watershed protection, 
biodiversity preservation, as well as tribal people's right and their cultural 
protection (GOP 1992b). 
The Act also created the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 
(PCSD) with a remit to govern, implement and give overall policy direction 
in the context of the SEP. The Council is interestingly not just a provincial 
agency but a national one as it is directly under the control of the Office of 
the President. " The Council is composed of both provincial/local and 
national agencies" in order to ensure proper co-ordination between local 
14 Ramon Mitra and David Ponce de Leon. 
15 Although Ramon Mitra expressively denies personal interests, it is often said that PCSD 
was set up in this way as he wanted it so (Arquiza 1996; Arzaga, 
interview, 2004). As a 
presidential candidate in 1992, he was confident about wining the election - yet, 
because he 
wanted to maintain control over Palawan (and its valuable resources), 
he created the 
Council under the Office of the President. 
16 The Council consists of mandated members such as the Congressmen from the two 
districts of Palawan, Governor of Palawan, Deputy Director General of National Economic 
and Development Authority, Undersecretaries of 
Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, Department of Agriculture, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, President of League 
of Municipalities of Palawan, 
President of Liga ng mga Barangay, representatives from the 
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governments, national agencies and private organisations in formulating and 
implementing SEP-compliant plans. It also has a role to negotiate donations 
and other financial resources to perform activities for the SEP (GOP 1992). 
The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSDS) has 
played the role of the PCSD's secretariat since 1992. In turn, the PCSDS has 
two main departments and four divisions directly under the office of the 
executive director (See Figure 6.6). As we can see from Figure 6.6, the 
PCSDS is quite specialised and technically oriented. This is particularly true 
for the ECAN/GIS division that requires considerable scientific expertise 
from its employees. 
Figure 6.6. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff 
Structure 
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ECAN/GIS 
PCSD Secretariat 
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Source: PCSD (2004b) 
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However, this unique structure of the PCSD and PCSDS has been rather a 
double edged sword. This is because, on the one hand, the Council can be 
generously supported by national government funds - but on the other, it 
can also equally be influenced by central government. This situation is most 
office of the President, Palawan Provincial Board, NGOs, military, business, tribal sectors 
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evident in the appointment of the PCSDS leader, which indeed affects 
implementing aid projects such as the SEMP. Given the nature of the 
PCSDS brief, the executive director is a "highly technical post" (Arquiza 
1996: 48). Yet, in practice, appointees have been clear political figures 
linked to the Philippine president. Thus, for example, President Ramos 
nominated a political protege, Arthur Ventura, as executive director - 
prompting one embittered Palawan leader to note, "we can't do anything 
because it is the will of the President" (Arquiza 1996: 48). Yet, this 
appointment process is highly problematic insofar as non-professional 
appointees are ultimately unable to perform an effective leadership role, as 
envisaged under the SEP. 
6.2.2. Ecotourism 
The task of the PCSD and PCSDS has been further complicated by national 
development processes. In particular, the Philippine government has 
adopted ecotourism as a key to promoting eco-sustainability and poverty 
reduction since the early 1990s, which resulted in a 1991 Tourism Master 
Plan collaborated on by the Department of Tourism (DOT), the United 
Nations Development Program and the World Tourism Organization (DOT 
1991; Chen Ng 2003; PCVC 2002). 17 The DOT and the DENR further 
collaborated in 1998 on the Plan and notably defined then the concept of 
ecotourism as a "low-impact, environmentally- sound and community- 
participatory tourism activity in a given natural environment that enhances 
the conservation of biophysical and cultural diversity, promotes 
environmental understanding and education, and yields socio-economic 
benefits to the concerned community" (DENR and DOT 1998 in Andrada 
2002: 169). 
In the 1990s, Palawan's leadership was in search of an alternative industry 
to commercial logging, a long-standing major industry of the province that 
had nonetheless been banned in 1992 as noted above (Broad with 
Cavanagh, 
1993). The 20-year Philippine Tourism Master Plan made this wish seem 
and the Philippine National Police-Provincial 
Command (PCSD 2004a). 
17 The San Roque Multipurpose Project area was also promoting ecotounsm by building a 
golf course in the area (see 
Chapter 5). 
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feasible as it identified the province as one of the major national ecotourism 
destinations, and also designated Northern Palawan as a priority ecotourism 
area (DOT 199 1; Malaya 18 May 2005). 
As a result, ecotourism was seen to be the way forward in policy circles. 
This was epitomized in House Bill 3453 filed by Palawan Representative 
Abraham Mitra in 2002 that sought to make Palawan the 'Ecotourism 
Capital of the Philippines' (The Palawan Times March 2002). The 
assumption here was that this economic activity would bring about 
increased income, promotion of the province, and protection of the 
environment (The Palawan Times March 2002). Indeed, and as part of the 
growth of all Philippine tourism receipts, " Palawan experienced a tourism 
boom in the 1990s (PGP 1995; SEMP Tourism Component 2003). " The 
existing tourism products exclusively rely on the area's natural attributes 
such as white sandy islands, as well as the rich and diverse marine life 
(Chen Ng 2003; DOT 2005). Northern Palawan in particular with its natural 
beauty and cultural heritage has been one of the most attractive such 
destinations (DOT 2005). 2' As such, and as reflected in Philippine 
government policy on ecotourism, it has been deemed to be imperative to 
manage the area's environmental resources carefully through eco-friendly 
and sustainable tourism (CEC 1994; DOT 2005). Donors such as UNESCO 
and JBIC, as well as international NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund 
and Conservation International, have supported this goal. 21 Indeed, the 
SEMP has also sought to do so through collaboration between the DOT and 
other Japanese aid agencies. 
18 Average annual growth here was 11.4% between 1990 and 1995, and 2.5% between 1995 
and 2000 (NEDA 1992; WTO 2003a, 2003b). 
19 It is very difficult to acquire Palawan statistical data. That is why only a general 
statement can be given for tourism growth in Palawan. Two of the Provincial Medium-Tenn 
Development Plans (PGP 1993,1995) clearly state "data is not available on past tourism 
growth". But at the same time, there was no current data incorporated there to explain 
present tourism trends in Palawan either. 
20 The area's popular attractions are the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, 
El Nido-Taytay Managed Protected Area, Coron Island Protected Area, the Calault Game 
Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary. The area is also well known as an ideal site for diving, 
swimming, trekkingý island hopping as well as for cultural tourism since the promotion of 
the area's ethnic and cultural diversity. 
21 In collaboration with UNESCO, local government has also implemented a community 
based ecotourism plan for Ulugan Bay in Puerto Princesa. WWF also 
has been working 
with a local community to promote tourism 
in El Nido (Chen Ng 2003). 
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However, the DOT's attempt to privilege environmental issues through 
ecotourism has faced difficulties as its definition of ecotourism conflicted 
with JICA's own notion of 'sustainable tourism' as used in the master plan 
study. Such a discrepancy reflected wider debates over these ten-ns. Thus, 
shifts in global environmental concern and development needs have 
enhanced interest in, but also debate over, ecotourism and sustainable 
tourism (Duffy 2002; Hall and Lew 1998; Honey 1999; Page and Dowling 
2002). While sustainable tourism sounds technical and value neutral, 
ecotourism seems to be more explicitly focused on ethics, which is shown in 
the Philippine government's own definition cited above (Libosada Jr. 1998; 
Page and Dowling 2002). This difference even caused a conflict while the 
JICA and the DOT were designing the tourism master plan - and which led 
ultimately to a change in the master plan title. Initially, it was the "Eco- 
tourism Master Plan for Northern Palawan" (JICA 1995a: 166), but later it 
became the "Master Plan for Environmentally Sustainable Tourism 
Development" at JICA's behest. This change was "to clearly indicate the 
aimed type of tourism development which is environmentally sustainable 
and economically feasible" (JICA 1995a: 186). This subtle but important 
title change suggested that JICA's initial focus was on tourism development 
rather than on environmental conservation - not surprisingly, as it started 
out as a development aid project as we have noted (Hillel, interview, 2004). 
This relative emphasis between environment and development - as 
symbolised in this title change - has also shaped the environmental 
consideration process for the Palawan project, to which we now turn. 
6.3. Assisting the Kankyd-hairyo process: JICA's 
Development Study 
Over the course of the next two sections, this thesis examines the SEMP in 
terms of the donor's own procedure to assist the recipient's environmental 
consideration. As we have noted, in the case of the SRMP, the NPC's EIA 
was at the centre of the recipient's environmental consideration due to the 
nature of project - that is, a hydropower dam development project with EIA 
submission required by JEXIM (see Chapter 5). However, for the SEMP, 
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environmental consideration was rather different. First , it was a regional 
development plan involving multiple project sites scattered across Palawan 
and which required a great deal of technical expertise as well as financial 
backup. Therefore, the Philippine government officially requested that the 
Japanese government provide technical assistance to perform environmental 
consideration activities including the Master Plan study by JICA and the 
Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity by the OECF 
(the latter is analysed in section 6.4). Second, an EIA submission by a 
Philippine agency was not required by the OECF in the light of the SEMP's 
project classification (see below). Hence, here we first assess the JICA 
development study in order to interrogate the extent to which this 
environmental aid project was fon-nulated in accordance with 'greener' 
procedures. 
6.3.1. The JICA 1992 Environmental Consideration 
Guideline for Tourism Sector 
The formulation of the SEMP began with JICXs own development study 
(comprising both a preparatory study and a master plan study) that started in 
1994. In that year, the DOT had made a request to the Japanese government 
that a study of ecotourism been done in order to "combine concerns on 
Northern Palawan's vulnerable environment and [a] rapidly expanding 
tourism industry" (JICA 1997: i, 1995b). This 'request' was also guided by 
Japan's interests in the region as there was increasing Japanese business 
interest in particularly tourism development in the early 1990s (Hillel, 
interview, 2004). JICA then dispatched a study team to confirm the terms of 
reference and then a fully-fledged study for sustainable tourism 
development in the region was carried out (JICA 1995a, 1995b; see Figure 
4.6). 
JICXs first task in this regard was the production of a preparatory study. 
Given the specific nature of the project, as well as JICA's own 
environmental guideline procedures (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6), 
reference was made to the relevant tourism sector guideline (1992) in 
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undertaking this environmental consideration. " As such, we need to first 
examine that specific guideline in order to appreciate how environmental 
consideration here was actually carried out. 
As noted, JICA established an environmental consideration guideline for a 
total of 13 sectors, specifically designed so as to predict environmental 
problems caused by socio-economic infrastructure projects (JICA 1992). In 
order to undertake the requested preparatory study for the Philippine 
government, the JICA team thus resorted to the 1992 tourism sector 
guideline specifically using its screening and scoping activities to complete 
the environmental consideration. Unlike the JEXIM environmental checklist 
discussed in Chapter 5 however, the 1992 guideline provided more detailed 
infonnation to its users. 
To reiterate a point made in Chapter 4- at the preliminary survey stage, 
scoping and screening play a critical part in assessing potential 
environmental impacts. This work is thus vital to the overall 'greening' 
process. Recall how, in the case of the San Roque Multipurpose Project 
discussed in Chapter 5, for example, slipshod scoping and screening 
activities did not properly identify some socio-environmental issues, thereby 
causing problems later on during project implementation. Even prior to the 
start of scoping and screening in the present case study, though, it was vital 
to know how JICA defined tourism development since the guideline and 
other JICA activities are based on that definition. The 1992 JICA guideline 
thus defined tourism development as "an activity that changes the natural 
environment to create more pleasant surroundings and to increase tourist 
receipts" (JICA 1992: 10; emphasis added). This definition thus 
acknowledges the inevitablity of environmental impacts and even specifies 
two types of tourism development according to their "typical 
(environmental) impacts": namely, rural resort development and urban 
22 With its first guideline in 1990 "Guideline for environmental impact study on Dam 
construction", JICA therefore established "Environmental consideration guideline on socio- 
economic infrastructure development plan" 
for 13 sectors. 
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tourism development (JICA 1992: 10). 23 it simultaneously highlights the 
positive economic gains from an inflow of tourists to local development but 
also acknowledges negative environmental impacts notably from the 
physical construction of infrastructure. This understanding does indeed 
suggest that JICA perceived tourism development as mainly about 
infrastructure-oriented development (JICA 1992). 
Detailed knowledge is required from the start under JICA's environmental 
consideration. Prior to scoping and screening, the JICA guideline thus 
specifies a need for completion of a project summary and a project site 
environment forrn based on secondary data collected in Tokyo. During the 
field visit itself, the study team then acquires further data to complete the 
relevant forms (See Table 6.3 and 6.4). 
As Table 6.3 and 6.4 show, the project summary form identifies 
straightforward (i. e. 'circle as appropriate') physical and socio-cultural 
environments at the project site, while the project site environment identifies 
further socio-economic issues relevant to implementation such as the 
constitution of the local community, the nature of the local economy, and 
local pollution records. Both forms are nonetheless simply descriptive of a 
project with minimal information thus provided. As such, the kind of data 
the team is asked to collect is inescapably general, possibly posing 
difficulties later on when more precise data may be needed to support 
informed decision-making. True, though, this stage is prior to the actual 
screening or scoping activities, and hence may be expected to be somewhat 
general. Yet, those two forms are important in their own way as the data 
contained in them are then used to orient both screening and scoping 
activities, following which important decisions about the direction of the 
project are made (see below). 
13 While the former produces physical pressure on to the natural environment (i. e. water 
pollution, deforestation and biodiversity 
loss) by building new infrastructure, the latter 
increases pressure on existing infrastructure facilities. 
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Table 6.3. Format of Project Summary 
A. 
item Details 
Project title 
Background 
Objective 
Location 
Implementing Agency 
Beneficiary local 
population 
Planning data 
Tourism resource Circle as appropriate 
Natural environment (coast, highland, Scenic sites. 
Flora/fauna)/ Historic sites, monuments/ Museum/ 
Cuisine and drink/ Shopping/ Sport activities (diving, 
yacht, golf, tracking, etc. )/ Others 
Main plan Circle as appropriate 
Demand projection/ medium-, long-term planning/ 
Infrastructure planning: transport facility improvement 
(port, airport, road, railway, river)/ Living environment 
facilities (water supply and sewage system, waste 
management, etc. ) tourism resource development 
Others 
Source: JICA (1992: 13). 
Table 6.4. Format of Project Site Environment 
Project Site Environment 
Item Details 
Project title 
Social Local community (resident/ indigenous people/ 
environment awareness towards the plan) 
Economic activity, transportation and living 
environment (commerce/ logistics/ water supply and 
sewage system/ waste) 
Historic site, cultural monument/ health and hygiene 
(how they are preserved and used/ disease 
outbreak ) 
Natural Topographic features, geological condition (scenic 
environment site, mountain area, marsh) 
Lake and river system, coast, weather (water quality, 
seashore, number of rainy days, etc. ) 
Flora/fauna, habitat (endangered species/ 
mangrove/ coral reef, etc. ) 
Pollution Degree of complaints (pollution with serious 
complaints) 
Measures taken (institutional measure/ 
compensation) 
Others 
Source: J ICA (1992: 14). 
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The next stage - the screening activity - is critical to the overall process as 
it judges whether a project needs an initial environmental examination (IEE) 
or EIA (see Table 4.1). However, this judgement is derived not from precise 
criteria based on scientific evidence, but from a general 
64 principle/perspective" view derived from the aforementioned forms for 
project summary and project site environment (JICA 1992: 19). 
Indeed, and instead of precise scientific criteria, the guideline here provides 
four 'horizontal stances' for screening (See Table 6.5). These stances aim to 
provi ea way to improve the environmental consideration process by 
setting up criteria based on the project's scale as well as land use plan. 
Table 6.5. Four "Horizontal Stances" for Screening 
1. Harmful impact on sustainability of economic activity that mainly relies on 
natural resources 
2. Significant impact on human health 
3. Degradation/loss of invaluable biological resources and their habitat 
4. Inequitable impact on affected local community's lives and livelihood 
Source: JICA (1992: 19) 
However, as Table 6.5 suggests, these four horizontal stances are again quite 
vague, and hence prone to flexible interpretation. The professed reason for 
such flexibility is the difficulty of establishing general quantitative criteria 
due to a recipient country 9s unique socio-political system and environmental 
features (JICA 1992). At a practical level too, this provides room for the 
accommodation of interests when conflict occurs between the Japanese 
guideline and the recipient's system. However, such flexibility, when 
combined with vague criteria, simultaneously robs the mechanism of 
applied utility in assisting the study team to do their work. As the guideline 
does not provide detailed infon-nation on how to apply these stances in 
practice, it thus thereby can weaken the entire endeavour (JACSES 2004). 
Such ambiguity can be clearly seen in the case of the principles guiding 
assessment of a tourism development plan. These principles stress that a 
project is not to cause harmful impacts on a 
local community and -not to 
significantýy damage" the natural environment, 
but rather is to ensure 
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sustainable development in the affected area (JICA 1992: 2 1; emphasis 
added). Yet, it is rather difficult indeed to see how users can apply these 
principles in practice as the guideline does not provide a precise means by 
which to gauge the impact - given the alarming vagueness of the word 
(significantly' here. 
Other features of the screening format compound the sense of vagueness. 
Thus, it offers only three simple categories to "tick as appropriate: 
Yes/No/Unknown" (JICA 1992: 22-23; emphasis added). However, these 
categories cannot assess the degree of significance. Rather, they are 
designed to answer not how significant potential damage is but whether 
there is potential damage. This passage thus contradicts the guideline in as 
much as the latter is designed to assess "to what extent tourism development 
affects the local ecological system" (JICA 1992: 10 emphasis added). 
Without concrete criteria to estimate significance, however, it is difficult to 
make an accurate decision on whether an EIA/IEE is necessary for a project. 
Subsequent environmental consideration scarcely eliminates such 
inadequacy. Thus, the next stage is to "select certain environmental impacts 
of a development project that are more critical than others, and to identify 
priority sectors/issues based on the chosen impacts" (JICA 1992: 25). Here, 
a scoping checklist is used "to identify all the potential environmental issues 
that would be possibly caused by project implementation" (JICA 1992: 25). 
Items listed on the checklist are then incorporated into a matrix in order to 
better highlight linkages between development activities and listed 
environmental issues. However , it is questionable whether the 
items on the 
checklist address "all the potential environmental issues" in a measurable 
way in order to assess their impacts (JICA 1992: 25, emphasis added; see 
also Appendix 3). 
Ambiguity here has a knock on effect for the matrix itself Ten items on the 
matrix form are thus designed to cover all potential environmental issues 
arising from tourism development: resettlement, economic activity, waste 
disposal, landscape, transport system and infrastructure, health and hygiene, 
underground water, water pollution, noise and vibration, and ground 
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subsidence. Yet, some issues are thus omitted including such things as soil 
erosion around tourism facilities and coral reef destruction caused by 
tourism. Thus, reliance on the matrix may create loopholes in addressing 
potential environmental issues, which would eventually affect any project 
therefore supported by JICA (see Abe 2002; Okamoto 2002; Ozeki and 
Matsumoto 2002). 
As with the screening procedure, the scoping matrix lacks quantifiable 
precision. Thus, it provides four categories to classify rough degrees of 
environmental impact (see Table 6.6). Thus, terms like 'significant' Yyfidai- 
na) and 'a certain degree of' (tash&no) lack further definition let alone the 
sort of quantitative indicators that might assist project workers (JICA 1992: 
31). 
Table 6.6. Four Categories of Potential Environmental Impact by 
project implementation 
Category Explanation 
A Significant Impact expected 
B A certain extent of Impact expected 
C Unknown 
D No IEE/EIA required as there is hardly any environmental impact 
Source: Adapted from JICA (1992: 31). 
To be sure, the 1992 JICA Environmental Consideration Guideline for 
Socio-economic Infrastructure Project - little more than a collection of 
checklists, forms, and a matrix - are readily comprehensible even by non- 
specialists ("senmonkade nakutomo"), a convenience for a development 
plan that is produced under great time pressure (JICA 1992: 25). Indeed, the 
JICA guideline in this regard is akin to the JEXIM checklist discussed in 
Chapter 5- and hence is subject to many of the same criticisms. 24 
Having briefly reviewed the general nature and principles of the JICA 1992 
Guideline, we can now turn to a detailed assessment of its use in both the 
JICA preparatory study of 1994-1995 and the JICA master plan study of 
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1997. Specifically we investigate to what extent environmental 
consideration was incorporated here - and hence, to be later reflected in 
actual project formulation. 
6.3-2. JICA's Preparatory Study 1994-1995 
As the DOT's official request suggests, the SEMP was not originally an 
environmental management project - rather it was meant to produce a 
sustainable tourism development project that simultaneously promoted 
environmental conservation and local socio-economic improvement (Hillel, 
interview, 2004; JICA 1995a, 1997). With the official request in hand, JICA 
began a preparatory study as a prerequisite to the master plan study. The 
DOT also requested that the latter take into account the findings of the 
Commission of European Communities (CEC) funded report entitled 
'Preliminary Tourism Development for Northern Palawan' (CEC 1994) in 
order to avoid duplication among donor projects. 25 
The preparatory study was completed over 1994-1995. It is of concern here 
mainly in three aspects: the interests of the study participants; the manner of 
problem identification; and the donor's dominance of agenda setting in the 
project. 
The first aspect relates to the interests of the participants comprising the 
study team. For the preparatory study, a total of eight Japanese staff 
members were dispatched as a JICA ch5sadan (research team), but which in 
reality was a multi-agency endeavour (JICA 1995a). Thus, only three JICA 
employees were on this team with the others (a majority) being drawn from 
the Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a 
private firm Mitsui Consultants Co. (MCC). Indeed, even the team leader 
was from the MOT and not from JICA as one might have expected. Here, it 
is important to note why the MOT in particular played an important role on 
the team. On the one hand, it was because the project was fundamentally an 
24 Yet, as note above, the JICA guideline is certainly more detailed than the JEXIM 
checklist. 
25 The CEC report addressed concerns on mass tourism development and proposed 
alternative models such as community-based ecotourism (CEC 1994). 
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infrastructure-oriented tourism development project, although it had had 
some green elements subsequently incorporated into it. Since the MOT is 
responsible for tourism administration in Japan, it made sense therefore that 
this agency took a leading role. On the other hand, the MOT has long been 
working on tourism development research and promotion overseas (MOT 
1993ý 19945 1995,, 1996a). The MOT even created a term 'kank5 ODN 
(tourism ODA) (ITDIJ 1990)26 to underscore how deeply it had become 
involved in the tourism sector as well as associated transport facilities 
through Japan's international cooperation (ITDIJ 1990,1994; see also MOT 
1995 ). 27 
The participation of MCC, further, suggested that the preparatory study 
would be infrastructure oriented . 
2' As MCC is a general construction 
consultant (MCC 2005), it follows that it would tend to produce a plan with 
more of a focus on civil works and infrastructure rather than on community- 
based conservation. In addition, as MCC was set up and co-financed by the 
parent Mitsui Group, it was likely that it would attempt to reflect the 
business interests of this Japanese conglomerate, notably in the automobile, 
construction, mining, machinery and shipbuilding sectors (Mitsui Public 
Relations Committee 2004). 29 
The second aspect of interest here is the way in which problems and 
solutions were defined in the preparatory study - something already hinted 
at in the particular make-up of the JICA research team. Above all, the team 
emphasised that three inter-linked problems needed to be addressed: the 
living conditions of the local community, the state of the local natural 
environment, and poorly implemented environmental regulation in the 
26 This International Tourism Development Institute Japan (ITDIJ) study report was 
commissioned by MOT (ITDIJ 1990). 
27 The Japanese domestic tourism industry depends heavily on transportation facilities, 
especially the railway system. Japan Railway has thus been the centre of tourism 
campaigning by connecting remote rural Japan (Ehrentraut 1993; Kim 2002). 
28 MCC's Japanese name is Mitsui-ky5d, 5-kensetsu-konsarutantsu of which translation is 
Mitsui Joint Construction Consultants. Thus, here again, the research team's interest lies in 
infrastructural facilities including civil works. 
29 Mitsui Group was one of the big four zaibatsu, the big fami ly- controlled banking and 
industrial combines of modem Japan, which then developed into top Japanese business 
conglomerate (called keiretsu) in the post 
WWII era. (Matsumoto 1979; Roberts 1973; 
Yasuoka 1982). 
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tourism industry in Northern Palawan (see also Arquiza 1996; Bryant 2005). 
The first problem in fact highlighted the linkage between poverty and 
environmental destruction. Northern Palawan was seen as "one of the least 
developed areas in the Philippines" (JICA 1995a: 1) - therefore, it is an area 
that lacks the means of a decent livelihood, which consequently had driven 
local communities into practicing environmentally destructive and illegal 
blast fishing for their survival (Luyt 1995; JICA 1996a, 1996b, 1999a, 
1999b, 2002a; Rodrigo 1998). The proposed solution was development that 
promoted environmental conservation at the same time as it created 
employment and/or business opportunities for local people. Japanese aid 
agencies and consulting companies used this particular discourse throughout 
the SEMP (see Luyt 1995). Accordingly, poor local communities were the 
core 'problem' in need of education, training and employment to correct 
their 'inadequate' environmental awareness and behaviours (Bryant 2002; 
Lawrence 2002; Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004). 
The next problem noted in the preliminary study was that Northern Palawan 
still possessed valuable tourism 'assets' such as rich coral reefs and marine 
life that were nonetheless subject to growing threat. There was a seeming 
paradox here, though. Thus, the report noted that the main reason for the 
relatively intact condition of the local natural environment was that the area 
had not hitherto been easily accessible due to the poor transport system (see 
CEC 1994). The logical conclusion was thus that better transport facilities 
would inevitably degrade the 'less spoilt' condition of the environment. And 
yet, the study recommended building more infrastructure such as airports, 
roads, and ports to create easier access to the area, thereby contradicting its 
own findings. 
The final problem set out in the preparatory study concerned poorly 
managed environmental regulations as well as dubious use of the 
idea of 
6ecotourism' in Northern Palawan. Indeed, large-scale development in the 
area was even given the ecotourism label (CEC 1994; 
JICA 1995; see also 
Libosada Jr. 1998). Further, this was not counting the many small and 
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medium sized resorts already in operation, many having been built without 
proper regulation and guidelines (Direct observation in Coron and El Nido 
May 2004; see also Corufia, interview, 2004; Rabe, interview, 2004; Hillel, 
interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). 
The third aspect of interest to arise from the preparatory study was the way 
in which it highlighted the donor's dominance in setting the agenda for the 
master study, notably as manifested in the minutes of a meeting on 
implementing arrangements (I/A) contained in an appendix of that study. 
These minutes trace the negotiation between the JICA research team and the 
DOT on what would be the priority issues (JICA 1995). The I/A set the aim 
of the preparatory study as being to devise a plan to achieve three goals: 
environmental 'protection'; community benefits; and generating Philippine 
national income and foreign exchange earnings. Among the three, top 
priority was placed on environmental protection, and development plans 
were thus to be decided within the framework of this key concern (JICA 
1995a: 147). " Nonetheless, tourism development became the favoured 
solution and was adopted as a means to create local employment, boost the 
local economy, and generate local government revenue. 
Yet, the I/A also showed a revealing difference in how to address 
environmental and social issues between the Japanese and Philippine 
agencies. There was, firstly, some skirmishing over how to define 
cenvironment' in operational terms. Thus, for the purpose of the study, the 
JICA team confined the term environment to "attributes of environment that 
are perceived as tourist attractions not the environment as a whole (kank5- 
shigen to nariuru kanky5) ... also environmental resources that may 
be 
30 Throughout the report, the words environmental protection (kan4'5-hogo) and 
environmental conservation (kanky5-hozen) are interchangeably used although they have 
different meanings in Japanese. Therefore, the researcher translating the report cannot avoid 
the dilemma of mixing them too. However, interestingly, it is the same case with those 
documents drafted in English by the Philippine government, such as the minutes of the 
meeting on I/A (JICA 1995a: 147,152). They are interchangeably used. This is highly 
problematic in two ways. First, it will cause confusion and may create dilemmas in 
implementing an environmental project like SEMP that also has development elements, not 
having clear understanding of the difference between conservation and protection. Second, 
it shows the poor performance of the JICA, an agency known as with pool of leading 
development experts in Japan. In the mid 1990s, JICA thus still did not clarify the use of 
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affected by the tourism development" (JICA 1995a: 10,153). This 
definition was agreed to by the DOT and subsequently determined not only 
the coverage area of the project but also its time span. Yet, due to 
subsequent time and budgetary restrictions, the JICA team broke this 
agreement by excluding areas such as Tubbataha Reefs and Cuyo Islands 
that the DOT wished to see included, as these areas would be potentially 
affected by tourism development .31 However, for its part, the DOT wanted 
to complete the master plan as speedily as possible in order to quickly gain 
benefit from the project. Thus, it requested that the time devoted to the study 
be less than 17 months. In this light, the DOT reluctantly agreed to JICA's 
exclusion of the two areas only because it was seen as a way to accelerate 
the process. However, while the exclusion remained in force, the DOT's 
request for a shortened study period was turned down by the JICA team 
because the latter believed that the study needed "at least 17 months" (JICA 
1995a: 11; emphasis added). 
There was, seemingly, a disagreement also revealed in the I/A over the role 
of NGOs in the project's steering and technical committee as well as the 
status of participation by local communities. As the SEP Act emphasises the 
social acceptability of development projects, the DOT strongly requested the 
'inclusion' (torikomi) of NGOs, but the JICA team disagreed, such that the 
DOT had to settle instead for a weaker 'dialogue' (taiwa) process. Indeed, 
JICA carefully circumscribed such dialogue: "communication with NGOs is 
only possible through an informal route" (JICA 1995a: 11, emphasis added). 
The responsibility of managing 'dialogue'with NGOs meanwhile would lie 
with the DOT as the Japanese government was bound to assist only when 
there is a request from its Philippine counterpart. On local community 
participation, meanwhile, JICA suggested "interaction (k5ryfi) with 
communities" rather than more extensive involvement or participation - 
reasoning that the local community was not an "official development plan 
entity" (JICA 1995a: 147). 
the two terrns. This problem is also reflected in power dynamics between the Japanese 
ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (11yarna 2004). 
" Tubbataha Reefs and Cuyo Islands are popular tourist destinations for daytrips. 
Therefore, an increase in tourist numbers to the project sites will significantly affect those 
two places. 
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Such uneasiness towards local participation is not, in fact, an unfamiliar 
situation in Japan as many researchers and government officials are 
reluctant to get involved in politically sensitive issues. For example, during 
the preparation of Japan's ill-fated EIA bill in the late 1970s, " the term 
'(active) participation' (sanka) in the original draft was changed to 
'(passive) involvement' (kanyo) (Isobe et al. cited in Barrett and Therivel 
1991: 158). This disposition was also shown in practice. Japanese citizens 
were thus not allowed to directly participate in the decision-making process, 
as that process was confined to local authorities, relevant government 
agencies, and the environmental agency (Mason 1999; Hirata 2002; Revell 
2003). 
In the end, JICNs unwillingness to sanction active local community 
involvement prevailed over the DOT's wishes. As such, the preparatory 
study was carried out based on an informal route of interaction with local 
communities as well as NGOs. This project was thus certainly based on the 
recipient's official request. However, as this discussion of the preparatory 
study stage reveals, the proposed project was clearly shaped by Japanese 
perceptions and interests rather than those of the Philippine partners. From 
the wider viewpoint of this thesis, moreover, those Japanese perceptions and 
interests were not exactly consonant with an expansive sense of 'greening' - 
for instance, a sense that prioritises environmental conservation and local 
participation. A similarly ambiguous process can be seen with the master 
plan study which was undertaken based on the preparatory study. 
6.3.3. JICA's 1997 Master Plan Study 
The Master Plan Study (MPS) was conducted between 1995 and 1997 
resulting in the 1997 final report (JICA 1997). " Ultimately, this report 
32 Before the establishment of EIA law in 1997, there had been prolonged deliberations. 
However, in 1984, after eight years of negotiations and revisions, the Environmental 
Agency gave up on the introduction of EIA law. Instead, the Cabinet approved a non-legally 
enforceable decision that included the bill's main concerns (Barrett and Therivel 1991; see 
also Chapter 4). 
33 Unlike the preparatory study of which a full report (Japanese) was publicly available, for 
this master plan study, there was only an executive summary (Japanese) publicly available 
during the period of this research investigation. Therefore, here, discussion of master plan 
study report refers to the summary only. 
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aimed to find a way to transform the existing tourism industry into one that 
could be described as sustainable tourism and, as such, recommended a 
detailed development plan Integrating concepts of environment (as 
understood by JICA and as noted above) and land use planning to that main 
end (JICA 1997). Below we discuss three key elements of the MPS - 
infon-nation/data sources, the sustainable tourism development master plan, 
and sustainable tourism development guidelines - which are most relevant 
to our exploration of the environmental consideration process. But, first, we 
need to discuss the way in which the nature of project-oriented problems 
were defined there, as the contents of MPS as well as the actual 
development plan were based on this process of definition. 
Figure 6.7. Northern Palawan Tourist Leaflet 
fes r) tsc0 rr, 
Source: Ten Knots Development Corporation (2002) 
Source: El Nido Tourism (2004) 
The major problem identified was that of environmental degradation and its 
influence on local tourism. The MPS thus found the level of environmental 
degradation in Northern Palawan to be much more serious than had ever 
been assumed in the preparatory study (JICA 1997). As a result, the MPS 
emphasised the great importance of establishing an environmental 
management plan in order to achieve sustainable tourism development. This 
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environment-tourism linkage was already well established in the business 
world. Thus, environmental conservation was principally used to sustain 
tourism itself often by promoting the idea of a rich natural environment (see 
Figure 6.7). This link was also there already in the preparatory study insofar 
as the term environment was understood as "attributes of environment that 
are perceived as tourist attractions not the environment as a whole (kank5- 
shigen to nariuru kanky5)" (JICA 1995a: 10,153). 
Yet, environmental degradation was mainly put down to inappropriate 
socio-economic practices by local people including population increase, 
environmentally destructive activities (such as blast fishing), and 
infrastructure development without appropriate environmental consideration 
and caused by inadequate institutional capacity (JICA 1997: ii; see also 
Aquiza 1996). Therefore, community-based sustainable tourism 
development was proposed as the best solution here because it would help 
create local employment and boost local business even as it would promote 
environmental conservation in order to maintain tourism 'assets' needed for 
diving, and dolphin/whale watching. 
More controversially, the MPS report also identified a problem of too little 
local infrastructure. Thus, there was a need for more infrastructure 
development since "a big problem in tourism development in Northern 
Palawan 
... 
[is that] all kinds of infrastructure are absolutely lack[ing] ..., 
in 
particular, transport infrastructure needs serious improvement" (JICA 1997: 
vi). The report thus sought to marry diverse and seemingly contradictory 
elements (including environmental conservation, and tourism infrastructure 
work) in one overall package. This possible tension can also be seen in the 
key elements of the MPS itself, to the analysis of which we now turn. 
The first key element of the MPS report concerns the data/information 
sources as well as the methodology used in the study. Some of the data used 
was of dubious utility to any serious effort at environmental consideration. 
Thus, because "environmental data and information on Northern Palawan is 
extremely limited"% the JICA team used a map based on aerial photographs 
from the 1940s and 1950s to establish a foundation for the development 
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study and plan (JICA 1997: 3). Yet, this map is clearly outdated. As 
Palawan's forests have rapidly dwindled since the 1950s, the landscape has 
changed significantly, thereby calling into question the utility of its use in 
the master plan. 34 Indeed, resort here to outdated data clearly did not 
represent the kind of 'technical assistance' that the Philippine government 
had requested in calling for this study (JICA 1995a, 1997). 
The MPS incorporated a socio-economic survey in its report that also 
reveals interesting issues of relevance to our analysis of Japanese ODA 
6 greening'. That survey consisted of two activities: a household interview 
survey and a more informal discussion with selected villagers. " Of 
particular interest here are the "serious problems raised by local 
communities" (JICA 1997: 6; see Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7. Problems Raised by Local Communities in JICA's 
Household Survey 
Services Busuwanga Coron El Nido Total 
Employment opportunity 56 73 64 193 
Marine resource destruction 16 71 25 112 
Deforestation 1 58 5 64 
Lack of agricultural facilities 9 44 10 63 
Lack of medical facilities 25 47 45 117 
Lack of education facilities 4 37 3 44 
Waste management 1 30 22 53 
Lack of electricity 26 31 34 91 
Lack of road 19 35 44 98 
Lack of transport facilities 5 29 18 52 
Water shortage 25 14 26 65 
Lack of administrative information 5 36 12 53 
Security 2 11 7 20 
Squafters 0 22 3 25 
Migrants issues 1 
-- - 
33 1 35 
Political leadership 
t 
2 7 9 18 
Note. Numbers show the numbers of times that households raised an issue 
Source: Adapted from JICA (11997: 6) 
34 The same use of inappropriate and outdated data occurred in the preparatory study too 
which used data (such as rainfall) collected between 1965 and 1981 (JICA 1995a: 64). 
35 However, the executive summary does not explicitly state whether the survey was open- 
ended or closed and whether they covered all households in each community. The former 
matters because a closed interview often involves fixed choice questions that limit an 
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Thus, Table 6.7 reports JICXs own data based on a household survey 
conducted in three communities between 1996 and 1997. The surveys asked 
local households to list all of the problems they faced. Table 6.7 thus 
addresses local complaints and issues but has a wider import. Indeed, there 
is a resonance here with my own field interviews in these communities. 36 
A couple of things stand out here. Thus, while there are differences between 
the three areas, local priority issues include employment, roads, medical 
facilities, as well as water supply and sewage systems - all of which tend to 
have an infrastructure component. True, environmental issues such as 
marine resource destruction and deforestation were also highly ranked. 
Nonetheless, the issues raised by the local communities are dominated by 
infrastructure items. Indeed, these issues were also raised in my own 
interviews with local officials and residents of El Nido, Busuwanga and 
Coron during field research there in May 2004 (Corral, interview, 2004; 
Densula, interview, 2004; Distal, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004; 
Sariego, interview, 2004). Among others, transport infrastructure (road, 
airport) and medical facilities were the most frequently raised issues due to 
their urgent nature. As one interviewee typically put it, "to help the tourism 
[industry in El Nido], we need a proper local airport, ... and need to 
improve access here by air " (Corral, interview, 2004; see also Densula, 
interview, 2004; Roces*, interview, 2004). This view reflected perceived 
local inequalities. In El Nido, for example, the existing airport was owned 
by a private firm El Nido Resort, and hence was only built for the 
transportation of its own customers and not for non-El Nido Resort users. 
This situation mattered enormously for the local El Nido tourism operators 
as tourists to the area are mostly backpackers and other 'non-mass' tourists 
(Roces*, interview, 2004)". Health worries were also prevalent. This was 
interviewee's response and the latter matters as it raises the issue of representation (Bryman 
2004). Consequently the data presented below must be interpreted cautiously. 
36 Data from the three locations noted in Table 6.7 are taken from the original source (JICA 
1997: 6) as they are also the three case study locations for my own research presented in 
this chapter. 
37 There was much discussion in the local community of El Nido when I was there 
regarding the tension between El Nido Resort and SEA Air (the commercial airline flying to 
El Nido). It was said that the SEA Air's infrequent schedule was due to El Nido Resort's 
disapproval of its flights. The Resort is a powerful local business in El Nido. Its staff 
occupy a majority of the tourism development and planning related bodies, such as the 
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because the lack of a local hospital had caused serious trouble in the past 
when accidents required intensive and urgent medical care (Acosta, 
interview, 2004: Densula, interview, 2004; Larint, interview, 2004). " Most 
of these issues call for infrastructure development as a solution. For her part, 
the Vice Mayor of El Nido Leonor Corral declared her wish to see no more 
"surveys, studies" but "action" and "development" - clearly understood to 
mean new infrastructure (Corral, interview, 2004; see also Sariego, 
interview, 2004). 
The JICA survey reported in Table 6.8 also revealed the strong desire of 
local people for economic development. Indeed, that desire was often 
manifested in environmental terms. Thus, in spite of being classified as 
environmental issues, both marine resource destruction and deforestation 
are also deeply linked to two main local economic activities, fishing and 
agriculture. Rapid depletion of the marine resource has thus been a huge 
blow to local fishing communities, as Palawan accounted for more than 
37% of total commercial fish output in the Philippines in 1991 (CEC 1994: 
8). Similarly, soil erosion was seen to be linked to deforestation in coastal 
areas, resulting in silt flowing down rivers and into the sea, thereby 
damaging coral reefs and marine resources (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; 
JBIC 2002a; Lawrence 2002). Thus, environmental issues in the JICA 
survey were privileged locally notably because of the strong environmental 
basis of local livelihoods. Again, my own research in the area tended to 
confirm this point. Thus, as one villager observed "there have been many 
buildings built, especially near the foot of the mountain that has a good 
view, without thinking about environment [for example cutting trees and], 
... 
[not building appropriate] sewage [system, thereforej ... 
dirty water 
with lots of soils goes straight into the sea" (Roces*, interview, 2004; see 
also Pablico, interview, 2004; Laririt, interview, 2004). As far as can be told 
local tourism council. The owner of the Resort is the president of the Palawan tourism 
council (Roces*, interview, 2004, Laririt, interview, 2004). 
38 The nearest hospital is in Taytay - 67 kin from El Nido town taking 2 hours by car. El 
Nido has one Rural Health Unit (1 doctor and I dentist) and a private clinic. Therefore, 
luxury private resorts like El Nido Resorts have arranged medical services with Lifeline 
Arrows for emergency cases including helicopter air lift service while there is a nurse on 
duty and a doctor is on call for immediate treatment at the resorts (Larint, interview, 2004; 
Ayson 2006; Lifeline Arrows Online). 
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from the JICA survey, therefore, the local response provided relevant and 
potentially even legitimate basis on which JICA could advance its own 
particular agenda of promoting combined conservation and development 
goals. Thus, environment was perceived, even by the local communities 
themselves, as being a matter for infrastructure and economic development 
in order to safeguard livelihood. The collected data, as suggested by the 
household survey result, fit well therefore with JICXs own interpretation of 
environmental consideration. 
And yet, other information in the MPS report pointed to clear inadequacies 
in local government structures that encompassed environmental issues. 
Indeed, the environmental problems just noted were seen to be partly driven 
by existing environmental (mis)management in Palawan. Thus, "the current 
environmental management system totally lacks human resources, financial 
resources, and technological resources (for example, planning, 
implementation and regulation), and therefore, PCSD particularly needs to 
strengthen its environmental management system" (JICA 1997: 22). It is 
often said that the Philippines has an international reputation for high 
quality legislation inadequately implemented (Serrano 1994; Arquiza 1996; 
Lawrence 2002). Thus, it is not surprising to find problems highlighted here 
in terms of the implementation of existing Philippine environmental 
management programmes like ECAN Zoning and Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) in Palawan. 
In the case of ECAN Zoning, for example, and in spite of its mandatory 
nature, it had been advanced very little at the time of the JICA study - that 
is, 5 years after the SEP Act had originally been passed (JICA 1997: iii). 
Delay was mostly put down to difficulties in the implementation process 
such as conflict between government agencies and local community 
organisations on the ECAN board" as well as official corruption (Arquiza 
1996; Lawrence 2002; Miclat, interview, 2004). Since ECAN Zoning work 
39 PCSD had to organise ECAN boards in every town. The ECAN board consists of both 
government agencies and community organisations whose interests often conflict with each 
other over such issues as the demarcation of core zones and 
buffer zones (Corral, interview, 
2004; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Reyes, interview, 2004). As 
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had thus not been carried out properly, the JICA team produced its own 
zoning data in order to be in a position to consider the environmental 
implications of the master plan as it was required to do. This step, in and of 
itself, suggested a proactive Japanese role in as much as it revealed a 
willingness to make some extra effort to facilitate greening in the proposed 
case project area. 
Based on the terrestrial criteria of ECAN Zoning provided in the 1992 SEP 
Act (see Table 6.8), the MPS thus classified most of Northern Palawan as 
core or buffer zones. It is important to be clear here about what zoning 
involved and, accordingly, Table 6.8 sets out zoning area specifications. 
Table 6.8. Terrestrial Components of ECAN Zoning 
Fully and strictly protected and maintained area that is free of 
human disruption: all types of natural forest, areas above 
Core zone 
1,000 meters elevation, peaks of mountains or other areas 
or Area of maximum with very steep gradients, and endangered 
habitats and 
protection 
habitats of endangered and rare species. Exceptions may be 
granted to traditional uses of tribal communities of these areas 
for minimal and soft impact gathering of forest species for 
ceremonial and medicinal purposes 
Generally surrounds the core zone 
Restricted use area and provides a protective 
barrier. 
Limited and non-consumption 
activities may be allowed in this 
area. 
Encircles and provides the outer 
barrier to the core and restricted 
use area. Controlled forest 
Controlled use area extraction, like the collecting of Bufferzone 
minor forest products, and strictly 
controlled logging and mining may 
be allowed. 
Edges of intact forests where 
traditional land use is already 
stabilized or is being stabilized. Traditional use area Management and control shall be 
carried out with the other 
I supporting programs of the SEP. 
This is the area where the landscape has been modified for 
different forms of land use such as intensive timber extraction, 
Multiple/Manipulative Use grazing and pastures, agriculture and infrastructure 
Area development. Control and management shall be strictly 
integrated with the other supporting programs of the SEP and 
other similar programs of the Government. 
Source: Section 8-10 of SEP Act (GOP 1992b) 
such, coordination has been hard in most cases 
(Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 
2004). 
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Thus, there are core and buffer zones where the protection of the 
environment is privileged over development. In core zones, no development 
access is permitted at all except for the purpose of research or 
environmental management, while buffer zones permit selective 
development under strict conditions. In practice, there were very few areas 
where unregulated development activities would be allowed in Northern 
Palawan according to the MPS zoning. This MPS classification thus 
underscored that a tourism master plan involving infrastructure development 
would need to take socio-environmental considerations very seriously 
indeed if it were to respect the requirements of ECAN Zoning (JICA 1997). 
This observation in the report was all the more acute given the history of 
poor past environmental practices. The MPS thus diagnosed that much 
environmental degradation was due to poorly managed infrastructure 
development (especially road projects) since inadequate ElAs did not 
prevent soil erosion, siltation and landslides from occurring in these areas 
(JICA 1997: 21). Further, JICA observed that EIA reports were sometimes 
either not submitted or poorly done even when submitted. Further, approved 
projects were not appropriately monitored thereafter as required in their EIA 
reports (JICA 1997: 21). Thus, JICA was fully aware of the problems of 
poor capacity of both consulting companies and Philippine agencies in the 
EIA process, which one would expect should then have been addressed fully 
at the later stage of project formulation (see below). 
The second key element of the MPS of interest to the concerns of this thesis 
comprised the sustainable tourism development master plan. Here, tourism 
is identified as an alternative industry for local communities, thereby 
enhancing both socio-economic development and "environmental protection 
(kanky5 hogo)" (JICA 1997: 30). The MPS identified in this regard a vicious 
circle that had harmed both local livelihoods and the environment (see 
Figure 6.8). 
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Figure 6.8. Vicious Circle in Environmental Destruction 
Illegal Activities (illegal logging, environmentally 
destructive fishing methods, unsustainable 
slash-and-burn farming) 
Environmental Destruction 
Lack of Livelihood/"' employment 
opportunity (in fishery and agriculture) 
Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 30) 
The circle begins with illegal activities (fishing and logging) that lead to 
environmental destruction. Local livelihoods based on the fishery and 
agriculture are thereby also heavily damaged. Worsening conditions further 
drive local communities to rely on illegal activities for survival, producing a 
desperate 'eco-cide' of the poor (Blakie 1985). In Palawan, population 
increase due to the arrival of new settlers (mainly poor folk from the 
Visayas, Mindanao) has only amplified the problem (JICA 1997; Pablico, 
interview, 2004; Sariego, interview, 2004; Palomar, interview, 2005). 40 The 
newcomers, who are also desperately poor, also fell trees and deplete 
fisheries to survive (Pablico, interview, 2004; Palomar, interview, 2005; 
Direct observation in Coron May 2004). 41 
The JICA report thus proposed tourism as an alternative industry in the 
sustainable tourism development plan that would stop this vicious circle 
because ecotourism perceives the environment as resource to be protected 
and not simply consumed (JICA 1997: 30). To implement this proposal, 
however, the MPS stressed the need for better environmental administration 
by proposing project tasks such as strengthening institutional capacity, more 
rigorous guidelines for environmental conservation, and securing adequate 
financial resources for good governance. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
environmental matters certainly involve political, institutional, and technical 
40 In 1990, those newcomers already accounted for 60% of the total Palawan population 
(JICA 1997: 19). 
41 During my visit to Coron and Busuwanga, there were a few areas that were already 
totally burnt out. In those areas, a group of new settlers (about 6-10 individuals) was 
clearing low land forests and building houses (Direct observation in Coron 15 May 1-004). 
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issues concerning the recipient government. With poor local institutional 
capacity, successful aid delivery is rarely attainable since it depends 
ultimately on the Philippine governance mechanism. In order to realise these 
goals, therefore, the MPS advocated the introduction of a system of 
environmental fees to local governments that would ease the financial 
burden for conservation and rehabilitation activities by increasing their 
revenue. User fees to be obtained from tourists were a key component here. 
Overall, the sustainable tourism master plan proposed an initial I 0-year 
budget of US$350 million for such activities as regional environmental 
management, policing illegal fishing, conservation activities and soil 
erosion rehabilitation (JICA 1997: 33). However, this initial estimate was 
not reflected in the actual SEMP budget in as much as the actual loan 
amount there was US$ 17 million - or only 5% of what the original figure 
42 had been recommended (Hillel, interview, 2004). The SEMP team leader 
told me in interview that this was partly because of the Asian financial crisis 
that broke out in 1997. Economic turbulence caused by the crisis diminished 
Japanese investors' interests in Northern Palawan tourism development at a 
time of great regional uncertainty (Hillel 2004; see also JICA 1999a, 1999b; 
JBIC 2003b, 2003c). Such corporate disinterest ultimately led, in turn, to a 
project budget cut as Japanese ODA is in general greatly influenced by 
private sectors interests (see Chapter 4). 
Interestingly, the sustainable tourism development master plan stressed the 
importance of non-official stakeholder involvement in sustainable tourism 
development, which was in sharp contrast to the JICA position on this 
matter that was revealed during the implementing arrangement meeting for 
the preparatory study (see above). This apparent about-turn was particularly 
evident in terms of the local community's role in environmental monitoring 
(see Figure 6.9). Although fully-fledged local community involvement in 
project planning had been explicitly denied earlier 
due to the 'non-official 
development plan entity' status of this local actor (JICA 1995: 147), for the 
42 During the interview, Oliver Hillel, the SEMP tourism component leader, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the budget for the SEMP as there was a huge gap between the 
initial 
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actual project implementation, the master plan specified that the local 
community be designated as a main regulating agency for tourism 
development maintenance and environmental monitoring (JICA 1997). 
At the same time, however, private tourist finns also assumed some aspects 
of Local Government Unit (LGU) environmental administration in the 
master plan - indicating a more general opening out to non-official groups 
in that plan (JICA 1997). This inclusion of the private sector was not as 
unnatural as it might initially seem. It is, in fact, a rational response for 
tourist resorts to take conservation issues seriously as their business entirely 
depends on a rich natural environment to attract the tourists. As they are in 
the practice of selling a 'beautiful environment' (see Figure 6.5 and 6.7), 
conservation is for them a routine business maintenance matter. For that 
reason, tourist resorts could not simply expect LGUs to take action, given 
the institutional and financial weakness of the latter (Distal, interview, 2004; 
43 Hillel , interview, 
2004; Laririt, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). 
Local community capacity building, meanwhile, was also anticipated in the 
plan as a necessary step forward for tourism development as an alternative 
livelihood. Yet, involving local communities in the project in this way 
required that they be provided with training and education. Of interest here, 
though, is the fact that, although the MPS repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of the environment (its conservation and management), it was 
curiously silent on the provision of assistance - to local communities so that 
they might be able to promote local conservation activities. Thus, for 
example, Table 6.9 shows that the estimated number of community 
personnel to be trained was missing even though all other sectors were 
clearly specified. The unavailability of complete data on environment- 
related community training was not explained in the report. 
budget estimation in the MPS and the actual JBIC loan that was the basis of the actual 
budget. 
43 For example, El Nido Resort has invested in coastal policing but also on researching the 
surrounding coastal areas in collaboration with the 
University of the Philippines (Laririt, 
interview, 2004; see also The 
Coral Reef Alliance 2005). UP marine biologists were invited 
to do research on such issues as damage caused by starfish to the 
local reefs. 
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Although (as aforementioned) the JICA data must be cautiously interpreted, 
this anomalous lack of data in Table 6.9 raises some concerns. Thus, while a 
one million Philippine Peso budget for the training cost in the environment 
sector was provided, this figure is of limited utility in reality without a clear 
sense of projected demand. As any budget estimate in the JICA system is 
generally based on how and what the budget would be used for - in this 
case, the total number of trainees in environment related employment - the 
absence of inforination on the latter suggests either indifference to this 'lost' 
item on the list or even a lack of preparation in this area. Indeed, for an 
agency firmly committed to 'greening', such an omission of details is not to 
be expected. 
Table 6.9. Estimated Needs in Training/Education 
Sector 
Total projected 
Total estimated 
demands training cost per Education facilities 
(persons) year (million Philippine Peso) 
Middle Existing universities/ 
manager/specialist 2,500 2 improving vocational 
school 
Management/ 2,500 2 Vocational training hospitality service 
Food and 3,000 1.5-2 Vocational training 
restaurant 
Housekeeping 650 1 On the job training 
Gardening 2,000 0.5 Vocational training 
Maintenance 900 1 -1.5 Vocational training 
Environment 1 Vocational training 
Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 47) 
Such inattention to detail may thus be indicative of a wider sense of 
'business as usuaF in JICA operations. Take for instance the composition of 
the JICA team that conducted the Master Plan Study. Unlike the preparatory 
study, there was no government official involved as the MPS was 
commissioned to consulting companies (JICA 1996a). Hence, it was four 
Japanese companies who carried out the MPS: Almec Corporation, 
Metocean Environment Inc., Pacific Consultant International and 
International Tourism Development Institute Japan (JICA 1996a). Although 
the specific role of each firm in the team was not stated in the summary of 
MPS, the general nature of each company's business activity is certainly 
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revealing here - after all, presumably they were expected to lend their 
expertise to the JICA deliberations. At least three of the participants were 
thus heavily involved in the development industry. It is interesting in 
particular to note Almec's participation as it is a firm that is mostly 
concerned with urban/regional planning including transport planning 
(Almec 2005). It can be plausibly assumed therefore that Almec was 
selected for the team because JICA wanted to include a transport system 
infrastructure component in the first place - and therefore, needed a 
company with the relevant experience and technology involved. This 
composition of the team thus explains why the sustainable tourism 
development master plan proposed more infrastructure development 
activities than conservation activities and even perhaps why consideration of 
environmental issues was uneven in general in the MPS. 
That said, the MPS did address the issue of environmental guidelines, as one 
of the main professed aims of the MPS was to establish environmental 
guidelines for tourism development and related activities in environmental 
management areas (see below). This specific concern was later developed 
into one of the major tasks of the sustainable tourism development 
component of the SEMP (SEMP Tourism Component 2003). It was indeed 
clear that this element (i. e. of the guidelines) needed to be properly 
conceived and implemented. Because development activities in small 
designated islands in Northern Palawan were in principle banned according 
to the DENR Proclamation No. 219 (CEC 1994), it was particularly 
important to produce environmental guidelines for the area's tourism 
development which was mostly focused on small island beachfronts (JICA 
1997; see also NEDA 2004). Small islands have limited environmental 
6carrying capacity' and therefore cannot accommodate excessive amounts of 
tourists (CEC 1994; France 1997; Honey 1999; Duffy 2002). Although the 
Northern Palawan resort business is still relatively small scale, it is 
nonetheless scattered across a wide area of 'Isolated' small island beaches . 
44 
In order to produce tailor-made sustainable tourism development for the 
" For example, one of the popular destinations is El Nido Resort which has only 15 
cottages (Ten Knots Development Corporation 2002; Larint, interview, 2004; Direct 
observation in El Nido May 2004). 
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area, the MPS thus needed to take the area's limited carrying capacity 
seriously. Indeed, it identified such issues as waste management (including 
sewage) as a top priority - since waste often causes serious problems for 
both the local community and the tourism industry - to be incorporated into 
a future environmental guideline (see ADB 2004; Chanco 2005; Chen Ng 
2003 ). 45 
This section has considered the JICA development study (both the 
preparatory study and the Master Plan Study) to assess the provision for 
greening in the initial environmental consideration phase of SEMP - our 
case study of kanky5-enjyo or environmental aid. There was a complex and 
at times ambiguous process at play here. Yet, environmental consideration in 
this project also involved a second Japanese aid agency (OECF) whose own 
procedures on greening are next assessed. As we consider the verification 
phase of the project environmental deliberation. 
6.4. Verifying the Kankyd-hairyo: OECF 1999 SAPROF 
and Appraisal 
The Japanese government provided two grants at the stage of project 
preparation for the SEMP: the JICA development study discussed above and 
the OECF's SAPROF considered here. Although it is common to have two 
aid agencies involved given the complexities of both the project cycle and 
the fragmented Japanese aid system (see Chapter 4), it was a bit unusual to 
see the OECF involved in a grant-based activity since it is a Yen loan 
implementing agency only. However, SAPROF was an additional procedure 
carried out in order to elaborate a "more realistic and integrated 
development schedule" for the 1997 JICA master plan (SEMP Tourism 
Component 2003: 3). This extra procedure was again requested by the 
Philippine government to satisfy concerns about possible weaknesses in the 
strategic delivery of the SEMP before project (environmental) appraisal 
(see 
45 Carrying capacity is a significant matter in tourism development. Boracay Island (one of 
the most popular destinations in the Philippines) 
has exceeded its carrying capacity 
thresholds resulting in various problems including water quality, waste overflows and 
related health hazards like malaria 
(Evangelista 2005; Trousdale 1997). 
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below; JBIC 1999b; Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004). 46 
Here too, then, given our focus on greening, there is an opportunity to assess 
procedures and practices possibly suggestive of a 'green' ODA focus via 
SAPROF and appraisal. 
6.4.1. Implementing SAPROF 
OECF thus dispatched a SAPROF team in August 1999 led by the Japanese 
consulting company Pacific Consultants International (PCI) in order to 
assist the Philippine DOT in elaborating a viable ODA project. SAPROF 
therefore involved re-formulating the SEMP by reviewing and 
supplementing the JICA 1997 master plan study (Anda, interview, 2004; 
JBIC 1999b, 2003c). 
The SAPROF prioritised five environmental strategies that were later 
condensed into three project components that are discussed below (JBIC 
1999b: 2) As Table 6.10 suggests, these strategies asserted the urgency of 
environmental protection as well as the need to minimise the local 
environmental impact of tourism in as much as they described Palawan's 
natural environment as "invaluable ... resources", "tourism assets", and a 
"lifeline of ... economy" 
(JBIC 1999b: 2). Interestingly, the SAPROF report 
appeared in places to endorse a project thrust that was somewhat different 
from JICXs infrastructure oriented development - thus stressing in parts a 
vision of a small-scale, local economy driven, sustainable tourism (JICA 
1997; see also Distal, interview, 2004*; Pablico, interview, 2004; Otadoy, 
interview, 2004). 
Overall, though, the SAPROF report remained faithful to the basic thrust of 
the JICA master plan study. For example, the former placed priority on road 
rehabilitation as in the latter. 
46 The SAPROF report was completed and published in December 1999. As the merger of 
OECF and JEXIM took place and JBIC was established in October 1999, the second phase 
of the SAPROF activity was camed out by JBIC and the report was published under the 
name of JBIC (JBIC 1999b). 224 
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Table 6.10. Five Priority Strategies for SEMP 
Invaluable environmental resources endowed with the Northern Palawan 
No. 1 are identical to attractive tourism assets, so the co-existence of both is a 
lifeline of the Palawan economy 
A proper velocity and carrying capacity of the potential area development 
No. 2 should be sought to ensure a balanced development mechanism while 
minimizing the environmental deterioration 
Urgent actions should be placed to stop on-going environmental 
No. 3 deterioration in both terrestrial and marine resource areas: particularly 
serious soil erosion problems due to poor engineering and maintenance 
works of existing road close to the coastal areas. 
The institutional framework being particularly applied for Palawan (ECAN 
system) should be functionally operationalised to ensure the 
No. 4 environmental management and control illegal activities at the local level 
- capacity building program for all the stakeholders to promote their 
awareness and understanding of the ECAN system 
Community-involvement and local economy-driven tourism should be 
encouraged to create a sustainable development basis - introduction of No. 5 the resource-user charge from tourists which will be utilized for local 
activities for sustainable environmental conservation as well as livelihood 
programs related to resource management. 
Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999: 3) 
Table 6.11. Proposed Project Components by SAPROF 
Estimated 
Major Category Project Component Project 
Cost 
Environmental 
Management Component 1: Facilitation of Establishment of 342.0 System ECAN Zoning System (16.4%) Development 
(Strategy No. 4) 
Component 2: Soil Erosion Protection Project Environmental 
along the existing road sections of Roxas - 1,030.7 Protection Taytay (74.7 km)/ Taytay - El Nido (61.1 km)/ St. (49.5%) (Strategy No. 3) Nino - Busuanga - Buluang (45.4 km) 
Environmental Component 3: Municipal Solid Waste 
cum Social Management Systems (Sanitary Landfill Sites 117.2 
Improvement Development) in El Nido (6 ha)/ Busuanga (3 (5.6%) 
(Strategy No. 2) ha) 
Environmental 
Resource Component 4: Environmental Reforestation 458.7 
Restoration with Programs (22%) Livelihood 
(Strategy No. 5) 
Project Component 5: Overall Project Implementation 135.4 
Management i ' ý Management (6.5%) jo I- Jj (StraZ O 
- 2,084.0 
Total (100 0) 
Note: In millions of Philippine Pesos (in 1999 prices) as well as the share of 
total costs 
Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999: 6) 
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Table 6.11 is suggestive in this regard. Thus, the estimated budget for civil 
works accounted for about 55% (road rehabilitation and sanitary landfill 
sites development), which left a budget for pure conservation-related 
activities of less than 40% (ECAN Zoning and reforestation). Problems with 
this perceived imbalance were also raised by many local NGO staff who 
were already critical about the JICNs strong infrastructure development 
emphasis (see below). 
The SAPROF report represented a delicate balancing act by the OECF given 
the circumstances of its creation. Thus, it was initially arranged through 
infon-nal dialogue between Conservation International Japan and the OECF 
held in Tokyo in 1997 - itself, an unusual practice (JBIC 2000c, 2002a, 
2004h; Fukuoka 2003; Anda 2004). Due to its infrastructure orientation and 
the perceived lack of adequate local community consultation, the 1997 JICA 
master plan was facing much resistance from local NGOs and community 
organisations (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004; Miclat, 
interview, 2004). However, opposition was not uniform here. Thus, for 
instance, the international environmental NGO Conservation International 
(CI) Palawan was judged to have a "realistic view"" in donor circles 
because it recognised that a huge wave of development would be coming to 
Palawan in the near future whatever local groups wanted (Fukuoka, 
interview, 2004; see also Anda, interview, 2004) . 
4' Thus, instead of simply 
opposing development, CI decided to propose that the Palawan Governor 
adopt the JICA Master Plan on condition that three aspects were 
strengthened: environmental consideration, local participation and 
environmentally sustainable income generation. With these conditions in 
mind, Cl approached the OECF informally with its idea - and ultimately 
succeeded in bringing the OECF on board through SAPROF. 
49 
47 Cl's moderate approach to donors is further discussed below. 
48 This is indeed a very hotly contested view because other organisations like PARD and 
ESSC resisted this view (Zingapan and De Vera 1999; Bryant 2002; 
Miclat, interview, 
2004). 
49 CI Palawan contacted its Japan Office and channelled its concerns there as it was the 
best 
way to open dialogue with the Japanese aid agency 
OECF through the Japan office (Anda, 
interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004). OECF was approached as it made the 
final 
funding decision and drew up a loan agreement based on the JICA Master Plan. Cl Japan 
off ice staff met with OECF staff in 
Tokyo to explain the perceived shortcomings of the 
Master Plan and relay concerns and propose improvements. Ms. Fukuoka, who was in 226 
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Such NGO participation in the early stage of project fon-nation is very rare 
in Japanese aid practice. However, it can be explained notably in terms of 
CI's character as a US based international environmental NGO. On the one 
hand, the CI's global organisational base made it easier for Cl Palawan to 
approach the OECF through its Japan office (Conservation International 
20025 2005). 'o On the other hand, CI is a politically acceptable NGO for the 
Japanese aid bureaucrats due to its internationally renowned scientific and 
policy status as well as its moderate political tactics. " Most international 
NGOs in Japan, for instance, are far more radical - and indeed are allied 
with Japanese left-wing activists (Hirata 2002). As noted, Friends of the 
Earth Japan has thus been campaigning fiercely against Japanese aid 
projects causing socio-environmental 'hann' in the Philippines and other 
Southern countries - to take but one example (see Chapter 5). 
Despite the innovative aspects of CI-OECF relations, there were still hurdles 
to be addressed surrounding NGO participation in the Japanese aid process. 
The first obstacle was the role of NGO participation in the bidding process. 
CI was thus not able to participate here because it is not a legal 'person' and 
is therefore not eligible for contract bidding (Yamashita, interview, 2003; 
Anda, interview, 2004; Watanabe 2006a). Besides, as the contractual 
procedure of SAPROF activity takes place in Tokyo, without having a 
contract (or a form of joint venture) with Japanese company, it is difficult to 
enter a bidding if a firm or organisation is not based in Japan (Watanabe 
2006a). This is an important point in relation to project implementation 
because NGOs with valuable experience and expertise nonetheless cannot 
contribute to aid projects. As a result, the contract for the SAPROF activity 
was given to the Japanese consulting company Pacific Consultants 
charge of CI Japan office, recollected, I guess I was lucky enough to meet with someone 
likerninded at OECF, and they invited us to work together for the proposed areas of 
improvement" (Fukuoka, interview, 2004). Yet, it cannot be dismissed that the OECF also 
was receptive because it was politically expedient to be seen internationally to be "working 
with" NGOs over aid projects by the later 1990s (JBIC 2003c). 
50 CI has local offices in more than 40 countries (Conservation International 2002,2005). 
51 The Japanese are reluctant to join NGOs like Greenpeace due to their perceived radical 
campaigning strategy and political views (Mitsuda 1997; see also Kerr 2001; Revell 2003). 
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International (PCI), although CI was then hired by PCI as a subcontractor 
upon the OECF's strong recommendation. " 
The second obstacle was the relative cost structure of CI operations (Anda 
2004). Thus, and in terms of project work, Cl was simply not as competitive 
as private consulting companies. This was because firms like PCI have full- 
time consultants working for them, which can significantly cut the project 
cost in their bidding proposal (Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, 
interview, 2004). In contrast, Cl needs to hire external consultants for each 
occasion a bid proposal is made, thereby raising individual proposal costs 
(Anda, interview, 2004). 
A third obstacle surrounding NGO involvement was the fact that, in general, 
the private consultancies have much better official connections and political 
knowledge about project dynamics in the aid process than do NGOs. For 
example, and as one interviewee bitterly pointed out, an Irish Consulting 
company, CHL Consulting Group, won the bid for the SEMP tourism 
component because it hired the former regional director of the DOT who 
had better political connections than the other bidders (Anda, interview, 
2004). 
In spite of these difficulties, CI still managed to maintain a good 
relationship with OECF (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka , interview, 
2004; 
Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004). Indeed, through 
SAPROF, OECF seemed keen to fon-nulate an environmental aid project" - 
and, CI's record addressed this interest in a way that PCI's development 
orientation did not (Nagayama, interview, 2004). Yet, for PCI, the undue 
restriction of development would cost it future business since it needed to 
satisfy both clients in Japan and in the Philippines (Kume, interview, 2004; 
Nagayarna, interview, 2004; see Adams 2001). On the one hand, the DOT 
and the DPWH (the executing agencies) had a strong desire for 
52 CI conducted two aspects of the SAPROF: marine rapid assessment and community 
consultation (Anda, interview, 2004; JBIC 2002a). 
53 As noted in 1999, the annual budget for a 'regular' development aid project in the same 
area had run out - therefore, presumably, there was a need 
for some 'green' alteration for 
project re-categorisation (see Hillel, 
interview, 2004). 
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infrastructure development (Corral 2004; Gacot-Lim 2004; Otadoy 2004; 
Sariego 2004). On the other, OECF insisted that the project be 'greened' to 
better fit the formal project aims - wrangling thus ensued. For example, 
when PCI proposed to use concrete surfacing for road rehabilitation, OECF 
rejected the proposal and instead asked PCI to come up with a more 
4 environmentally friendly' proposal (Anda, interview, 2004; Kume, 
interview, 2004; Nagasawa, interview, 2004). 54 
These power dynamics between OECF, the Philippine agencies and PCI 
were thus reflected in SAPROF, as each player's political and economic 
interests were there asserted, and which in turn influenced overall project 
formulation. An interesting point to emerge from this discussion is that the 
usual Japanese claims of limited involvement at the early project stage out 
of 'respect' for recipient preferences are decidedly ambiguous - at least in 
the case of SEMP. After all, the OECF via SAPROF played a key role here 
that is indeed rather similar to that of other donorsl as when, for instance, 
they attach green conditionality (Lewis 2003; Neuman 1998; Ross 1996). 
Japanese aid officials often proudly state that they do not impose 
conditionality on recipients (Yamamoto, interview, 2002; see Chapter 4). 
Yet, by 'assisting' in the formulation of a potential ODA project as 
witnessed here, Japanese agencies are moulding projects into something 
more appropriate to the political economy of Japanese aid and its assorted 
preoccupations (such as 'greening'). 
This section has thus highlighted some grounds for seeing a 'greening' 
effort by at least one agency - OECF through its SAPROF initiative - at the 
crucial stage of project formulation. Still, such greening was seen to have its 
own ambiguities and inconsistencies given the agency's own complicated 
agenda. 
54 That is why the soil erosion rehabilitation component does not involve concretising the 
existing road system but improving it with methods such as gravel surfaces and ditches to 
cope with heavy rains for drainage. 229 
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6.4-2. Environmental Appraisal 
As noted in Chapter 4, the OECF's greening was more pronounced than that 
of JEXIM. Therefore, more pro-active greening was expected at the 
appraisal stage in which the donor was to play the central role in verifying 
the environmental consideration. However, as mentioned above, the OECF 
was merged into JBIC during the SAPROF activity in 1999, so OECF tasks 
were passed on to the latter, including the SEMP's environmental 
appraisal. " Thus, the 1999 JBIC environmental guidelines (hereafter the 
Guidelines) were applied to the SEMP (see below). " 
Before we consider in general terms the SEMP appraisal, it is important to 
note that, unlike the SRMP, an actual environmental appraisal was not 
highlighted as needed by either JBIC, " the Philippine government agencies 
involved or local stakeholders (local government units, community 
members and NGOs). " This difference was presumably attributable to the 
fact that the SEMP was Japan's first aid project to the Philippines that 
specifically targeted environmental conservation - therefore, harmful 
environmental impacts were not anticipated. For instance, throughout the 
interviews conducted during my fieldwork, great expectation was placed on 
55 Despite the seemingly epoch-making establishment of JBIC, the merger, in reality, has 
not induced much change (Hayashi, interview, 2004). The JBIC simply created an umbrella 
that combined both agencies for ODA and OOF operations, which was a part of the 
Japanese government's administration reforrn (gy5sei no surTmuka) begun in 2000 (Murai, 
interview, 2003; Hayashi, interview, 2004; Hirai, interview, 2004; Matsumoto, interview, 
2004). For example, even after the merger, JBIC still maintains two separate budgets for 
ODA and OOF instead of one single budget. 
56 As noted in Chapter 4, the JBIC established environmental guidelines for ODA loan 
projects in 1999 based on the 1995 OECF guideline. In fact, the two guidelines are 
identical as JBIC simply took the OECF guideline on board by attaching a new title "JBIC 
Environmental Guidelines for ODA Loans" (JBIC 1999c). 
57 During the SRMP fieldwork, most interviewees raised the issue of the NPC's EIA and the 
JEXIM's environinental appraisal without even being asked. However, for the SEMP, even 
when I asked directly about this matter during an interview with the JBIC SEMP project 
officials in Tokyo, interviewees seemed to have very little idea even about the procedure. 
Thus, in response to my questions ("In what way was environmental appraisal conducted? 
What category was used? "), they replied: "this is a project to produce environmental 
guidelines for the tourism development in Northern Palawan [which is one of the tasks of 
SEMP tourism component]" (JBIC, interview, 2004h). 
58 During my interviews with local government officials and NGO members, the core 
debates concerning the SEMP were mainly over the JICA master plan study due to its 
heavy focus on infrastructure development as well as the SEMP ECAN Zoning component 
due to the size of the core zone and ancestral domains (Anda, interview, 2004; De La 
Calzada, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Rabe, 
interview, 2004; Sanego, interview, 2004). 230 
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the anticipated benefits of the SEMP through such means as advanced 
environmental technologies and a community-based ecotourism initiative, 
while the focus of interviewees on SRMP was more concerned with the 
costs of the poorly performed EIA by NPC, problems with JEXIM's 
environmental appraisal and the irregularity of the ECC issuance (see 
Chapter 5). This may echo the general perception concerning likely 
environmental effects of development as opposed to environmental aid 
projects - hence, for an environmental aid project like the SEMP, greater 
expectations for greening are pertinent here. 
The use of the Guidelines is meant for environmental appraisal prior to 
funding decisions in order to verify the appropriateness of a proposed 
project's environmental consideration. As discussed in Chapter 4, unlike the 
weak JEXIM environmental checklists, the JBIC guidelines were set up 
with two underpinning mechanisms: first, five basic rules for environmental 
consideration were established that were in turn incorporated in the 
environmental checklist (see Table 6.12 and 6.13); and second, project 
classification that screened whether a proposed project requires an EIA 
submission (see Table 4.2). The former included compliance with the 
recipient country's environmental regulations, consideration of 
environmental pollution, natural environment, involuntary resettlement, and 
environmental conservation measures, which then became the basis of the 
four main topics to be assessed for the environmental checklists. The latter 
was to classify proposed projects into three categories - Category A, B and 
C- and thus required submission of an EIA when a project was classified as 
Category A. 
231 
Chapter Six 
Table 6.12. Basic rules for environmental consideration 
Compliance with the recipient country's environmental regulations: 
A project is to comply with regulations, etc., stipulated in the laws of the 
recipient country relating to the environment, environmental conventions to 
which the recipient country is a party, etc. 
2. Environmental pollution: 
a) In principle, a project is to comply with the regulatory standards, such as 
emission standards, of the recipient country. The recipient country is also to 
endeavour to attain any existing government target values for the protection 
of the environment, such as Environmental Quality Standards applying to the 
area around the project site. 
b) If emission standards are not currently established in the recipient country, 
when necessary, JBIC encourages the recipient country to establish 
provisional emission target levels for the project, referring to the emission 
standards established by international organizations, Japan or other 
countries, taking cost-benefit considerations, etc., into consideration. 
3. The natural environment: 
a) In principle, a project is to be implemented outside designated nature 
conservation areas established in accordance with the national laws, etc., of 
the recipient country. In addition, a project is not to have a significant impact 
on such conservation areas. 
b) Necessary action is to be taken to prevent significant project impact on the 
lives of endangered species and to ensure conservation of biodiversity. 
4. Involuntary resettlement 
a) In the planning and implementation of a project, there is to be adequate 
consideration for people who will be called upon to relocate and resettle 
involuntarily and/or lose a major source of income because of the project 
(hereinafter "project-affected people"). 
b) There is to be careful examination of alternatives at the planning stage with 
a view to ensuring that the number of project-affected people is the smallest 
possible. 
c) For a project which necessitates involuntary resettlement, plans are to be 
prepared beforehand in order to mitigate any negative impact. These plans 
are to be prepared by the recipient country's government following 
appropriate hearings of the opinions of project-affected people. 
d) Plans to mitigate negative impacts of involuntary resettlement are to have 
as their objective the restoring of living, income, etc., for project-affected 
people after resettlement. 
5. Environmental conservation measures 
a) The cost of measures to conserve the environment (including the social 
environment, such as the cost of involuntary resettlement) is to be included in 
the project cost. In particular, for a project which requires measures involving 
pollution-control equipment and monitoring, financing to cover operation and 
maintenance is to be duly obtained. b) It is desirable, in the interests of 
objectivity in the evaluation and monitoring of project-related environmental 
measures, that the executing agency of the recipient country utilizes a third 
party when necessa - 
Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999c: 2-3) 
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With reference to the Guidelines, the SEMP was classified as 'Category B' 
by the JBIC department involved; " it was therefore not formally required 
by the JBIC to submit an EIA, but was appraised instead simply based on 
the checklists provided by the Guidelines (JBIC 1999c; Watanabe 2006b; 
see JBIC 2002e) . 
60 The project classification was then confirmed by the 
J131C environmental analysis department which further required completion 
of an environmental checklist. This checklist requirement was solely based 
on the civil works (road construction and rehabilitation) intended for the soil 
erosion protection component - as a result, the DPWH submitted a 
completed environmental checklist for road and railroad for appraisal in 
2000 (e. g. see Table 6.13; see also Watanabe 2006b). The submitted 
checklists were subsequently appraised and verified by the JBIC 
environmental analysis department in the light of the recipient's own 
environmental regulations. 
For the SEMP, JBIC did not seem quite as reluctant as JEXIM (as noted in 
Chapter 5) to reveal the identity of the appraiser, the role of the 
environmental analysis department and the usage of the environmental 
guidelines. However, these basic facts do not tell us much about how 
thorough the activity was in terms of possible procedural greening - bearing 
in mind that the actual appraisal is not available for viewing and little is 
publicly known about the JBIC department. For example, even the number 
of its staff complement remains classified (JBIC 2004g). Such secrecy - 
standard practice among Japanese aid agencies - suggests a basic 
apprehension about their environmental appraisal system (see Chapters 4 
and 5), and even (perhaps) about the quality of the appraisal itself. " Hence, 
it is important to discuss briefly the actual checklist so as to assess to some 
59 Development Assistance Department 1, Division 3 is the JBIC department dealing with 
loan projects in Southeast Asia including the Philippines (JBIC 2000d) 
60 The DPWH's Environmental Impact Assessment Project Office completed an EIA in 
February 2000 in any case, notably in order to meet Philippine environmental regulations. 
That EIA was supportive of the project inasmuch as an ECC was shortly thereafter issued 
ýChan 2006). 
1 During the interviews with JBIC (2004h), I was able to personally approach a senior 
official from the environmental analysis department as I was leaving the interview room. I 
talked with the official whom seemed very much interested in my questions. However, this 
conversation was shortly cut off by a public relations officer controlling the interview 
throughout. The PR officer seemed uncomfortable with my conversation with the 
environmental official and swiftly caught an elevator (by pressing the buttons repeatedly) 
and sent me out from the building. 
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extent at least, possible greening at the SEMP's appraisal stage - because, 
after all, the checklist was the only procedural commitment at this stage of 
project appraisal and in fact ought to have therefore played a crucial role 
here. 
As Table 6.13 shows,, however, this environmental checklist raises concerns 
as it has ambiguous assessment criteria similar to those of JEXIM checklists 
and the JICA guidelines (see Chapter 5). Thus, for example, the checklist 
first instructs the appraiser to tick an applicable category such as major, 
small, none, or not clear for a total of 12 items (JBIC 1999d: 11). Yet, those 
categories lacked any general definition let alone quantitative indicators 
such that a result can clearly vary from one appraiser to another based on 
subjective assessment. In this regard, the JBIC environmental checklists 
were akin to both the JEXIM 1993 checklists and the JICA guidelines in as 
much as ambiguity and vagueness hinder the efficacy of appraisal 
procedures (see Appendix 2 and Chapter 5). In addition, considering that 
this JBIC guideline was established only in 1999, compared with that of 
JEXIM in 1993 and JICA in 1992, it is clear that not much practical 
improvement has been made since the early 1990s in terms of the 
specification of environmental guideline standards. 
The SEMP's appraisal stage was thus a rather low-key affair that did not 
attract much attention, even from local stakeholders such as NGOs and 
community groups (see Anda, interview, 2004; De La Calzada, interview, 
2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). Based on the limited evidence available to 
the researcher, it seems clear that this was a 'light touch' appraisal based on 
a Category B classification as well as its status as the first Japanese aid 
project in the country dedicated fori-nally to environmental conservation. In 
short, the environmental status of the project resulted in a less rigorous set 
of checks being conducted than might have been the case if it had been a 
conventional development project. That said, and as our general discussion 
of the checklists here suggests, there was seemingly only ever room for 
superficial appraisal given the vague and ambiguous structure of the 
checklists themselves: superficial, at least, in relation to JBIC's own 
high 
profile pledge to 'green' aid through environmentally sensitive project 
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delivery. In any event, the appraisal did not lead to modifications in the 
SEMP, nor did it slow down project implementation. 
6.5. Implementation 
Unlike the San Roque Multipurpose Project, this chapter explores the 
implementation stage of a project (the SEMP) as an ongoing process. Given 
it is still in operation at the time of writing, there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to this state of affairs. On the one hand, there is an 
opportunity for greater empirical research associated with an ongoing 
activity that can help fill in data gaps where otherwise it might be difficult. 
On the other hand, it is clearly impossible to examine all the stages of the 
project cycle, especially the monitoring stage, which has yet to be 
undertaken. Thus, this chapter is only able to explore SEMP's first two years 
of implementation out of a total period of 5 years. In this section, our focus 
is therefore on the extent to which the Japanese aid agencies complied with 
their own rules on greening, and more precisely, whether compliance in 
relation to environmental consideration requirements specified in the project 
formation and planning has been attained. Indeed, the implementation stage 
further enables us to see how 'effective' the two earlier stages have been. 
Therefore, this section explores the ECAN Zoning, soil erosion protection, 
and the sustainable tourism development components - which together 
comprise the SEMP as implemented. 
6.5.1. ECAN Zoning Component 
The ECAN Zoning component has faced more problems and hurdles than 
the other SEMP components due to conflict between the ECAN Zoning 
team and local governments over existing Comprehensive Land Use Plans 
(CLUPs) (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, 
interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). The SEP Act (GOP 1992b) had 
mandated local government to produce their own CLUPs with ECAN 
Zoning as a designated main tool. Yet, ECAN Zoning has not been properly 
implemented to date - therefore, there was no complete conservation map to 
guide the development plans of the municipalities 
(see above). However, 
local governments' desire for development could not wait until ECAN 
Zoning could be completed (Corral, interview, 2004; De La Calzada, 
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interview, 2004; Sanego, interview, 2004). Thus, some LGUs went ahead to 
produce CLUPs with NGOs like Environmental Science for Social Change 
and World Wildlife Fund (Lawrence 2002; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; 
Miclat , interview, 2004). By 2004, El Nido, Busuanga, and Coron had 
already produced CLUPs and were thereby ready to launch development 
projects even in the absence of local ECAN Zoning guidance. 
The problems that ECAN Zoning faced have come from inflexible 
organisational practices at both the PCSDS and JBIC. On the one hand, it 
was PCSDS organisational inflexibility that had originally caused conflicts 
between the ECAN Zoning team and LGUs, such that the latter had acted on 
their own (Arquiza 1996; De Vere Moss, interview, 2005). The ECAN 
Zoning component nonetheless required LGUs to replace their existing 
CLUPs with a new ECAN map instead of revising them, which 
consequently triggered further conflict. 62 Ironically, the PCSDS had been 
involved in producing those CLUPs in the first place during its preliminary 
ECAN activities that had included the drafting of guidelines on how to 
proceed with planning activities in the province. Still, PCSDS inflexibility 
was to blame and was felt to occur as "PCSDS has never really had the 
resources to carry out its mandate and has always been project-based... thus 
PCSDS is habitually biased towards specific projects/programme objectives 
since they are in effect its paymaster" (De Vere Moss, interview, 2005). That 
is why, although PCSDS once had played a major role in producing CLUPs, 
it had suddenly become 'biased' towards the JBIC's ECAN Zoning scheme 
once new money was at hand. " Such inflexibility thereby stemmed from the 
political economy of donor-local agency relations, which was the reason 
why the ECAN Zoning team was subsequently rejected in certain 
62 According to my interviews, LGUs were open to compromise if PCSDS was willing to 
revise and conduct additional studies to the existing CLUPs rather than replacing them 
(De 
La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). The LGUs also argue, if the PCSDS 
propose revision by adding to what is to be found by ECAN Zoning, that 
it would be more 
feasible for them to work on them in planning work (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; 
Miclat, interview, 2004). However, the way that JBIC ECAN Zoning has been carried out 
by PCSDS was perceived as "something ridiculous" (Corral, interview, 2004). Further, the 
size of core zones set by the PCSDS was not agreeable 
(too big) for the LGUs because they 
wanted more development in their municipalities. 
This view is also shared by WWF El 
Nido (De La Calzada, interview, 2004). 
63 Recall that OECF (and hence SAPROF) was folded into JBIC in October 1999 (see 
above). 
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municipalities (De La Calzada 
, interview, 
2004; Hiler, interview, 2004; 
Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). 64 
On the other hand, problems involving ECAN Zoning have also reflected 
the I inflexible' terms of reference of the JBIC contract itself. Most Japanese 
aid projects are inflexible when it comes to solving problems that crop up 
during the implementation stage, even when there is an obvious solution 
61 (Sbderberg 1996b; Kerr 2001; Hillel, interview, 2004; see also Chapter 5). 
LGUs are implementers of the future ECAN map for their own development 
projects, such that conflicts with them inevitably hinder successful project 
implementation (Hillel, interview, 2004; see also Lawrence 2002). Yet, JBIC 
was steadfast here on the specific parameters of ECAN Zoning - thus, 
refusing to modify some specifications set out in the project formulation 
stage. LGU anger and even deadlock have been the result. In one sense, 
Japanese agency intransigence here might be seen to reflect a wish to 
maximise 'greening' as per its brief. In another sense, however, such 
intransigence may be notably to blame for project deadlock - and hence, the 
inability to actually achieve 'green' aims in an efficacious manner. 
6.5.2. Soil Erosion Protection Component 
The soil erosion protection component has so far not faced problems in the 
way that the ECAN Zoning component has done (Hiler, interview, 2004). It 
used "state of the art technology to stop soil erosion and conserve the 
environment" according to one of the DPVv'H engineers working in the field 
(Magubat, interview, 2004). As it is straightforward construction work, 
obstacles relate mostly to natural conditions like the weather. For example, 
rain makes it almost impossible to carry on civil work, as the present road 
condition is described by the El Nido municipal tourism office as not 
64 In Taytay, the ECAN Zoning team was in fact kicked out (De La Calzada, interview, 
2004; Hiler, interview, 2004; Hillel, inter-view, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Pablico, 
interview, 2004). 
65 Thus, a new ECAN map contradicts existing CLUPs M terms of setting a core zone size, 
which is precisely why LGUs are refusing the new ECAN Zoning, but could be adjusted 
through negotiation. 
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passable under heavy rains (El Nido Tourism 2004; Direct observation in 
Coron and El Nido May 2004). " 
The core issue here is whether the 'envirom-nentally friendly' technology 
used under the terms of the project would really stop the serious soil erosion 
- that is, the use of gravel road, ditches for drainage, and the planting of 
indigenous grass species to bolster slopes. In spite of this 'envirom-nental 
technology', DPVv'H officials had a different view on the matter from that 
embodied in the SEMP (Otadoy, interview, 2004). During interview, for 
example, the DPWH director expressed his wish to concretise the road: "as 
an engineer, I believe concrete is the only solution to [this problem]. With or 
without JBIC's help, we can do this with our government fund or other 
donors [such as] ADB, World Bank, whoever is willing to give us money. 
For now, we are laying down the foundation for the concrete work" (Otadoy, 
interview, 2004). " Revealingly, this passage suggests how far the recipient 
government can go in terms of reversing any one donor's green priority on 
6 environmentally friendly' technology if it was so inclined. Indeed, it also 
suggests that recipients are quite liable to revert to their own prior priorities 
once funds are disbursed (Connolly 1996). Recipients seem more inclined in 
general to renege on 'green' promises because environmental projects 
usually present real development 'opportunity costs' to them in the long 
term (Connolly 1996; Nagayama, interview, 2004; Otadoy, interview, 2004). 
As per the SEMP implementation, 'environmentally-friendly' technology 
was still being used in the project-and hence, reflects 'commendable' 
Japanese practice here. 
6.5.3. Sustainable Tourism Development Component 
As noted, SEMP was not originally categorised as an environmental aid 
project in the stage of project formulation. Thus, it was "originally a tourism 
" During my fieldwork in early May 2004 in the areas that occurred in the rainy season, a 
two-wheel drive van I was in got stuck on a muddy road for two hours and could not move 
at all. Without rescue from a four-wheel drive car passing by, I would have spent a night in 
the van. 
67 A concrete road was supported by both DPWH and the consulting company PCI in the 
project formulation stage as the road condition was extremely 
bad. Their reasoning was that 
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development project" to promote small scale community-based eco-tourlsm 
ilipino eco-f . 
6' This third targeting Fi I riendly tourists (Hillel, interview, 2004) 11 
component is therefore the ongoing legacy of that initial focus. 
This component has been notably plagued by problems of implementation - 
some linked to external factors. Thus, regional economic trouble has hit the 
component. At the beginning of the JICA preparatory study in 1995, 
Japanese investors had shown a great deal of interest in building 
infrastructure for tourism development in Busuanga and El Nido, which had 
made the SEMP as a whole look promising (Hillel, interview, 2004; SEMP 
Tourism Component 2003; Pablico, interview, 2004). However, once the 
Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, Japanese private investment was 
withdrawn from the area, consequently destabilising SEMP implementation. 
Simultaneously, this crisis reduced the number of Asian tourists from Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan whose share of the total international tourist 
arrivals in the Philippines had accounted for about 45% (DOT 2005). 
Therefore, the weak economic situation in those countries had a significant 
adverse impact on the Philippine tourism sector. There was also delay 
encountered in the SEMP in terms of the coordination and selection of the 
implementing agencies within the Philippine government itself as multiple 
components invited multiple agency involvement (see below). Moreover, 
there was a more general tourism crisis in 2001. This crisis was caused both 
by local factors (notably by a kidnapping near Puerto Princesa in Palawan) 
and the September I I'h terrorist attacks in the US. Accordingly, the actual 
start of the SEMP project was delayed until November 2002, but in the end 
did not start until March 2003. 
In addition to such external problems, the sustainable tourism development 
component faced further problems linked to the set up of the project itself 
that also limited its capacity. One problem thus relates to structural 
problems within the SEMP itself as the project's implementing structure 
involves three different executing agencies - the DOT, the DPWH and the 
gravel road was not good enough to stop the soil erosion 
because pebbles and small rocks 
are easily dislocated by cars. 
68 This national focus is because most foreign tourists to the area are backpackers and their 
number is very few (Acosta, interview, 2004; 
Distal, interview, 2004). 
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PCSD. These agencies have separate agreements with JBIC, which further 
complicates an already complex implementation process (see Figure 6.3 and 
Table 6.1). Although the DOT is the leading agency in this project, power 
dynamics between DOT and DPVv'H have already affected project 
implementation insofar as over 50% of the total budget allocation is for civil 
work which is a DPWH responsibility (see Hillel, interview, 2004; Tsuda 
and Yokoyama 1999). 69 
The other problem associated with the tourism component is JBIC's own 
business orientation. JBIC, as it gives out loans, strongly urges each 
component to show concrete output and results - and therefore, uses 
quantitative indicators to evaluate project implementation (JBIC 2005b). 'o 
The SEMP Tourism component leader referred to JBIC seeking "value for 
money" in this way as being unrealistic because the pressure to come up 
with quantitative data not only hurts staff morale in the tourism component, 
but also affects their capacity to act (Hillel, interview, 2004). This is so 
because the only available measurable output for the tourism component is 
an increase in the number of tourist arrivals. However, there is very little 
possibility to increase the number of tourist arrivals as JBIC wanted because 
Northern Palawan is not a mass tourism destination and in any event has 
been hard hit by the assorted crises just noted. " Indeed, JBIC's insistence 
on increased tourist arrivals may even fly in the face of the need for careful 
regulation of such arrivals on environmental grounds - and hence, of the 
4greening' responsibilities that this is supposed to adhere to. 
The misfortunes of the tourism component reflect a complex situation. Thus, 
the aforementioned decrease in tourist arrivals in the region has not only 
damaged the local tourism sector, but has also discouraged local 
conservation initiatives because of the interlinked nature of these two 
69 DPWH is one of the most powerful government agencies and has been involved in many 
corruption cases due to the nature of civil work contracts (Azfar et al. 2000; World Bank 
2000b). Also it has a closer relationship with Japanese aid agencies than any other 
Philippine government agency (Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999) 
70 Although the SEMP started out with two grant-based activities (JICA Master Plan Study 
and OECF SAPROF activity), it is ultimately a yen loan project (see above). 
71 This is largely because of poor infrastructure. For example in El N'do, there is limited 
electricity service running between 1 pm and 1 am, as well as no 
banks or even an ATM, 
and hence no possibility of cash advances with very 
limited availability of credit card use in 
the area; and no Internet access (El Nido Municipal Tourism 
Office 2004). 
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aspects. For example, as local businesses are hit hard by declining income, 
they have cut back on expenditures devoted to making the locality 'pristine'. 
In turn, such cutbacks have jeopardised the objective of environmental 
conservation (Densula, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Pabrico, 
interview, 2004). 72 
There is also the difficulty of quantifying the tourism component insofar as 
it is designed in part to create a community-based environmentally 
sustainable tourism system by establishing standards, piloting tourism 
products and building environmental capacity for the tourism sector. These 
elements involve non-measurable outputs that do not thus fit JBIC's criteria 
on successful outputs even as they may be vital to successful long-term 
4greening' (see above). JBIC's criteria also do not need to be so restrictive 
either. For example, JICA (involved at an earlier stage of this project) 
classifies "projects in a soft field" (sofuto na bunya no anken) that involve 
the establishment of things such as piloting of community-based tourism 
products as being not suitable for assessment based only on cost and benefit 
calculation (JICA 2002c: 4). Thus, JBIC's predilection for quantitative 
outputs has not only weakened aspects of the SEMP, but also contradicts 
JICA`s own policy on the matter - underscoring the perils of fragmentation 
in the Japanese aid system (Dauvergne 1997). 
However, there is also a wider issue revealed in the mixed record of the 
tourism component of the SEMP so far - as the case of the tourism entrance 
fees attests. As per the project formulation documentation, that component 
has sought to distribute conservation benefits locally by establishing a self- 
financing system of environmental conservation fees, often known as 
entrance/visitor or dive fees (SEMP Tourism Component 2003,2004; 
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 1996). In so 
doing, the environmental fee became a key goal to encourage conservation 
activities by local communities (including indigenous people and private 
resort owners) through tangible financial gains from the system (SEMP 
Tourism Component 2003,2004; Laarman and Gregerson 1996). Yet, the 
72 The motto "we conserve for tourism that gives us alternative income" 
has been used for 
promoting conservation in local communities. 
However, local communities who witnessed 
a decrease in tourist numbers started challenging the project staff why 
they should conserve 
when there were fewer tourists coming 
(Pablico, interview, 2004). 
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effort to introduce entrance fees in the area at behest of SEMP tourism 
component was neither new nor without opposition. Thus, for instance, in 
Coron, an entrance fee for use of Kaganyan Lake was already facing 
resistance, even as it was a major local tourist destination in 2001 (Arquiza 
2001a, 2001b). The Tagbanua (the resident indigenous people) already 
began to charge entrance fees there in 2001 , 
based on their possessing title 
to ancestral lands (under a 1998 Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim or 
CADC) (GOP 1997; Bryant 2002; Figure 6.5,6.10 and 6.1 1). 73 
Figure 6.10. Entrance Fee Receipt for Ancestral Domain - Kayangan Lake 
1 Amm 14oFcmvmý, AM , 
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--4A^ as payment for 
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Source: Own Photo 
Tagbanua leaders were strongly committed to limiting the number of 
visitors to the lake in order to stop environmental deterioration (SEMP 
Tourism Component 2004; see also Arquiza 2001a). Yet, both the arbitrary 
nature of the fee set, as well as the tight restrictions on visitor numbers, led 
to conflict with other local stakeholders in the tourism sector. On the one 
hand, new restrictions on tourist access to the lake angered both local 
government and affected tour operators who had previously enjoyed free 
access. 
73 The entrance fee system started out separately from the SEMP. But, since March 2003, it 
was combined and reinforced as a part of the implementation of the SEMP's tourism 
component. 
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Source: Own Photo 
This access dispute reflected a much larger local history of dispute over the 
area (Bryant 2000; Arquiza 2001b; Sariego, interview, 2004). " On the other 
74 This resentment towards Tagbanuas was also from the size of the land claimed by them 
under the CADC, which was seen as a threat to local municipalities. In the case of 
Busuwanga, the municipal planning and development coordinator expressed his concern, as 
the claimed land accounted for about 60% of Busuwanga while the Tagbanua only 
accounted for 40% of the total population (Sanego, interview, 2004). This concern was also 
raised by Coron municipal assessor Genario Labrador during my interview: "If more 
ancestral doinain titles are granted, nothing will be left for us and my office will become 
useless" (see also Arquiza 2001b). 
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hand, the Tagbanuas had attempted to raise the entrance fees without 
consultation with local government units and tour operators, despite a lack 
of evidence that the higher fee was sustainable. " The Tagbanua's 
imposition of an entrance fee in this specific case was therefore criticized as 
not having led to much ecological improvement in the lake even as the fee 
collection system was deemed to be flawed and unfair (Arquiza 2001a, 
2001b, Direct observation 2004; " see also Nevill 2001; United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development 1996). 
This particular case in the tourism component does raise questions over the 
possible fit between key social and environmental aims especially in 
contexts where political division is the local norm. Nevertheless, the SEMP 
is strongly committed to the idea of entrance fees. Indeed, it has been 
monitoring tourist sites (including Kagayan Lake) through regular 
consultation meetings with barangay representatives, Conservation 
International, SARAGPUNTA, and the Coron Association of Tourism 
Establishments (SEMP Tourism Component 2004). Further, it has evaluated 
the market feasibility of Kagayan Lake fees in particular by conducting a 
survey of guests and their 'willingness to pay' (SEMP Tourism Component 
2004; see Laarman and Gregersen 1996; Benitez 2001). In this regard, the 
SEMP can be seen to have provided legitimacy to entrance fees otherwise 
perceived by some locals to be imposed by the Tagbanua via consultations 
and research designed to strengthen the capacity for Tagbanua 
environmental management locally. In short, although it is too early to be 
definitive here, the entrance fees saga - and especially a Japanese insistence 
on it via SEMP - may indicate some evidence of greening to a Japanese aid 
project as it is being implemented. 
75 Entrance fees vary according to visitor nationality: 200 Philippine pesos (PhP) per person 
from locals and PhP 400 per person from foreigners (Bulauitan 2002; Direct observation in 
Coron May 2004; Pablico, i1riterview, 2004). But, during my visit to Kagayan Lake, the 
entrance fee for locals was 270 PhPs (see Figure 6.9). 1 USD was 52 PhPs in May 2006. 
76 In 2003, the Tagbanuas' office for boat pen-nits in Coron was transferred to 
SARAGPLJNTA (federation of 7 Tagbanua foundations including Tagbanua Foudation of 
Coron) located in Coron. However, this was not explained to boat operators. As a result, 
until April 2004, boat permit fees were collected very poorly. At the same time, it was also 
observed that Tagbanua sometimes did not come to collect individual fees to enter tourist 
sites as required (SEMP NP Office Coron 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). When 
I was 
visiting Kagayan Lake and the surrounding areas, Tagbanuas were napping in their 
boats 
even though there were three tourist boats passing by that ought to 
have been charged 
(Direct observation in Coron May 2004). 
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6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined to what extent an environmental aid (kanky& 
enjyo) project has incorporated 'green' elements as proclaimed in top-level 
policy pronouncements as well as how those elements are actually translated 
into project practice through specific procedures and tools. In particular, it 
addressed three major studies at the project formation level (i. e. JICA 
preparatory study and master plan study completed between 1994 and 1997; 
OECF 1999 SAPROF activity) that were formally designed to assist the 
recipient's environmental consideration (kanky&hairyo) procedure. 
Consideration of the SEMP in this chapter provides an interesting contrast 
to the analysis provided in Chapter 5. Thus, in the case of the traditional 
development aid project (San Roque Multipurpose Project) examined in 
Chapter 5, the main role played by Japanese agencies was to verify whether 
the environmental consideration process undertaken by the recipient was 
appropriately done. That discussion highlighted that the Japanese agency 
involved was more akin to a passive auditor than an active facilitator for 
environmental consideration. However, in the environmental aid project 
discussed in this chapter, the donor played a more active role from the stage 
of project fon-nation right through to that of implementation. Even in the 
latter stage, the JBIC has put pressure on each project component - for 
example, to come up with tangible tourism outputs as it seeks 'value for 
money' or to persuade a consulting company to use 'environmentally 
friendly' technology in road rehabilitation. The donor's presence here has 
been therefore more observable at diverse stages of the project than was the 
case for the SRMP. 
Indeed, there is some certainly evidence of greening in the SEMP. It could 
be argued, for example, that the very fact that the donor provided two grant 
packages to assist the recipient's environmental consideration here can be 
considered as evidence of greening in both JICA and OECF in so far as it 
demonstrated a willingness to devote time and money to such consideration. 
The informal dialogue between OECF and Conservation International was 
especially revealing given its unheard of nature. And yet, the SEMP was of 
course designed to be 'green' in the first place - and 
hence, a great deal of 
246 
Chapter Six 
greening was only to be expected. Moreover, careful scrutiny suggests that 
the degree of 'green-ness' of SEMP is less significant than it was said to be 
in official documents. True, this is partly because it was originally a 
development aid project as well as the onset of external factors that could 
not be controlled or expected (e. g. Asia financial crisis, terrorism). Beyond 
that, though, the SEMP at times still has had the feel of a somewhat 
traditional project - for instance, in its stress on economic development and 
above all, in its emphasis on infrastructure oriented project practices. The 
latter in particular has suggested that the project's main aim is still to 
privilege development - here tourism activities - over environmental 
conservation. 
Overall, then, the preceding two chapters have given us scope to assess the 
possible greening of Japanese international cooperation using two project 
case studies from the Philippines. There has been space to consider how 
'greening' has unfolded (or not) in three key agencies: JICA, OECF, and 
JEXIM (with JBIC only appearing at the end of the period due to 
amalgamation). The thesis findings suggest in the end a complex picture - 
one shaped by such things as fragmented aid delivery, recipient 
development predilections, and wider international material and discursive 
trends. The next chapter concludes the thesis. It summarises the key findings 
even as it reflects on the possible wider implications of this study in terms 
of a possible research agenda. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This thesis has considered to what extent and in what ways there was a 
'greening' of Japanese aid in the 1990s as officially claimed. Specifically, it 
examined Japan's bilateral international cooperation (kokusai-ky&yoku) 
policy process through the prism of two case study projects in the 
Philippines. In doing so, and as related in Chapter 2, it drew upon a 
theoretical framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as 
key themes drawn from foreign aid and implementation studies. Based on a 
qualitative and case study methodology (discussed in Chapter 3), the thesis 
then undertook to analyse the Japanese greening process in tenns of the key 
stages involved -environmental consideration, the verification of 
environmental consideration, and implementation-linked monitoring. These 
stages were first considered in general form, along with the three main 
Japanese aid players (JICA, OECF, JEXIM), in Chapter 4. Then, the actual 
procedures and practices were assessed in relation to two major types of aid 
project (development aid and environmental aid) in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
two project case studies illustrated both the complexity and ambiguity of the 
greening of Japanese international cooperation in so far as it mapped levels 
of project-related compliance with formal 'green' policy statements and 
procedures. The important role of the recipient's environmental assessment 
system was noted at various stages, as the inter-linked nature of donor- 
recipient 'greening'was emphasised. 
This thesis has thus highlighted a rich and complex story of contemporary 
aid dynamics using the bilateral Japan-Philippines relationship as the 
analytical focus. In this, the last chapter of the thesis, I revisit the two 
projects considered in Chapters 5 and 6 to summarise the key findings. The 
key stages of the environmental assessment process are thereby evaluated in 
order to gauge the degree of commitment of the main Japanese aid agencies 
to project greening. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of a 
future research agenda and selected policy recommendations related to the 
topic of the greening of aid in the light of the thesis findings. 
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7.1. Environmental Consideration 
At the stage of environmental consideration, the two case study projects 
were found to have had a different agenda due to the distinctive and 
differentiated nature of the aims and practices of these two types of project. 
Given this basic difference, our expectation was that the degree and depth of 
greening would also vary across the two projects. Thus, while the 
development aid project (the San Roque Multipurpose Project or SRMP) 
was expected to show relatively little greening and, even then, mainly linked 
to minimising adverse environmental impacts of dam construction, the 
environmental aid project (Sustainable Environmental Management Project 
in Northern Palawan or SEMP) was anticipated to display greater greening 
due to its environmental conservation project preoccupations. 
Envirom-nental consideration, it was expected, would therefore vary in 
keeping with the different project aims involved. 
For the environmental consideration of the San Roque Multipurpose Project, 
there were two types of activity performed by the donor and the recipient 
working in tandem: JICXs development study and the Philippine 
government Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) The former was 
designed to assist and complement the latter (which was done by the 
National Power Corporation). However, the SRMP became mired in 
political controversy in the 1980s and was only saved in the early 1990s due 
to the Philippine energy crisis. These larger political and economic events 
thus shaped the vicissitudes of this mega-development project. 
As a politically and economically controversial project caught on the cusp 
of international greening, it is not surprising that Japan's envirom-nental 
consideration here was patchy, if not downright contradictory. Thus, and as 
Chapter 5 illustrated, JICA`s environmental assessment work showed little 
sign of rigour, failed to demonstrably 'assist' the recipient, and 
indeed 
seemed to be part - and - parcel of a wider set of Japanese 
delaying tactics 
arising from political embarrassment over a Marcos-related scandal. 
More 
generally, the research suggested that the environmental consideration 
process in a high-stakes mega-development project was only ever 
liable to 
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be superficial at best (an experience corroborated by Japanese ODA 
practices elsewhere in the South, see Okamoto 2002; Ozeki and Matsumoto 
2002; Sumi 2004) Thus, and in keeping with the 'request-based' approach, 
Japanese officials sought to ensure that they had done, or were at least seen 
to have done, a crigorous' vetting procedure in order to avoid future 
criticism, especially if (as seemed likely in the case of SRMP) the project 
became even more controversial in the future than it had already become by 
the early 1980s. Accordingly, this JICA activity was performed to satisfy a 
mere procedural requirement even as there were sporadic signs of 
prototypical 'greening' in the work completed. For instance, the activity was 
an exclusively environmental survey including the reservoir water quality 
and hydrological analysis, which in the end emphasised the dam's possible 
contribution to water quality improvement. Such 'green' signals, however 
limited, nonetheless, suggested at least some concern over the likely 
environmental impacts of the proposed dam. 
For the Philippine side, the EIS system was certainly used to provide 
legitimacy for the SRMP - in effect, a bureaucratic requirement met in order 
to gain issuance of an Environmental Compliance Certificate that could be 
thereafter used to rebut anti-dam related criticism. As noted, the project was 
revived in the early 1990s with JEXIM's blessing, thereby affording an ideal 
opportunity to put into practice 'greener' practices. In reality, though, the 
recipient's environmental consideration was even here still patchy and did 
not provoke a negative reaction from JEXIM On the one hand, the effort to 
avoid more rigorous 1990s environmental assessment procedures by having 
the 1980s phase I work 'retro-validated' entailed complex political and 
bureaucratic negotiations as well as generating much controversy. On the 
other hand, some effort was made by the DENR to enhance the quality of 
the original (and clearly inadequate) 1980s environmental consideration 
through specific steps that suggested some recognition of the need to better 
account for socio-environmental issues. Thus, for example, specific project- 
related environmental management plans incorporated new ideas on 
environmental conservation, sustainable livelihoods, and indigenous 
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people's rights and ancestral land, with the Itogon Integrated Watershed 
Management Project providing a useful case in point 
Unlike the development aid project, Japanese officials played a more pro- 
active role from the start in the Sustainable Environmental Management 
Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP). A great deal of greening was thus 
expected at the environmental consideration stage of this project as this was 
an explicitly environmental project (kanky5-enjyo). Attention was centred 
here on JICXs master plan study. However, and as we saw in Chapter 6, the 
focus of that study was largely on tourism (infrastructure) development, in 
part because it had in fact originally been intended as a tourism 
development project. A green re-labelling was nonetheless possible because 
there were no strict criteria set by the Japanese government on what 
constituted 'environmental' aid. Thus, a development project was re-worked 
in the 1990s to benefit from increased environmental aid provisioning by the 
Japanese government, as part of the latter's international 'greening' 
campaign (JBIC 2003a; Potter 1994; Taylor 1999) 
That said, environmental consideration was clearly applied to the SEMP. 
This effort demonstrated HCA's procedural compliance insofar as It 
involved the undertaking of two studies (preparatory and master plan study) 
with considerable financial commitment. Still, there were ambiguous results 
here. Thus, the 1992 HCA environmental guideline was used but proved of 
relatively limited utility. This was the case because it was little more in 
practice than a collection of checklists, forms, and a matrix that provided a 
simple description of a project and its context, but with minimal detailed 
environmental infori-nation thereby required. As the guideline was used to 
generate data for the master plan study that, in turn, was the main basis for 
the final decision as to whether or not to proceed with the SEMP, this 
situation raised questions about the ultimate rigour of the procedures utilised 
to ensure 'greening' in project design. 
Interestingly, as the discussion in Chapter 6 illustrated, Japanese interests 
and preferences were dominant in agenda setting as indicated notably in the 
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master plan study. In spite of Japan's 'request based' approach designed to 
privilege a recipient's environmental consideration, therefore, evidence from 
the case of the SEMP suggested strong donor conditionality akin to what 
other Northern donors do as a key feature in the Japanese aid process here. 
For our purposes, this proactive role suggested that there was more scope 
for Japanese agencies to ensure that there was indeed 'greening' in the 
project. To some extent at least, the OECF's intervention under the 
SAPROF achieved precisely this outcome, as specific requirements here and 
there assumed a 'greener' hue (see below). That said, there was nonetheless 
much 'business as usual' to be seen in the SEMP. Thus, influenced by strong 
Japanese corporate involvement, the SEMP was based on a master plan with 
more of a focus on civil works and tourism-related infrastructure than an 
emphasis on community-based conservation, as perhaps might have been 
expected if a more rigorous environmental consideration had been 
completed. 
7.2. Verifying and Strengthening Environmental 
Consideration 
The stage where the environmental consideration is verified (environmental 
appraisal) and strengthened (Special Assistance for Project Formation or 
SAPROF) provided us with a second opportunity in the project cycle to 
gauge the Japanese commitment to aid 'greening'. Given the distinctive 
nature of the two case study projects examined in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
verification of environmental consideration in each project reflected a 
different central preoccupation at the procedural level. Thus, for the SEMP, 
there was an emphasis put on anticipated project environmental benefits 
(e. g. 'environmentally friendly' technologies and a community-based 
ecotourism initiative), while for the SRMP, there was a stress on anticipated 
project environmental costs linked to the all-but inevitable adverse 
impacts 
of a mega-dam development project. As with the environmental 
consideration stage , it was anticipated 
that there would be more evidence of 
greening' in the Palawan project than in the Luzon project. 
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In the case of the traditional development aid project (the San Roque 
Multipurpose Project), the main Japanese role was played by JEXIM. The 
job here of this agency was checking whether the environmental 
consideration process had been done appropriately with the correct 
environmental assessment reports submitted by the project proponent (i. e. 
NPC's EIA). In Chapter 5, though, it was argued that JEXIM's role in the 
case of SRMP was more that of a passive auditor than an active 'watchdog' 
for effective environmental consideration. And yet, it needs to be 
emphasised at this stage of the project, JEXIM directly controlled the 
funding decision. By addressing environmental issues raised during the 
appraisal through new conditions added to the loan agreements, it had the 
power here to effect material improvements in the environmental status of a 
proposed project or, if necessary, to suspend a loan (and hence, terminate a 
project) when the standard of environmental consideration was deemed to 
be poor. Nevertheless, in practice in our case study, instead of reinforcing 
environmental standards via the loan agreement, JEXIM simply affirmed the 
SRMP's compliance with Philippine environmental laws. Therefore, despite 
opposition by LGUs, local NGOs and communities, the project went ahead 
more or less intact. Notably, and in order to account for some apparent 
reservations that had cropped up during the appraisal, a lengthier period of 
time was allocated to the monitoring phase. Yet, this JEXIM procedural 
commitment was then later somewhat subverted by recipient government 
action. Thus, there was the SRMP's illegal quarry that was cleared by 
Presidential order thereby by-passing the EIS framework since no ECC was 
applied for the quarry 
In the case of the SEMP, the main Japanese agency involved was the OECF. 
Under the SAPROF initiative, this agency did indeed intervene in order to 
strengthen the environmental consideration process even before the 
appraisal stage Considering the OECF's traditional organisational culture 
purely as a lending agency, there was certainly some evidence of a 
willingness to be pro-active about the greening of the SEMP. 
Most 
interesting in this regard was the way that OECF agreed to work with the 
international environmental NGO Conservation 
International in order to 
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enhance the quality of environmental consideration in the original JICA 
study. 
However, Chapter 6 also highlighted that the SAPROF initiative was not 
without ambiguity. Thus, the Japanese private sector had a prominent role in 
it such that a complex power dynamic occurred between OECF, Philippine 
partner agencies (notably DOT, DPVM and PCSDS), NGOs, and the 
consulting company, as each player sought to advance its own interests. The 
end result showed an interest in both environmental protection and a 
tourism-related development, as the OECF struggled to balance the 
competing interests surrounding the project. Thus, on the one hand, there 
was the OECF decision that road rehabilitation use 'environmentally 
friendly' technology rather than conventional concrete surfacing that had 
been advocated by both a key Philippine agency and the Japanese consulting 
firm involved. And yet, on the other hand, the SAPROF initiative served to 
validate the prior JICA decision to emphasise an infrastructure-oriented 
project in support of 'sustainable' tourism. 
In the case of the SEMP, the actual appraisal itself (that verified whether 
harmful environmental impacts were appropriately considered) was rather a 
low-key affair which was notably due to the basic difference between the 
SEMP and the SRMR Thus, difference was linked to the fact that the project 
was Japan's first aid project to the Philippines that specifically targeted 
environmental conservation - therefore, the benefits of the SEMP (for 
example, advanced environmental technology and a community-based 
ecotourism initiative) were emphasised and not the costs. Thus, according to 
the JBIC 1999 guidelines, the SEMP was classified as 'Category B'- and 
hence was not requiring an EIA submission - but was appraised instead 
based on the environmental checklist provided by JBIC. And, yet, that 
environmental checklist shared similarly ambiguous assessment criteria to 
those of the JEXIM checklists and the JICA guidelines also considered in 
this thesis - that is, a lack of definition, and quantitative indicators. The 
sense, then, was that this appraisal was rather superficial in relation to the 
JBIC's own high profile commitment to 'green' aid. 
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7.3. Implementation and Monitoring 
Finally, the stage of project implementation (notably where the monitoring 
process features) provided us with a third occasion to assess the Japanese 
emphasis on the 'greening' of aid. Our focus here was on the extent to 
which Japanese aid agencies complied with their own rules on greening, and 
more precisely, ensured recipient compliance with environmental 
consideration requirements specified in the project objectives. As ever, the 
implementation stage provided further evidence as to Japan's possible 
commitment to greening. 
The implementation of the SRMP in the 1990s was certainly not without 
controversy - with attendant implications for Japanese 'greening'. Local 
Philippine politics thus threatened to subvert the project's environmental 
consideration as proponents intrigued with political allies to validate an 
illegal quarry on site. The silence of the Japanese agencies here on this 
erosion of environmental consideration was telling - and reflected a wish to 
push on with this trouble-plagued development project. And yet, the Itogon 
Integrated Watershed Management Programme (IIWMP) suggested some 
evidence of Japanese-backed greening in this mega-development project. 
Indeed, JBIC's unexpected voluntary financial contribution (through an 
interest payment waiver) to the IIWMP was encouraging in this respect, 
especially as interest repayments to JBIC are obligatory under Japanese law 
and thus any changes required bureaucratic justification. However troubled 
the IIWMP's subsequent history was, the gesture to assist an environmental 
management project component in jeopardy was one possible indicator of 
Japanese greening. 
In contrast, the more recent JBIC-led monitoring of SRMP has been widely 
seen to be superficial and hence not in keeping with what might be expected 
of a 'green' donor agency. True, the JBIC team has been sent biannually to 
the project site and its neighbouring communities. However, its activities 
there were over a very short time period (2 days) only and tended to focus 
on working with the project proponents rather than seemingly with listening 
to NGOs and local communities critical of the SRMP. Indeed, there was 
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even a sense among some interviewees of JBIC simply (covering up' past 
mistakes rather than attempting to solve implementation problems. 
In the case of the SEMP, the project is still ongoing - and hence, a clear 
project outcome is not yet achieved. Still, already there is mixed evidence 
on donor involvement at this stage of implementation. Thus, for example, 
JBIC has put pressure on each project component to come up with concrete 
outputs as it seeks 'value for money'. This quantitative output bias has 
weakened the effort to advance 'alternative' sustainable tourism as 
mandated in the original terms and conditions of the project. As Chapter 6 
discussed, the pressure to come up with quantitative data not only hinders 
staff morale in the tourism component, but also affects their capacity to act 
in a way that fully accounts for environmental issues. Indeed, this stance has 
also contradicted JICA's own position on this type of project in as much as 
the latter is deemed not suitable for assessment based on cost-benefit 
calculation alone. Here therefore, Japanese greening is subject to 
discrepancies between the Japanese aid agencies themselves that seem to 
hinder effective policy action. 
Interestingly, JBIC inflexibility over the implementation of the ECAN 
Zoning component might be construed as being a stance in support of the 
greening process, albeit with ambiguous efforts. Here, an unwillingness to 
decrease or otherwise modify protected zones specified by the ECAN 
Zoning team seemingly sought to maximise areas subject to strict 
environmental protection. However, this stance only occurred at the expense 
of LGU support given the latter's wish to open up more access to 
development in the proposed conservation areas. The ensuing gridlock thus 
jeopardised the feasibility of this component, hence its possible green 
attributes. 
Finally, the soil erosion protection component also revealed ambiguities 
surrounding Japanese greening endeavours. Thus, here the OECF 
insistence 
on the use of 'environmentally friendly' road rehabilitation technology, 
rather than concrete surfacing can be seen as a positive step toward 
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greening. However, once more, such an endeavour can be subverted by 
recipient government interests - in this particular situation, there are the 
Philippine plans to concretise the road after the Japanese project is 
completed. 
Over the various stages of the two aid projects considered in this thesis, 
therefore, there has been conflicting evidence as to the relationship between 
4 green' policy pronouncements and project practices. A complex picture was 
revealed in both projects. Indeed, some 'greening' was observable in both 
cases, albeit in varying degrees. To a considerable extent, therefore, our 
starting propositions for this thesis were confirmed - namely, that minimal 
greening would be found in 'old style' development projects (such as the 
SRMP), whereas a greater degree of greening would be seen in 
6environmental' projects (such as the SEMP). However, both projects were 
riddled with political compromises and ambiguities suggesting that a clear- 
cut and definitive assessment of the greening of contemporary Japanese 
international cooperation is unlikely. 
In addition to the empirical findings, this thesis has also made significant 
conceptual contributions to the literature. For one thing, it has demonstrated 
the need for and the utility of an analytical approach to political ecology that 
emphasises the 'contextual sources of environmental change' (Bryant 1992) 
in general, and North-South aid relations in particular. The Japanese 
bilateral aid relationship served as a useful case study to this end. Much 
research in political ecology remains focused on local community-level 
studies (Robbins 2004). Yet, there is a need to complement such work with a 
greater array of studies that examine in detail national and international 
political and economic dynamics that affect human-environment relations. 
Indeed, this thesis constitutes one of the first in-depth studies of the political 
ecology of the bilateral aid industry. 
In addition, this thesis has suggested the utility of a 'cultural politics' 
perspective within the research field of political ecology. It 
did so by 
highlighting how cultural politics dynamics specific to individual countries 
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condition the ways in which unequal power relations unfold across time and 
space, and between a multitude of state and non-state actors that crisscross 
national boundaries. Here, discussion of the distinctive cultural politics of 
the Japanese bilateral aid system - and its ramifications for aid to the 
Philippines - provided rich grounds for illustrating empirically the 
usefulness of a more cultural-based appreciation of political ecology. This 
call for more 'culture' in political ecology is usually related to local 
community-level work (e. g. Robbins 2004). However, this study argues for 
its application to a wider array of issues and actors, notably linked to the 
national and international levels. 
7.4. Greening of Aid and beyond 
This thesis has been a study of the possible greening of the Japanese 
international cooperation system in the 1990s and was informed by a 
theoretical framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as 
themes drawn from the foreign aid, and implementation literatures. It has 
stressed both the complexity and ambiguity of an aid process in which 
donor and recipient are intrinsically linked. Such complexity and ambiguity 
was seen as being reflected in the uneven degree of greening in the Japanese 
aid system of the 1990s. In turn, the findings of the thesis suggest a number 
of policy recommendations as well as raise a variety of interesting issues 
that future research ought to consider. 
A first policy recommendation in relation to the greening of Japanese aid 
concerns the introduction of an improved system of information disclosure, 
which if implemented would make the delivery of aid more open and 
transparent than is presently the case. Such a change would better enable 
public citizens and civil society groups including research think tanks and 
NGOs to follow projects with particular social/environmental issues - 
including traditionally 'sensitive' mega-development projects (such as that 
involving the San Roque dam in the Philippines). Hitherto, non-state groups 
have experienced great difficulty in gaining access to even basic information 
on planned or existing projects - as even my own experience in conducting 
research for this thesis demonstrated. The sort of outside scrutiny suggested 
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here would facilitate in turn constructive criticism of both the content and 
execution of Japanese aid projects - and it is hoped thereby, more 
accountable and effective aid delivery. 
A second policy recommendation to emerge from the findings of this thesis 
is the need for a stricter environmental appraisal procedure. As this thesis 
has shown, Japan has been well aware of the lack of capacity both for 
effective environmental consideration as well as for appropriately tailored 
project implementation measures in the Philippines (JICA 1997; Higa, 
interview, 2006), the recipient government considered here. In spite of this 
knowledge, however, Japanese aid agencies did not do nearly enough to 
strengthen the recipient's environmental consideration procedures during the 
1990s - even though the environment was formally a top priority for Japan 
at that time and this donor should have been well-placed to help out in this 
area. As such, change here should involve increasing the number of 
Japanese aid officials who deal with environment-related tasks, while 
strengthening their authority to act on environmental commitments in 
conjunction with their counterparts in the recipient government. Such joint 
work ought to assist local officials as they attempt to strengthen 
environmental appraisal - and by extension the implementation of more 
environmentally sustainable projects - insofar as firm donor backing often 
facilitates such change (e. g. Ross 1996). 
A third policy recommendation relates to Philippine government practice. 
Although our focus has been mainly on Japanese policy procedures in this 
thesis, the nature of the Japanese aid system has meant that attention has 
also inevitably been given to the environmental management system of the 
recipient government. Here, it emerged that the Philippine system was very 
good on paper with an array of good laws and formal policy procedures. As 
just noted, though, capacity has been lacking. In addition, existing 
Philippine government policy - notably centred on the EIS and ECC 
appraisal system - is quite erratic due to the ever-present role of political 
intervention that subverts efforts to implement an effective and non-political 
environmental management system (Vitug 1993; Ross 
1996). However 
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difficult, policy reform in the Philippines must be designed to root out such 
political interference drawing on support from donors as well as local and 
foreign civil society groups. The focus here should be on entrenching a 
much stricter EIS implementation system through, for example, a more 
consistent and stricter enforcement of ECC conditions attached to projects 
as the latter are implemented. 
A final policy recommendation to emerge from the discussion in this thesis 
relates to the NGO sector - as noted, an increasingly influential non-state 
actor in the aid policy process. Given the nature of the Japanese aid system, 
it is crucial that NGOs - and especially Japanese NGOs who are generally 
better placed than foreign NGOs to win access to senior Japanese policy 
circles - further develop their scientific expertise and policy-related skills if 
they are ever to hope to play a significant long-term role in that system. The 
strengthening of NGO professional expertise (for example, in marine 
biology and conservation work) will thus enhance their standing with 
Japanese (and other) aid agencies even as it will strengthen their capacity to 
assist local partner communities in need (Silliman and Noble 1998; Bryant 
2005; Suzuki, interview, 2006). In this way, NGOs will be able to work 
more effectively with aid agencies even as they will be better placed to 
criticise socially or environmentally deficient projects in a constructive 
manner - for example, by explaining not simply that 'social and 
environmental assessments are badly done' but how and why those 
assessments are 'badly done' as well as how they could be improved in the 
future (Nakajima, interview, 2006). 
In terms of avenues for further research, a variety of issues come to the fore 
in light of the findings of this thesis. One such issue is whether the 'green' 
decade of the 1990s that was our thesis focus was the start of a new 'green' 
phase in aid history or simply an unusual blip in the political economy of 
that industry. Indeed, the September 11,2001 terrorist attack on the US has 
even prompted the idea that we are now entering an era in which aid is 
prioritised largely on security grounds (JICA 2002b; UNDP 2002,2005; 
Woods 2005). Thus, and in spite of growing alarm over climate change and 
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other worsening environmental problems, the green agenda has seemingly 
become less popular in aid circles in a post 9/11 world. As such, how has the 
green agenda of the 'Rio decade' been altered in light of the new security 
focus? Indeed, there is an increased emphasis in today's aid industry on 
'environmental security'. Northern donors now increasingly stress 
environmental security as an issue that is profoundly linked to poverty and 
human security while underlining associated social and environmental 
issues including population growth, water scarcity and pollution, food 
security and natural disasters including the recent Asia tsunami and 
earthquake incidents (Warner 2000; Dalby 2002; UNDP 2002,2005; Woods 
2005). Thereby, such environmental problems (both human-made and 
natural) are seen as a key source of poverty that is the nurturing milieu for 
terrorist activities, and hence, eventually further global insecurity (MOFA 
2003g; Benn 2004; Blair 2006). This new aid agenda is further highlighted 
by the US led counter-terrorism policy that acknowledges environmental 
security as central to social stability in the South (Butts and Turner 2004a, 
2004b), even as aid is increasingly used to serve donors' own security 
concerns (Woods 2005). Thus, and as the concept of environmental security 
demonstrates, there is a legacy of the 1990s 'green' decade - albeit, one that 
is subject to modification in an age where there is also a 'war on terror'. 
A second research interest relates to the possible implications of a recent 
return to the large-scale financing of infrastructure development aid 
projects. This new trend can be seen, for example, in the Connecting East 
Asia (CEA) initiative, which was launched in 2005 by the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 
and which has (re-)emphasised the key role of infrastructure in promoting 
economic growth, reducing poverty, and also generating so-called 'inclusive 
development' (ADB et al. 2005; JBIC 2005a). Yet, considering the relative 
unpopularity of mega-infrastructure projects among many donor agencies 
during the 1990s due to adverse social and environmental impacts as well as 
political protests, this sort of new initiative seems to suggest 
"institutional 
amnesia" on the part of some donors (Bosshard 2004: 
12). That said, and in 
light of this thesis, it would seem useful to ask whether there 
is something 
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different about these projects that reflect learning from previous ill-fated 
projects. For our purposes, the possible leading role of Japan in this 'revival' 
of interest in infrastructure development aid is also intriguing. After all, our 
findings suggested a keen ongoing Japanese interest here - even during the 
4green' decade of the 1990s. As Asian countries including China and India 
have been achieving rapid economic development, there is a greater need for 
infrastructure development to support this process (ADB et al. 2005; Asia 
2015 2006; Jones 2006; Nogami 2006). As Japanese corporations are 
increasingly investing in this region, they are appealing to their government 
to provide more financial support, notably via foreign aid to help improve 
the region's infrastructure and hence facilitate their business interests (JBIC 
2002d; METI 2002; MLIT 2005). Thus, Japan, through its own aid budget 
but also through its influence over the Asian Development Bank (dubbed by 
some critics as "Asian Dam and Bridges") is now seemingly spearheading 
this infrastructure drive (Tamura 2004). This potentially critical shift in aid 
flow merits as well academic attention. 
A third research interest suggested by the findings of this study relates to the 
under-emphasised importance of cultural politics and associated institutional 
dynamics in donor policies and practices that shape aid flow and impact. 
Indeed, qualitative research on different national aid 'cultures' is critical in 
understanding similarities and differences in donor behaviour (Mosse 2004; 
Rossi 2004). Thus, our aim here was to study the relatively neglected 
subject of Japan's bilateral international cooperation (kokusai-ky5ryoku) 
system in part in order to assess how Japan's differentiated interests and 
international approach (as distinct from other Northern donors) may have 
resulted in unique patterns of aid giving and management, especially in 
relation to possible greening trends. As this thesis demonstrated, such a 
culturally-based difference in the Japanese aid system - including the 
request-based approach (y5sei-shugi) and the emphasised self-help effort 
(iýyo-doryoku) - has certainly played a significant role in 
Japan's 
international cooperation. Such distinctive aid mechanisms notably resulted 
in significant Japanese corporate participation throughout the project cycle, 
reflecting their great influence over political 
leaders and aid bureaucrats in 
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both donor and recipient countries. Cultural difference also can be linked to 
the relatively greater emphasis on loans rather than grants in the aid system 
in keeping with Japanese self perception of successful national 
development. Still, further work on both the similarities and differences 
between donor aid cultures is need to further unpack and clarify national aid 
dynamics. 
A fourth research interest considers the possible comparative implications 
for aid delivery of the bureaucratic organisation and structure of a given 
donor's aid bureaucracy. Thus, the Japanese system represents a more 
intrinsically fragmented approach than, say, the American approach where 
USAID has a clear central role. Yet, and since no Japanese aid agency 
enjoys similar centrality, in part because of long-standing bureaucratic 
rivalries in Japan over power and resources, and in part due to the complex 
ODA-0017 mix of the aid system itself, there is a need for multi-agency 
involvement and negotiation, that is arguably not as pre-eminent elsewhere 
(DFID 2001; USAID 2006) Assessment here could thus potentially illustrate 
quite different bureaucratic configurations with variations in aid delivery 
and greening. Indeed, the current debates in Japan on the abolition of the 
JBIC certainly reflect the Japanese government's attempts to address this 
long standing issue of fragmentation. Thus, the Japanese government as part 
of Prime Minister Koizumi's reform initiative is considering to transfer the 
JBIC's ODA functions (providing yen-loans) to the JICA while OOF 
functions are privatised (Kyodo-tsushin 2005; The Japan Times 2005b, 
2005c). Such potential changes in Japan's international cooperation is an 
intriguing subject for investigation in itself, even as it reiterates the utility of 
a comparative understanding of donor bureaucratic organisation and 
behaviour. 
A final research interest links the findings of this thesis back to the research 
profile of political ecology itself Here, a case can be made for a greater 
emphasis in that field on 'the contextual sources of environmental change' 
as opposed to the local community centred studies that have tended to 
predominate so far (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant and Bailey 
1997; 
263 
Chapter Seven 
Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005) Such an emphasis clearly does not call for a 
move away from locally-based study, but rather its accompaniment by a 
series of works (as with this thesis on the possible greening of the Japanese 
aid system) that spotlight other key actors in depth. The result ought to be a 
more well-rounded political ecology. 
Indeed, it is hoped that this thesis, which has highlighted both the 
complexity and ambiguity involved in the 'greening' of Japanese aid in the 
1990s, using a Philippine case study, has made a contribution to that 
endeavour. It has done so, notably, by situating the interstate sources of 
environmental change in a context of global environmental concerns, 
institutional dynamics and international political economy so as to 
underscore the complex links between global/regional political economy 
processes on the one hand and aid-related envirom-nental change in the 
South on the other hand. 
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Guide Questions for Qualitative Interviews 
The following questions guided the qualitative interviews with various 
actors including Japanese aid agencies, national and international NGO 
workers in Japan and the Philippines, Japanese consulting companies, state 
officials and local community members in the Philippines. These questions 
were for general guidance only and tended to vary depending on the interview context and interviewee responses due to the political sensitivity 
of this research topic. 
Do you think Japan's international cooperation system is different 
from that of Western donors? If so, in what way is it different and how 
would you evaluate the difference? 
How different is the greening Japanese aid from that of Western 
donors? If so, could you please explain it? 
How would you define 'greening' in general in ten-ns of Japan's 
international cooperation? And what would be the most appropriate 
term to describe this trend in Japanese? Can you describe major 
characteristics of this greening? 
Since when (or a particular time or incident) do you think the green 
shift in Japanese aid started and what triggered this shift? 
In what way has this greening influenced your organisation (or vice 
versa)? 
Environmental guidelines were revised in the 1990s. What were the 
driving factors for the series of revisions? 
How has the sustainable development concept been incorporated into 
Japanese aid in terms of both policy and project? How do you translate 
it into Japanese? Have you noticed differences in aid practices since 
the arrival of this concept? If so, what were the major changes? 
What does environmental aid mean exactly in Japan's international 
cooperation? And how does the budget work? - for example, project 
category, funding criteria and interest rates in case of loans? 
Does environmental aid share the same problems with development 
aid? If so (or different), how so? 
How are brown and green issues categorised in Japanese aid? Are they 
under different or the same categories? Why are they categorised in 
that way? 
Do you think that the request-based approach has contributed to or 
otherwise reflected the recipient's participation in donor's decision 
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making? If so, can you give me concrete examples or explain your 
reasons to me? 
0 Were there particular reasons for the merger of OECF and JEXIM? 
Was there any change in terms of aid operation since the establishment 
of JBIC? How has this change influenced your work? 
Have consulting companies been a subject of greenIng? If so could 
you explain this to me with some concrete examples? 
How would you describe the relationship between consulting 
companies and Japanese aid agencies in general? 
Do consulting companies get specific requirements from the aid 
agencies in term of environmental consideration? 
Do consulting companies have their own environmental guideline? If 
so, do you have a department in charge of application of the 
guideline?, and what sort of concerns are most reflected at the stage of 
development study and project formation? 
San Roclue Multipurpose Pro*ect (SRMP) in Northern Luzon 
0 What have been the aims of this project? 
If any, in what way is the 1990s SRMP different from its 1980s 
version? 
In what ways are the 1997 NPC EIA and 1998 ECC different from the 
former 1980s version? 
How was JEXIM's environmental appraisal procedure performed on 
the San Roque Multipurpose Project? How was JEXIM's 
environmental checklist applied to the said project? 
What were the problems identified during project implementation? If 
any, in what way have JEXIW JBIC dealt with the problem(s)? 
Did those problems become worse once the dam construction started? 
If so could you explain in more detail? 
What are your biggest worries about this project? 
How have those concerns raised by local communities been dealt with 
by NPC? What was the solution to it? 
How was Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project 
first 
perceived by the different actors? 
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If any, what have been the problems encountered in carrying out the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project? Was there any 
concern by implementing agencies or the local community? If so, can 
you explain? 
How would you evaluate the JBIC field investigation team's activity? 
(or have you met them or heard about their activities? ) 
Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan 
Could you explain this project - why and how was this environmental 
aid project first conceived? 
How different is this environmental aid project from a standard 
development aid project - for example, financing, project criteria for 
environmental appraisal? 
Is a development study for environmental aid different from that for 
development project by design? If so, how different are they? What 
are the major differences? 
How has environmental appraisal been carried out? Has the Philippine 
side completed EIA and ECC issuance? 
How did Conservation International become first involved as a NGO 
with an aid project (SAPROF)? Who took the initiative for this 
project? Was there any difficulty and problem you (as the programme 
coordinator) had to tackle and solve? Was there any conflict between 
your goal (Conservation International's goal) and OECF's? If so, how 
did you manage to compromise? 
How do you think this process (Japanese and local NGO participation 
in an aid project) was initiated and then reinforced? Was there any 
event that triggered this process? 
How did the local community respond to the ECAN zoning 
component? Do they understand how it works? What do you think is 
most important for this particular project in order to maximise its 
effectiveness? 
What has your project component achieved so far? Is there any 
problem with implementation? 
What are your special measures to make this component 
environmentally friendly? 
0 What sort of development does this munIcipality need? 
0 What are the biggest environmental problems in this municipality? 
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Appendix 4. 
List of Formal Interviews 
Acosta, R. U. (2004) Tourism Officer Designate, El Nido Tourism Office, 
Municipality of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 20 May 
Alisuag, L. (2004) Attorney, Puerto Princesa, 7 May 
Anda, R. D. (2004) Palawan Programme Manager, Conservation 
International, Puerto Princesa City, 8 May 
Aratame, N. (2004) Professor at Faculty of International Development, 
Department of Development Cooperation Takushoku University, 
Manila, 15-23 March 
Arzaga, W. G. (2004) Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable 
Development Staff, Puerto Princesa, II May 
Bagasao, F. F. (2004) Executive Director, Community Organizers 
Multiversity, Manila, 15 March 
Balcos, M. (2004) Local Tourist Guide in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Puerto 
Princesa, 8 May 
Barangay Captain of Dalupirip (2004) Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, 
Itogon Municipality, Benguet Province, the Philippines, Barangay 
Dalupirip, 28 March 
Barangay San Nicholas Villagers (2004) 5 Barangay San Nicholas 
Villagers, San Nicholas, 25 March 
Barangay San Manuel Villagers (2004) 6 Barangay San Manuel Villagers, 
San Manuel, 24 -25 March 
Besitan, L. (2004) Ibaloi Person, Dalupirip, Benguet, the Philippines, 
Baguio and Dalupirip, 27-30 March 
Cabrido, C. A, (2004) Deputy Project Manager, ECAN Zoning Component, 
SEMP, Puerto Princesa, 7 May 
Capulet*, R. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Baguio, 31 March 
Carling, J. (2004) Chairperson, Cordillera People's Alliance, Baguio, 17-18, 
31 March 
Chan, F. C. (2004) JBIC SEMP Project Officer, Manila, 13 April 
Corral, L. (2004) Vice Mayor, Municipality of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 
21 May 
Coruifta, D. V. (2004) DOT-PMO Project Coordinator, SEMP Project 
Management and Tourism Development Component, Manila, 25 
May 
De La Calzada, R. J. M. (2004) Conservation Officer, WWF Philippines, El 
Nido, 21 May 
De La Cruz, N. B. (2004) Interview SRMP and IIWMP, Cordillera 
Administrative Region Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences 
Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 31 
March 
De Quiros, T. (2004) Consultant, Department of Agriculture, March - May 
De Vere Moss, P. (2004) European Co-Director, Palawan Tropical Forestry 
Protection Programme, Puerto Princesa, II May 
Densula, M. M. (2004) Technical Assistant and Researcher, El Nido Office, 
SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, 
El Nido, 18-22 May 
Distal, J. (2004) Owner of El Nido Boutique, Local Tourism Operator in El 
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Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 18 May 
Doton, J. (2004) Leader of Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway t' Agno (TIMMAWA), San Nicholas, 24 March 
Dygico, M. P. (2004) Project Manager, Tubbataha Project, WWF Palawan, 
Puerto Princesa, 12 May 
Fianza, G. S. (2004) Engineer, Itogon Integrated Watershed Management 
Program Office, Itogon, 29 March 
Fujimoto, N. (2004) Researcher, Programme Section, Asia-Pacific Human 
Rights Infori-nation Centre, Osaka, 25 February 
Gacot-Lim, E. (2004) Municipal Mayor of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 21 
May 
Gapuz, A. (2004) Dalupirip Interview, 27 March 
Hatae, H. (2003-2004) Development Finance and Environment Programme 
Staff, Friends of the Earth Japan, Tokyo and Manila, November 
2003 - April 2004 
Hatake*, K. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo, February 
Hayashi, K. (2004) Director General, Sector Strategy Development 
Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 5 February 
Higa, 1. (2006) Programme Officer, Environment and Social Consideratoin 
Review Team, Office of Gender Equality and Environment and 
Social Considerations Review Planning and Coordination 
Department, JICA, 8 June 
Hiler, A. (2004) Project Manager, Soil Erosion Protection Component, 
SEMP, 20 May 
Hillel, 0. (2004) Team Leader, SEMP Project Management and Tourism 
Development Component, Puerto Princesa, II May 
Hirai, A. (2003 - 2004) Researcher at Ferris University (A Former JICA 
Employee), Tokyo, November 2003- February 2004 
Hori, M. (2003) Deputy Managing Director, Forestry and Natural 
Environment Department, JICA, Tokyo, 12 November 
Ishida, K. (2004) Staff, Japan Centre for a Sustainable Environment and 
Society, Tokyo, 18 February 
Itogon Municipal Mayor (2004) Itogon Municipal Mayor, 28 March 
Itoh, T. (2004) Evaluation Specialist/ Financial Economist, Evaluation 
Division 2, Operations Evaluation Department, Asian Development 
Bank, Manila, 29 April and 6 May 
JBIC (2004h) JBIC Environmental Analysis Department, Development 
Assistance Department I (Philippines and Oceania Countries), Public 
Relations Office (Public Information and Disclosure Division), 
Tokyo, 21 January 
Kadowaki, D. (2004) Engineer, Deputy Director (Forestry), Division 3, 
Sector Strategy Development Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 5 February 
Kim, S. (2002) Professor at Faculty of Law and Political Science, Jeon-Ju 
University, South Korea, London, 15 June 
Kimura*, T. (2003) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo, November 
Kitazawa, Y. (2006) Planning Division, Development Assitance Strategy 
Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 6 June 
Kojima, T. (2004) Programme Officer, Global Issues Division, Planning and 
Evaluation Department, JICA, Tokyo, 16 January 
Kume, T. (2004) Project Manager, SEMP ECAN Zoning Component 
(Consultant, Department of Development Planning, Pacific 
Consultants International), Tokyo, 12 February 
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Kurita, H. (2004b) Associate Professor at Department of Comprehensive 
Policy Making, Faculty of Law and Letters, Ehime University., 
Baguio, March and April 
Kusanagi*, T. (2004) Anonymous Interview, March 
Laririt, M. 1. (2004) Manager, El Nido Resorts, Ten Knots Development 
Corporation, Palawan, El Nido, 21 May 
Maeda, T. (2004) Deputy Director General (Europe, Middle East and 
Africa) International Finance Department 11,10 February 
Magubat, J. E. (2004) Project Engineer, SEMP Soil Erosion Protection 
Component, El Nido, 20 May 
Marcus, R. (2004) Corporate Communications, Quality Management 
Division, Pacific Consultants International, Tokyo, 12 February 
Matsumoto, 1. (2003) Programme Director, Development Finance and 
Environment, Friends of the Earth Japan, Tokyo and Manila, 
November 2003 
Matsumoto, S. (2004) Director, Mekong Watch Japan, Tokyo, 3 February 
Matulac, J. L. S. (2004) Department Director, Project Operations & 
Implementation Department, Palawan Council for Sustainable 
Development Staff, Puerto Princesa, 7 May 
Miclat, S. S. (2004) Senior Planning Manager, Environmental Science for 
Social Change (ESSC), Manila, 5 May 
Miyako*, H. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Manila 
Mooy, N. (2004) Ibaloi Person, Tabu, Benguet, the Philippines, Baguio and 
Tabu, 26-27 March 
Mori*, Y. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo 
Municipal Agriculturalist of Barangay San Manuel (2004) Municipal 
Agriculturalist, San Manuel, 24 March 
Murai, Y. (2003-2004) Professor at Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia 
University, Tokyo, November 2003- February 2004 
Nagayama, K. (2004) Director, Resources Development and Management 
Division, Pacific Consultants International, Tokyo, 12 February 
Nakajima, K. (2006) Loan Officer, Division 2, International Finance 
Department 1, JBIC, 6 June 
Ogawa, N. (2004) Senior Advisor, Office of the Vice President, Asian 
Development Bank, 6 May 
Ondrik, R. (2004) Chief Country Officer, Philippines Country Office, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila, 6 May 
Otadoy, F. P. (2004) Director, Department of Public Works and Highways, 
SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component, Manila, 24 May 
Pablico, P. E. R. (2004) Senior Research Analyst, SEMP Project 
Management and Tourism Development Component, Coron Office, 
Coron, 14-17 May 
Peifta, R. E. (2004) DENR Interview, Regional Director, Mines and 
Geoscinces Bureau, Department of Environmental and Natural 
Resources, April - May 
Plantilla, A. E. (2004) Executive Director, Haribon Foundation, 30 April 
Rabe, G. R. (2004) Technical Assistant and Researcher, SEMP Project 
Management and Tourism Development Component, Coron Office, 
Coron, 14-17 May 
Reyes, V. C. (2004) Project Manager, WWF Palawan, Puerto Princesa, 12 
May 
Rimban, L. (2004) Broadcast Director, the Philippine Center for 
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Investigative Journalism, 12 April 
Roces*, S. (2004) Anonymous Interview 
Sariego, M. P. (2004) Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, 
Municipality of Busuanga, Palawan, Busuwanga, 17 May 
Suzuki, H. (2006) Advisor, Development Assistance Department 1, JBIC, 6 
June 
Takahashi, F. (2004) Manager of Corporate Planning Team, General Affairs 
Department, Kansai Environmental Engineering Center Co. Ltd. (a 
predecessor of The General Environmental Technos, Co. Ltd. ) 25 
February 
Takayanagi, A. (2003) Professor at Faculty of Global and Inter-cultural 
Studies, Ferris University, Yokohama, Yokohama, 9 December 
Tamondong, S. D. (2004) Evaluation Specialist, Division 1, Operation 
Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 26 April 
Tamura, Y. (2004) Advisor to the President, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, 6 May 
Tanaka, S. (2004) Senior Poverty Reduction Specialist, Poverty Reduction 
and Social Development Division, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, 26 April 
Tobias, F. 0. (2004) Manager, Planning and Management Division, DENR- 
CAR, Baguio, 30 March 
Tsuda, M. (2004) Professor at Department of Philippine Studies, Graduate 
School of Integrated Studies in Language and Society, Osaka 
University of Foreign Studies, Osaka, 20 February 
Tsuj i, M. (2004) Environmental Specialist, Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Division, Regional and Sustainable Development 
Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 6 May 
Usuil K. (2004) Associate Expert, Global Issues Division, Planning and 
Evaluation Department, JICA, Tokyo, 4 February 
Valdez, T. (2004) Environmental and Social Development Manager, San 
Roque and Manila, 25 March and 24 May 
Yamamoto., A. (2002) Resident Representative, JICA, UK Office, London, 
17 October 
Yamashita, K. (2003) Coordinator Japan Programme, Conservation 
International Japan, Tokyo, 20 November 
Yokoyama, M. (2003-2004) Professor at Faculty of Global and Inter- 
cultural Studies, Ferris University, Yokohama, November 2003- 
March 2004 
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